

# Pakistan's Perception And Responses Towards The Cold Start Doctrine

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## ABSTRACT

The article aim is to explore how Pakistan perceives the Indian Cold Start Doctrine. The article also highlights various possible responses from Pakistan to counter the Cold Start Doctrine. India and Pakistan have bitter and hostile relations since the time of partition. India and Pakistan's estranged relationship is mainly due to Pakistan's negative perception towards India and the Kashmir issue. The two countries have fought many wars in the past, and India defeated all-time Pakistan. Pakistan's military knows that they cannot defeat India in a total fledge battle because the Indian Army is superior to the Pakistani Army both in number and modern types of equipment. But still, Pakistan is hoping to defeat India in future by launching small and localized conflicts. Pakistan believes that the Cold Start Doctrine will remain on paper with no serious threat. At the same time, Pakistan doubts the intentions of India. Pakistan is asserting that it is fully prepared to deal with internal as well as external threats. Pakistan is developing itself both at the conventional and nuclear levels to deal with any danger.

**KEYWORDS:** Cold Start Doctrine, Offensive-Defense, New Concept of War Fighting, Full Spectrum Deterrence, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Missiles.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The cold start doctrine is an offensive strategy of India with the twin objective of creating deterrence and countering Pakistan's proxy war against India without crossing the nuclear threshold. The cold start doctrine aims to resolve issues with Pakistan by using force as per India's desire. India's proactive action to counter Pakistan by penetrating into Pakistan's territory and then bringing Pakistan on its knee to resolve any issue as per India's wishes. To counter India's cold start doctrine, Pakistan is modernizing and developing its defensive posture. Pakistan is also developing nuclear triad and tactical nuclear weapons and holding military exercises.<sup>1</sup> Pakistan knows that it cannot win a conventional war against India, but this does not mean that Pakistan wouldn't harm India. Pakistan is trying to defeat India through the germination of an Army of terrorists. Pakistan is shaking the confidence and morale of India through infiltration and terrorist attacks. Pakistan's strategy is to attack military area in India through militants and remain quiet to show that it has no links with the militants. Pakistan is attacking military targets rather than civilian because the killing of civilians will lead

to global condemnation. Pakistan is managing India through two strategies. One is to make militant attacks in India, and the second one is that Pakistan is creating a fear in India that if India retaliates, it will use Nuclear Weapon. In line with the concept of nuclear deterrence, Pakistan is developing Tactical Nuclear Weapons and nuclear missile to carry out nuclear arsenal and warhead with high accuracy and for a quick response.<sup>2</sup>

## 2. PAKISTAN'S PERCEPTION OF COLD START DOCTRINE

Pakistan's relations with India remain tense, and over the last five years, Pakistani attitudes towards India have become more negative. Currently, only 14% of Pakistanis see India positively, while 75% give the country an unfavourable rating. A majority of Pakistanis consider India a more serious threat to their country than Al Qaeda or the Taliban. Likewise, Indian attitudes toward Pakistan are generally negative. Despite the tensions, Pakistanis and Indians agree that it is important to improve relations between them. Publics in both countries are

<sup>1</sup>. HafeezUlha khan and Ijaz Khalid, "Indian Cold Start Doctrine: Pakistan's Policy Response", *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, 55, no.1, (2018):325-27.

<sup>2</sup>Sandeep Unnithan, "Sheilds Up," *India Today*, October 6, 2016, accessed June 12, 2019 <https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/20161017-india-pakistan-loc-indian-army-indian-air-force-pathankot-829673-2016-10-06>

supportive of additional diplomatic talks and stronger trade ties across the border.<sup>3</sup>

Pakistan believes that India wants to create stress and anxiety through the cold start Doctrine, and practically India cannot implement it. Pakistan believes that the Cold Start doctrine will remain on paper with no serious threat because India lacks initiative and capability. If implemented, the cold start doctrine may destabilize the South Asian region, in Pakistan's opinion. At the same time, Pakistan doubts India's intentions and to save itself from the implications of the cold start doctrine, Pakistan is tilting more towards China. Pakistan is asserting that it is fully prepared to deal with internal as well as external threats. Pakistan is developing itself both at the conventional level and nuclear level. Pakistan is modernizing its military with the help of the USA and China to increase its defence posture. Pakistan is also conducting military exercises close to India's strategic area so that it can mobilize its forces quickly and precisely.

