

Analyzing Objectivistic Interpretation Of Sartrean Ethics

Sushain Raina¹

¹Research Scholar, School of Philosophy and Culture, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University, Jammu and Kashmir, India
Email: ¹sushain18dec@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

This paper deals with the objectivistic interpretation of Sartrean ethics. The objectivistic interpretation is grounded in promotion of common freedom and fulfillment of common human needs emphasized by Sartre's in his major works such as *Existentialism Is a Humanism* (2007, hereafter EH), *Notebooks for an Ethics* (1992, hereafter NE), *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960, hereafter CDR) and *Rome Lectures* (hereafter RL, 1964).

In EH, the promotion of common freedom is recognized through the interdependency of freedoms of human beings. Freedom that one chooses as the primary value is not only one's own freedom but also the freedom of other individuals. Moreover, Sartre's description of the city of ends in NE, where every individual treats other individual as an end enhance collective freedom of all individuals and thus reflects Sartre's objectivistic moral view.

Similarly, Sartre's objectivistic moral thought can also be recognized in CDR and RL. The central objective of Sartre's socialistic and concrete ethics, as proposed in CDR and RL, is to attain human fulfillment. By human fulfillment Sartre means the satisfaction of common human needs. The concept of material needs is central to the objectivistic interpretation. This paper attempts to develop an objectivistic interpretation of Sartrean ethics by analyzing Sartre's views regarding human fulfillment, material needs, city of ends and enhancement of collective freedom in his above mentioned significant works.

Keywords

Sartre; objectivistic; human fulfillment; material needs

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Introduction

The present paper intends to explore an objectivistic interpretation of Sartrean ethics. The objectivistic interpretation (of Sartrean ethics) is based upon the enhancement of collective freedom discussed in EH and NE and fulfillment of human needs emphasized in CDR and RL. In EH, the enhancement of common freedom is observed through Sartre's concept of the interdependency of freedom of all individuals on each other. Freedom that one chooses as the primary value is not only one's own freedom but also the freedom of other individuals. Sartre considers this sense of freedom as an obligation on the part of any normal moral agent. He says, "I am obliged to will the freedom of others at the same time as mine" because "in willing freedom, we discover that it depends entirely on the freedom of others and that the freedom of others depends on our own" (Sartre, 2007, p. 48-49).

The promotion of common freedom can also be observed in NE through Sartre's description of the city of ends in which every individual treats other individual as an end. The city of ends represents and promotes a socialist and classless society "where freedom is valued as such and willed as such" (Sartre, 1992, p. 418). The main thrust of NE is the proposal that one must choose freedom as a primary goal and value. Moreover, the discussion of notions of generosity and authentic love reflects one's willingness to promote the freedom of other individuals. This approach prepares the necessary framework for an objectivistic interpretation of the ethical ideas of Sartre.

Similarly, one can find the objectivistic orientation in CDR and RL. The central objective of Sartre's dialectical, objectivistic, socialistic and concrete ethics, as proposed in

CDR and RL, is to attain human fulfillment. By human fulfillment Sartre means the satisfaction of human needs. The status of these needs is independent of human freedom and they objectively exist in the external world demanding their satisfaction. Therefore, the needs form the roots of values. Since the needs have an objective status, the values which emanate from them also acquire an objective status. Values, for Sartre, have an 'assigned', 'imposed' and 'given' character.

After the elaboration of the objectivistic themes in EH, NE CDR and RL, the effort will be made to trace the limitation of objectivistic interpretation of Sartrean ethics. However, in order to comprehend the objectivistic interpretation of Sartrean ethics, it is necessary to discuss the notion of moral objectivism. According to this theory, the ethical judgments must confirm to an independent moral reality. These judgments are universal in nature. They are not conflicting as the relative judgments. It suggests that moral truths have an independent status and are immune to the contingency of subjective beliefs, opinions, emotions, and so on. The first section of the paper therefore, discusses the notion of moral objectivism.

Moral Objectivism

Moral objectivism advocates that there are certain objective universal moral judgments that guide one's behavior and action. The objective moral judgments are those judgments which can be demonstrated as true by referring to historical experiences of human beings and the study of facts which can be understood by any person of reason. Consider for example the act of generosity by a rich and a poor person. No doubt that there is going to be a difference in how much

charity is given by both of them. People belonging to elite class can afford to donate more as compared to those who belong to poor families. Despite a difference, the moral judgment “one ought to act generously” is applicable to all human beings irrespective of their class, conditions or circumstances. Because, the moral judgment “one ought to act generously” does not involve any specification or variation. It is a general statement and universally applicable to all individuals.

One may raise an objection as to why one should require following these moral judgments? And, why these moral virtues are universal and binding in nature? The answer to these objections is that one has freely chosen to live a human life, i.e. a life in accordance with human values. So, if one has made a commitment to live human life, then he must be committed to requirements of this kind of life. One should follow certain principles and values that are required to live a human form of life. For instance, if a person chooses some profession, then he is bound to follow the codes of that profession. Likewise, if one has chosen to live a human life, then he has to follow the basic principles to live a human life. Similarly, the persons who are doing jobs in the corporate sector are bound to follow the norms and principles of corporate sector. On the other hand, those who are not part of the corporate world, they are not bounded by those norms and principles.

Moral judgments guide how one ought to act and in what ways human organizations or institutions ought to be established and operated. Answer to the questions how one ought to live and how one's institution ought to run is a general and all pervasive requirement. Moreover, if one is to condemn other's actions or judgments regarding some moral facts, it is carried out in terms of moral judgment. Whether a judgment is morally right or wrong, it is said in terms of moral judgments. For example, the judgment ‘One must not think that moral judgments are objective’ is itself a moral judgment. Those who believe in these judgments such as relativists or subjectivists considered such kind of judgments as true in nature. However, such assertions do not fulfill the condition that establishes the objectivity of moral judgment. It implies that one must be able to attain the knowledge of (the rightness and wrongness) moral judgments and their demonstration in the same way as the factual judgments are seen in the sciences. The objectivity of moral judgments assists one to get out of the influence self referential system that is fraught with relativistic difficulties.

Machan (2008) claims that one significant way through which the objectivity of morality could be established is to develop an appealing and naturalistic conception of human good and formulation of different methods of conduct through which human good is sustained and promoted. If these various methods of promoting the human good are established, then one could be able to defend the objectivity of morality. But in establishing the objectivity of moral judgment, one does not claim their universal applicability except where the similar situations are found. For instance, if one chooses to become a basketball player then it does not necessarily imply that other person must also choose to become a basketball player. It does not make any sense in moral context to universalize one's subjective choices, desires, and wishes to all human beings. However, there are some fundamental moral judgments that are universally

applicable to all moral agents. Objective judgments in general sense means those judgments that are substantiated by the facts that themselves are independent of human wishes, desires, and beliefs.

The principles of morality are objective in the same sense as the rules of a game or sports are common for all the players. These principles are conditional but not contingent or relative in nature. For instance, if a man wants to live a good human life, then he must be honest. This statement is conditional and objective in nature, but it is not contingent as it does not depend upon one's social conditions and circumstance. It is applicable to all human beings who want to live good human life irrespective of their circumstances. The moral values are objective not in the sense that they are ipso facto given. They are agent-relative in that they originate from the human mind only. Morality is only applicable to human beings, once they start living their life in accordance with certain principles; the moral values assume a form of objective facts. However, the objectivity of these values lies in their general applicability and internal obligation than in any constraint on the freedom of choice, one is still free to regard or disregard these facts, unlike the facts of material reality. With this general understanding of the objectivity of moral values, it is pertinent to see how Sartre's moral ideas represent moral values as objective.