Pakistan trio forces are conducting war exercises jointly to deal with the threat from India. Pakistan knows that India's superiority in terms of conventional capability is unquestionable. Thus Pakistan is enhancing its nuclear capability to balance the conventional capability. Pakistan aims to deter India's attack with the threat of nuclear weapons and bring major power for compromise. Pakistan thinks that the development of nuclear weapons will provide strategic parity to Pakistan with India.<sup>4</sup>

### 3. PAKISTAN'S RESPONSES TOWARDS THE COLD START DOCTRINE

Since Independence Pakistan had invented an enemy India to create force for the nationhood. The anti-India card was a deliberate policy for nation building. Pakistan sought to negate India's geographical size, large population and economic base, and conventional military superiority by embarking on

pan-Islamism, nuclear weapons program and fomenting internal disturbances in various parts of India including J&K through its terrorist organizations network.<sup>5</sup>

The two countries have fought four wars and on more than one occasion mobilized their militaries with a credible threat of war. Since the early 1990s, the insurgency in Kashmir and terrorist incidents in other parts of India has affected bilateral relations in a profound way. Serious terrorist attacks in India like Parliament attack in 2001 and Mumbai attack in 2008 have led to the loss of public support for dialogue with Pakistan. Consequently, the India-Pakistan debates have been led by belligerent minds, regularly perpetuating the negative narratives.<sup>6</sup> The Parliament attack in 2001 led to a serious standoff between two countries. But India could do nothing and pulled its forces back by October 2002. The Failure of India's operation Parakram forced India to search for a new strategy that gave birth to the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). It is a limited-war strategy designed to quickly seize Pakistani territory without provoking a nuclear conflict. The Cold Start doctrine envisages swift deployment of troops on the western border within days if a situation of a full blown war arises. The operation would be carried out by a unified battle group involving various branches of India's military.

The doctrine aimed at reducing the time required to mobilize troops and develop a network-centric warfare to ensure well-planned geographical distribution of forces. The Cold Start doctrine sought to prepare the army in such a manner that offensive operations could be undertaken within 48 hours enabling the Indian troops to take their Pakistani counterparts by surprise. While the Cold Start doctrine had been in place for years, the government as well as the Army always stated otherwise. It was

<sup>3</sup> How Pakistani and Indian view each other", Pew Research Centre, June 21, 2011, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2011/06/21/chapter-6-how-pakistanis-and-indians-view-each-other>

<sup>4</sup> Gurmeet Kanwal, *Conventional Operations under Nuclear Overhang*, Indian Army: Vision 2020 (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2008), 70-72.

<sup>5</sup>RSN Singh, "Pakistan's Threat perception", *Indian Defence Review*, February 19, 2019, <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/pakistan-threat-perception>

<sup>6</sup>. Kamaldeep Singh Sandhu, "India Pakistan Relations: A Brief Survey of the Evolving Conflict Terrain", *E-International*, March 21, 2016, <https://www.e-ir.info/2016/03/21/india-pakistan-relations-a-brief-survey-of-the-evolving-conflict-terrain>

openly stated when Army Chief Bipin Rawat took up the charge. Soon after this Pakistan's Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi said that his country is prepared to counter the Cold Start doctrine adopted by the Indian Army for which it has developed short-range nuclear weapons.<sup>7</sup>

Pakistan's response to CSD has been two fold. On the one hand, Pakistan asserts that Cold Start is an unviable plan as India lacks the capability and initiative to implement it. On the other hand, Pakistan doubts the intentions of Indian military spending and military modernization, arguing that such actions threaten Pakistan's national security. Pakistan asserted many times that it is prepared to deal with any kind of national threat. Between 2009 and 2013, the Pakistani Army has conducted various military exercises to remark its capability to deal with the cold start doctrine. Pakistan has increased its military expenditures by 58% during the period between 2010 and 2016 to strengthen its capability.<sup>8</sup>

Pakistan believes that the Indian military possess the ability to execute Cold Start style operations and Pakistan's current nuclear arsenal would not deter India from launching such operations. Pakistan argues that the deterrent value of their arsenal operates only at the strategic level and not at the tactical level which gives India the freedom to successfully engage in limited Cold Start style military operations without fear of nuclear escalation.<sup>9</sup>

Some of the responses from Pakistan towards cold start doctrine can be classified as under:

<sup>7</sup>. "What is India's cold start doctrine?" , *Indian Express*, September 21, 2017, <https://indianexpress.com/article/what-is/what-is-india-cold-start-doctrine-military-strategy-india-pakistan-indian-armed-forces-4854019>

<sup>8</sup>. Meenakshi Sood, "Pakistan's (Non-Nuclear) Plan to Counter Cold start," *The Diplomat*, March 25, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/pakistans-non-nuclear-plan-to-counter-cold-start/>