Objectivistic themes in *Existentialism Is a Humanism*

In *EH*, Sartre observes that one is obliged to will the freedom of other person while willing his own: “I am obliged to will the freedom of other at the same time as mine” (Sartre, 2007, p. 52). This claim, on the one hand, maintains the freedom of choice of an individual, on the other hand, it does not allow the individual to have arbitrary choices. When a person chooses the kind of person he or she wants to be, he or she sets precedence for others and this responsibility is unavoidable for a rational being. The reason that Sartre offers for universalizing a choice is that “In effect there is not one of our acts that in creating the man whom we wish to be, does not create at the same time an image of man such as we judge he ought to be” (Sartre, 2007, p. 29). He or she thus chooses an ideal and sets an image for other persons what they ought to be. This is however not a Kantian type of universalization, the test one must qualify to make a choice rational. Sartre emphasizes on the term image that one creates through one's choices and the anxiety one undergoes in thinking what the affairs would be like if the others were to make the same choice in a similar moral situation. One's choice thus becomes entitlement for others. In this sense, one is objectively related to others in the context of promotion of common freedom.

Moreover, when one considers freedom as primary value, one is obliged to let others consider their freedom as primary value. In a moral context, freedom is primary value and all other values emanate from it. If one's freedom is the source of one's all values, then the other's freedom is also the source of their values. In choosing a certain course of action, a person creates an ideal for other person. Thus, in choosing freedom as primary value, one creates an image, which intends that other individuals should also choose freedom as their primary value (Anderson, 1993). This feeling obliges one to value other's freedom more than one's

own. There is a necessary connection between other's recognition of their freedom as supreme and one's recognition of others freedom as valuable. This necessary connection is profitably explained by Linda A Bell with the help of the relationship between choosing and acting. She says that if one wills that other should choose freedom as their value, then one must also will that others should act according to their value they have chosen. Moreover, if one wills that others should act according to their choice then one must also will that they have their freedom to act upon their choice. This means that one wills that they should not be oppressed. Furthermore, she adds that to value is to act, which means that one must act against others oppression. It is however not a matter of not interfering oneself and not allowing others to interfere in the freedom of other persons. Instead, one must positively act to boost and increase the freedom of oneself as well as of others to achieve the city of the ends (Anderson, 1993).

Sartre argues that to will or choose the freedom of oneself or others is to recognize willingly that one and others are structurally free and can make free choices. It also shows that one and others are being-for-themselves, not the things completely limited by processes and forces. Another reason for why one should value the freedom of other person is largely neglected by many people. Sartre here talks about the interdependency of the human freedoms. When one chooses one's freedom, one finds that his or her freedom is in some sense linked to the freedom of others and similarly others freedom is also linked to one's own freedom. By definition, freedom is contrary to dependence; however when it comes to the interaction between individuals, a mutual dependence is observed. It is therefore inevitable that in choosing one's own freedom one chooses the freedom of others. As Sartre says,

In willing freedom, we discover that it depends upon the freedom of others and that the freedom of others depends on our own. Obviously, freedom as the definition of man does not depend upon others, but as soon as there is engagement I am obliged to will the freedom of others at the same time as mine (Sartre, 2007, p. 51-52).

Such dependency is the dependency of socio-political and psychological kind. Sartre recognizes that, in a social structure, one's freedom is dependent upon the other and others freedom is dependent upon oneself. The goals that are available to one's free choice and freedom to attain those goals are heavily dependent upon other's will and freedom. But this does not mean that one is compelled to will the freedom of other or depend upon others freedom. It is also a fact that the other person is more powerful to restrict someone's freedom and use him or her to satisfy the personal interests. In that case, it does not mean that the interdependency is hindered, but on the contrary, it is acknowledged. In this way, one's dependency for freedom is not restrictive for others. Willing or choosing others freedom does not mean to restrict or increase it. Rather, it is a mutual acknowledgement or affirmation of the fact of freedom.

The above acknowledgement is significant in one more way. One wills other's freedom because he or she wants other should also will his or her freedom. What kind of willing is this? In response, it can be said that one needs or wants others to acknowledge his or her freedom and do not

interfere. Nevertheless, it is not the whole story. One needs the favor of others to achieve the goal of freely chosen values. Without mutual assistance, one cannot achieve this goal. So this willing and dependency according to Sartre means that both oneself and other actively engage and promote the freedom of each other. That is what Sartre means when he says that "I am obliged to will the freedom of others at the same time as mine".

Sartre claims that one cannot accept any truth about oneself without a confirmation by the other. He asserts, "I cannot accept any truth whatsoever except without the mediation of another" (Sartre, 2007, p. 45). This assertion is contrary to the earlier statements. In *BN*, he says that one is pre-reflectively aware of oneself and one's freedom and nobody can destroy or assist in his or her freedom. But by the end of *BN*, he also remarks that an existentialist psychoanalyst can enhance and promote one's self awareness and self-knowledge.

Later in *NE*, Sartre affirms that one is mystified by others actions. One is made by the other in that one's awareness can be influenced and modified by others to seek their personal ends. Sartre considers the example of children who are not aware that for all their freedom they are heavily dependent upon the adults. If others always hinder or restrict one's self-awareness, it would be impossible that the other help a person in feeling of freedom. To further illustrate this point, one may consider the protagonist Saint Genet, a character in one of the literary works of Sartre with the same title, who is labeled as thief from his early childhood by the society and he is unable to realize his identity as other than thief. He lacks self-awareness. Contrary to this, if he were given a favorable and friendly environment from his early childhood, he would have been aware of his true character and role in the society. *Saint Genet* was written four or five years after the *NE* and its insights can be found in the earlier ethics. Despite repeated claims in *NE* that a human being is pre-reflectively aware of freedom, at some places Sartre recognizes that in some situations human beings are not always aware of their freedom and their self-awareness is dependent upon others to some extent.

This kind of psychological dependency that Sartre talks about in *EH* is similar to the statement made in another work "Materialism and Revolution". In this work, he states that one's freedom can only be confirmed by the recognition of other's freedom. He says, one's "freedom can be asserted only by the recognition bestowed upon it by others freedom" (*MR*, 225). But here Sartre does not clarify or elaborate the meaning of the term *recognition*. Anderson says that there can be two meanings of the term *recognition*. First, recognition of freedom means awareness that others are not things but human beings with certain goals and possibilities and with some project of their life. Second, to recognize someone as free is to see that he or she has free choices and has chosen his or her project for life not under undue influence of the psychological and environmental factors.

In the above sense, one can say that a slave recognizes his master as free human being in his context. First, he recognizes his master as a free individual who has certain goals to achieve in his life, and second, the slave recognizes that the master has freely chosen to enslave him because he has free choices not determined by any socio-political or economic conditions. Therefore the term recognition is

simply used here to mean, to acknowledge, be aware, or identify. Thus, slave acknowledges, understands, and is aware of the fact that the master is not limited but a free human being who has oppressed him and limits his opportunities.

There is also a more substantial meaning of the recognition that involves a positive appraising context. This could be the third sense of recognition to value the freedom of others. This means that when the oppressed people demand their recognition, they just do not want that other should be aware or understand that they are not limited but free beings. In addition to this, they actually want that they should be treated equally and their dignity must be valued. This kind of recognition of one's freedom demands that it should be affirmed and valued by others. The psychological dependency thus means that if other would not recognize the value of one's freedom, then one is not able to recognize the value of one's freedom.

Sartre holds that to have a meaningful and valuable freedom, one needs positive evaluation of others, that is, a positive recognition by others. The evaluative kind of recognition is necessary because value and meaning of the freedom depends upon the free individuals. Although every individual can ascribe value to the freely chosen projects and freedom of others, the others also recognize and value his or her freedom. This way it will "enrich" an individual to affirm and value his or her freedom. This implies one should recognize or value the freedom, because it is the source of one's valuation or recognition of freedom in others. If one does not recognize or value the freedom of other and the other still recognizes or gives positive valuation to one's freedom, then it will be an imbalanced recognition. Similarly, if one oppresses or limits the freedom of others, one would not be able to elicit recognition from others regarding one's own freedom.