<sup>9</sup>. Jaganath Sakaran, "Pakistan Battlefield Nuclear Policy: A Risky Solution to an Exaggerated Threat," *International Security* 39, no. 3 (Winter 2014/15): 122-23, accessed July 27, 2015, doi: 10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00191

### 3.1 OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE STRATEGY

In international politics states use two strategic options to maximize their security. One is defensive posture and other is offensive posture. States display offensive and defensive behaviors according to the situations. Both offensive and defensive behaviors involve the use of force and aggression. An offensive state will use force to attack and defensive state will use force to deter attack. Besides this the combination of offensive and defensive leads to two strategic options. One is offensive-defense and second one is defensive-offensive.

In offensive-defensive, state initiate attack and then defend itself and in defensive-offensive, state believes in second strike capability. The Sundarji military doctrine of India was based on defensive strategy which failed to achieve positive results and thus cold start doctrine was formed which reflects India's offensive posture.<sup>10</sup> Pakistan lacks strategic advantage vis-à-vis India due to geographical features and it feels that missing the opportunity to launch a timely offensive or counter-offensive may threaten the very existence of the country. Therefore offensive-defensive strategy is a viable option for Pakistan to deal with security threat from India.

Gen Mirza Aslam Beg is generally credited with the offensive-defence concept, which envisages launching of a sizeable offensive into enemy territory rather than waiting for an enemy offensive. The objective of these offensives would be to seize territory of strategic importance thereby forcing the enemy to react. A variation of the offensive-defence strategy was highlighted in 1965, which stipulated a limited number of troops in the ground holding role and maximum effort was to be concentrated on offensive and counter-offensive operations. The emphasis was on mobility and firepower.<sup>11</sup> The strategy calls for Pakistani Army strike corps to launch an offensive attack in an event of war, with

<sup>10</sup> Khalid H Chandio, "India from Defensive to Offensive", *Pakistan Observer*, January 15, 2015 , accessed August 20, 2019, <https://ipripak.org/india-from-defensive-to-offensive/>

<sup>11</sup>. RSN Singh, "Pakistan's Offensive-Defensive Strategy", *Indian Defense Review*, February 11, 2011, <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/pakistans-offensive-defence-strategy>

the aim of occupying Indian-territory near border while holding back the initial hostile advances. Pakistan has reorganized its strategic reserves, i.e. the Army Reserve North and Army Reserve South to implement this doctrine. In addition, Pakistan's six defensive corps is situated in close proximity to Indian territory which provide initial defenses against Indian conventional aggression.<sup>12</sup>

### 3.2 NEW CONCEPT OF WAR FIGHTING

The cold-start doctrine is intended to allow India to perform swift operation and seizing large territory penetrations before the Pakistani military respond. In order to counter India's swift action, Pakistan has adopted a New Concept of War Fighting (NCWF) that aims to improve mobilization time of troops and to enhance inter-services coordination. NCWF envisages Pakistan to launch an offensive operation in short reaction time.<sup>13</sup> The new war concept seeks to improve the mobilization time of troops and to develop an integrated response from the Army, Navy and air forces, in case of a national threat. It was formally put into practice after the completion of the Azm-e-Nou military exercises in 2013.

The military exercises, which were started in 2009, have been part of the Pakistan's new concept of war fighting, designed to respond to the threat posed by India's Pakistan-specific cold-start doctrine.<sup>14</sup> Azm-e-Nau military exercises were

principally aimed to achieve coordination among the Army, Air-force and Navy for joint operation in case of any national threat and with enhanced mobility and speed. Pakistani Air Force (PAF) will play a significant role in NCWF for providing support to the ground forces. Beside this Pakistan Navy with its submarines and speed craft missile boats and indigenously produced Harba anti-ship cruise missile is likely to be a part of NCWF. Also cruise missiles like Raad and Babur will play an important role in NCWF. The Pakistani defence forces are conducting regular military exercises and war games to validate their military doctrines and operational preparedness, as well as to display their firepower and military might.<sup>15</sup>

### 3.3 MILITARY EXERCISES

The doctrine of Cold Start, which was announced in April 2004, is aimed at making shallow territorial gains that can be used in post-conflict negotiations to extract concessions from Pakistan. India has conducted a number of military exercises to test its military doctrine in the last decade such as Divya Astra (Divine Weapon) in March 2004, Vajra Shakti (Thunder Power) in May 2005, Desert Strike in November-December 2005, Sang-i-Shakti (Joint Power) in March-May 2006, Shatrunash (Destruction of Enemy) in May 2007, Ashwamedh (Valor and Intellectual Illumination) from January to May 2007 and Hind Shakti (Indian Power) in May 2009. Many of these exercises were Pakistan-centric and are meant to test the efficacy of the Cold Start doctrine. Similarly Pakistan is also building its capabilities to counter India.