Another significant point that Sartre makes in the context of recognition is that one's freedom is valuable and having worth only if other persons are not recognizing or valuing it under any pressure or forcible conditions. If they are forced to value one's freedom, then it is regarded as worthless. For instance, if a slave recognizes the freedom of his master, then this recognition would have a restricted sense of freedom since the slave is already constrained by his master. Such recognition of freedom of the master by a slave is of no value. However, if a person were of equal status of the master, then the recognition would be valuable as the recognizing person is not enslaved in evaluation. Moreover, Sartre believes that seeking recognition from the children and an adult having the personality of a child is also worthless. But seeking recognition from a mature adult have a value and meaning. Similarly, recognition obtained from those with restricted freedom such as those suffering from poverty, illness, oppression and ignorance is also of no value for oneself as compared to the persons who are physically well, not oppressed having good status in the society. If one wants complete recognition of one's freedom from those who are oppressed socially and economically, one needs to assist them and enhance their freedom in order to seek complete sense of recognition or positive valuation of one's freedom devoid of any psychological or economical dependency on the part of other persons. This way, Sartre

says, we can achieve the city of ends where each individual would freely recognize each other's freedom.

Sartre's above argument from interdependency shows that one is not obliged to choose to value the freedom of those whose freedom and subjectivity one can never touch. So one is not obliged to will the freedom of those who are barely linked to oneself. At first sight, the above argument seems to be based upon the personal interest of an individual. Why should one choose to promote or value the freedom of those who are deprived socially and economically as one could expect little or nothing from the other side? This is a non-question for Sartre since believes in the city of ends where one is not supposed to use other as means or exploit others to achieve selfish ends. Promotion and recognition should be values equally form the both sides and it will only be possible when all individuals consider each other as ends in themselves. This leads to a question related to the ontological beliefs about human reality.

Objectivism in Ethical themes elaborated in *Notebooks*

Sartre in *NE* asserts if one wants to live an authentic life one must objectify his existential condition. The ideal of authenticity demands that human *condition* has essence in the objectification. Sartre says that human condition "can and must in authenticity assume the objective transformation of itself and its metamorphosis into destiny" (Sartre, 1992, p.418). The authenticity demands that one should willingly offer one's objective transformation including the acts, and the gifts to the other. Sartre even says that if every individual becomes each other's object, then there would be no problem. The objective transformation of one's acts means the acts have a troubling objectivity, because they are turned into an object by the recognition of other individuals or others consciousnesses. By turning one act as into an object, the others also are turned into object since they are related to it. Sartre remarks that "[m]y act has a troubling objectivity only because it is taken up by consciousnesses which make of it [only] an object and that makes themselves an object in relation to it" (Sartre, 1992, p.10).

Sartre says that the objectification by other is not a degradation or threat to one's existence and freedom. Such degradation or threat becomes possible when other individuals refuse to recognize someone as free existing individual. But if others recognize his/her free existence and also accept as an object, then they will enrich his/her existence and also the world. They also ascribe meaning to someone's existence in addition to the meaning the person gives to his/her own existence. Sartre says,

"It only becomes so if Other refuses to see a freedom in me too. But if, on the contrary, he makes me exist as an existing freedom as well as a Being/ object... he enriches the world and me, he gives a meaning to my existence *in addition* to the subjective meaning that I myself give to it" (Sartre, 1992, p.500).

This mutual recognition and enrichment of each other's existence find its place in the city of ends, where each individual willingly offers value and meaning to their freedom. Such proposal is certainly in need of a better formulation (we propose Moral Objective Relativism) where each individual is transforming his/her subjectivity into objectivity for others, making one's subjectivity as an object

for others. In this war, one's and other's subjectivity are objectively related to each other and enriching it.

This understanding of human relation is found in *NE*, which is different from the proposal of *BN*, where emphasis is given only on the subject/object relations. But *NE* conceives human relations in terms freely existing individual as well as objects also. Sartre accepts that this transformation of his earlier limited views is made through the conversion in to the new ideas about human relations. The new views are of "reciprocal recognition" or "reciprocal comprehension" of each other's freedom which was lacking before conversion in the earlier ideas about human relations in *BN* (Sartre, 1992, p. 414).

The recognition or comprehension that was discussed in *BN*, is contrary to the recognition or comprehension explained in the *NE*. The recognition and knowledge of Other in *BN* is alienating. As the infamous Look of other constrained one's freedom and turn oneself into an object, whereas in *NE*, one's recognition of other means to promote the freedom and assist the person generously so as to enable him/her towards the goals of life. Therefore, in reciprocal recognition, there is not an inactive reflection or observation of others freedom and goals keeping one at distance from others. Rather it is an active engagement of one's subjectivity with that of others in an objective relation to help them to achieve their goals. "I outline", Sartre says, "my adopting [the other's] end" (Sartre, 1992, p. 227). One can freely participate in the projects of other and promote their freedom. A generous recognition of other's freely chosen project does not mean that one chooses to accomplish someone else's projects. Whereas sympathetic recognition means that one should generously recognize the freely chosen projects by others, at the same time must be willing to accomplish it realizing as if one's own. Thus a person becomes an instrument of objectivity for others to accomplish their goals.

This type of mutual engagement, reciprocal recognition and mutual accomplishment of each other goals depicts objectivism which was lacking in the *BN*. There is unity between persons in the *NE* that was missing in the *BN*. But Sartre explains that this type of unity is not an ontological fusion individual in to some super individual kind of reality. Rather it is a, "certain kind of interpretations of freedoms (Sartre, 1992, p. 290), where, "each freedom is wholly in the other one" (Sartre, 1992, p.288). Sartre asserts that these kinds of relations take place in authentic love and friendship. There is a unity in diversity and similarity as all individual value and willingly promote each other's freedom. This unity replaces otherness and differences, and separation. Sartre says that "otherness is replaced by unity, even though optically, otherness always remains" (Sartre, 1992, p.49). That is why one's subjectivity is maintained as separate. This unity takes place only on the level of will and action, not on the level being. This unity makes possible the generous comprehension of others free projects without constraining their freedom. Whatever objectification occurs is not the form of oppression or degradation of one's freedom because the objectification is made by the familiar person, not by the unknown, who can degrade one's freedom. It is the objectification offered by the person who sympathetically recognizes one's free projects and willingly accomplishes the goals. In this sense one person is

objectively related to another in sympathetic or generous manner.

Tracing objectivism in *CDR* and *RL*.

The description of human condition and freedom in Sartre's objectivistic, socialistic and dialectical ethics formulated in *RL* is more concrete and real. It is realistic because it emphasizes on the concrete dialectical relation between man and his social environment. It highlights the casual relation and interaction between both of them. The conception of human reality in *CDR* is not limited to human freedom. Rather it represents human being as a material organism with specific material needs. For this reason, Sartre declares his understanding of human reality in *Critique* as 'monism of materiality' or 'realistic materialism'. This position reflects that human consciousness is not absolute and conditioned in nature, rather it is deeply rooted in the material organism. For this reason, Sartre calls man 'wholly matter'. He states that, an individual is composed of similar atoms and molecules like other material objects. He holds that like other material organism, the human being is also subject to destruction and disintegration. Moreover, Sartre asserts that the basis of dialectical relation between human being and his social world is the satisfaction of his material needs. In order to fulfill these needs, an individual acts upon his social environment and dialectically conditioned by it (Anderson, 2013).

Despite the conditioning of human freedom by material needs, Sartre asserts that human consciousness has the power to 'negate', 'deny' and 'wrench itself' from the given situation. However, such material needs affect one's freedom to a great extent (Anderson, 2013). One's freedom is exercised to fulfill these needs. Sartre in his later ethics asserts that human reality is not only confined to human freedom but it extends to human fulfillment. This human fulfillment involves the satisfaction of human needs. However, Sartre maintains that human freedom is central and fundamental to human needs, but he also holds that there are other needs as well which are necessary for integral humanity or human fulfillment. For instance, Sartre emphasizes on the physical needs that should be satisfied to have good physical growth and health. He stresses on the need of love and affection of other individuals. He lays importance on the need for education, culture and meaningful life which make one as civilized human being (Anderson, 1993).

Sartre emphasizes on the role of human freedom in the fulfillment of all these needs. He argues that one does not only desire to have good physical health but the freedom to choose the kind of appropriate mean through which he can have a good health. One does not merely desire for knowledge, but the freedom to acquire that knowledge. One does not only want a culture but the freedom to create his own culture. One does not only desire the relations with others, but also freedom to choose and create one's own relations. It is therefore in the exercising of one's freedom to satisfy these concrete material needs of everyday life that one's freedom is defined and limited by these needs. In this sense, the conception of human reality and freedom is more concrete and real in the second ethics as compared to the first ethics (Anderson, 1993).

After the discussion of conception of human reality and its relation to the world in later ethics, it is necessary to explore the respective source of values of earlier and later ethics. The reason being, ethics is ultimately concerned with the values. In the context of earlier ethics, the ultimate source of human values is human being or human freedom. Since it is an individual's freedom from where all the values emancipate, therefore Sartre denies the existence of any such objective system of morality that governs and evaluates one's choices and actions (Anderson, 2013). Regarding the nature and status of the values, Sartre defines them as lacks, imperatives, norms, necessities and so on. These values are felt as lacks and necessities because they are not present in the world. Rather, they are beyond being as a kind of non-being. These are experienced as necessities, imperatives and norms because they urge or prompt one to actualize them through one's concrete actions. Only human freedom has the power to bring them to level of being. The reason being, that the values are beyond the being and only human freedom has the capacity to transcend the given and reach to the sphere of non-being. It is therefore, human being is only a kind of being who can bring the values to the level of being (Anderson, 2013).

Similar to the earlier ethics, Sartre, in his later moral thought, also assigns human values the status of lacks, imperatives, exigencies and so on. But these values do not originate from the human freedom, rather their source lies in human need. These values, Sartre asserts are 'assigned', 'imposed' and 'given' to the individual to actualize and follow them. They demand their satisfaction. Since these values are derived from the needs, therefore they cannot be governed by human freedom. Of course, Sartre affirms that human freedom is the fundamental need, but Sartre also talks about other needs (need for food, health, education, love) which are satisfied by the objects which exist in the external world. In this sense these objects which satisfy these needs are considered as valuable. Since these objects have objective existence therefore values ascribed to them have also an objective status. One cannot freely choose these needs because human beings are born with specific kinds of needs which they have to fulfill. These needs are not governed and controlled by one's freedom. Anderson (2013) holds that by grounding the human values in the human needs, Sartre's second dialectical ethics assigns an objective status to the human values. He holds that these values are not affected by human freedom. The basic material needs have valuable for one's survival whether one regards them valuable or not. Since one feels their need as inevitable for one's growth and development, therefore one considers them valuable.

However, Catalano (1996) argues that these needs have subjective origination. He remarks that one's biological needs such as for food are humanly constituted. Sartre writes, "Everything is to be explained through *need*; need is the first totalizing relation between the material being, man and material ensemble of which he is a part" (Catalano, 1996, p.53). He holds that need is totalizing relation which means that it has its origin in free project of an individual or a group. The need for food is only felt and satisfied on the human level. The need for money is to buy that food. Therefore, this need for food is only felt at the individual

level and cultivated in his social, cultural and economic environment.

Limitations

The Objectivist interpretation of Sartrean ethics defends Sartrean ethics against the charge of subjectivism by emphasizing the promotion of common freedom in *EH* and *NE* and human fulfillment in *CDR* and *RL*. By setting the promotion of common freedom and human fulfillment as objective value and ideal, the objectivistic interpretation promotes inter-subjective relations based on the mutual recognition. But it does not recognize a compatible view of relativism and objectivism which attempts to reconcile the relativistic and objectivistic themes in context of Sartre's early and moral thought by considering his significant works such as *BN*, *NE*, *EH*, *CDR*, and *RL*.

Concluding Remarks

In this paper, the objectivistic interpretation of Sartrean ethics has been discussed by considering the objectivistic themes in Sartre's significant works such as *EH*, *NE*, *CDR*, and *RL*. In *EH*, the objectivistic themes are reflected in one's moral obligation to will the freedom of others. In *NE*, the objectivistic interpretation is recognized in Sartre's concepts of generosity and authentic love which promotes the common freedom of all individuals. In *CDR* and *RL*, the objectivism is observed in promotion of human fulfillment or integral humanity. However, there are certain limitations of this interpretation. It does not emphasize the compatible view of relativism and objectivism in Sartre's early and later moral thought. It lacks an approach to reconcile the relativistic and objectivistic viewpoints of Sartrean ethics.

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