The process was accelerated when General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani took over command of the Pakistan army in November 2007. He declared 2008 as Year of the Soldier and later, he declared 2009 as Year of Training to motivate and prepare the Pakistan

<sup>12</sup>Maimuna Ashraf, "Pakistan's consolidating conventional deterrence: An Assessment", *SouthAsianVoices*, December 7, 2018, <https://southasianvoices.org/pakistan-conventional-deterrence-assessment/>

<sup>13</sup> Meenakshi Sood, "Pakistan's Non-nuclear Plan to Counter Cold Start", *The Diplomat*, March 25, 2017, accessed June 5, 2018 <https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/pakistans-non-nuclear-plan-to-counter-cold-start/>

<sup>14</sup> Kamran Yousaf, "Countering cold start: Military to adopt new war concept", *Pakistan Defense*, June 4, 2013, <https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/new-war-concept-to-counter-cold-start.256413/>

<sup>15</sup>Muhammad Ali Baig, "Pakistan's new war strategy", *Daily Times*, February 26, 2018, accessed May 5, 2019, <https://dailytimes.com.pk/207360/pakistans-new-war-strategy/>

army to respond to the Indian Cold Start Doctrine.<sup>16</sup> The military exercises reflect Pakistan's vigilance and alertness towards the defense of the country. The capabilities manifested in these exercises would boost the defence forces. It would help to offset enemy's strategic surprise and reduce the reaction time to respond to any challenge. These exercises convey a message to the Indian decision makers that Pakistan has the capability to defend itself from any unprovoked intrusion.<sup>17</sup> Pakistan has carried out number of military exercises with the aim to boost up their readiness and operational capacity. These exercises ranges from operation Zarb-e-Momin which is considered to be the largest ever military exercise by Pakistan army to that of operation Azm-e-Nou, operation Sea Spark , operation High Mark in 2010 and the Friendship 2016 with Russia. Pakistan also has conducted joint military exercises with many countries in recent decade like DRUZBA 2017 with Russia Thunder North with Muslim countries.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup>. Arif Jamal, "Pakistan's Ongoing Azm-e-Nau-3 Military Exercises Define Strategic Priorities", *Terrorism Monitor* 8 no.18 (2010): 1 , accessed October 20, 2018, <https://jamestown.org/program/pakistans-ongoing-azm-e-nau-3-military-exercises-define-strategic-priorities>

<sup>17</sup>. Franz Stefean Gandy, "Is the Indian Military capable of executing Cold Start Doctrine?", *The Diplomat*, January 29, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/is-the-indian-military-capable-of-executing-the-cold-start-doctrine>

<sup>18</sup>Hafeez Ullah Khan and Ijaz Khalid, "Indian Cold Start Doctrine: Pakistan's Policy Response" ,*Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, 55, no. 1(January - June, 2018), [http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/history/PDF-FILES/24\\_55\\_1\\_18](http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/history/PDF-FILES/24_55_1_18)

### 3.4 MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

Pakistan acquired and developed missile technology in four phases. The first phase began in the 1960s and 1970s when Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) acquired French and US sounding rockets and developed a plant for solid fuel stage construction. The second phase began in the late 1980s and 1990s when Pakistan fielded short-range systems the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 which were based on its sounding rockets to counter India's missile programs. To supplement these systems, which could not carry relatively heavy first-generation nuclear warheads, Islamabad imported an estimated 34 short-range M-11 missiles from China in 1991-1992. Subsequently, it imported 12 to 20 medium-range Nodong missiles from North Korea.

The third phase began in the mid and late 1990s when Pakistan developed indigenous versions of the M-11 (Hatf-3), the Nodong ( Hatf-5 or Ghauri), and the Hatf-4 ( Shaheen). In the fourth stage between 2000 and 2010 Pakistan has developed new short-range and medium-range missiles. Over the years Pakistan has developed and acquired several ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.<sup>19</sup> Pakistan's missile program is rapidly evolving, achieving greater accuracy, payload capacity and range. Both their ballistic and cruise missile programs have been benefited from foreign assistance. Pakistan believes that it's ballistic and cruise missile programs are answer to balance against India's conventional superiority. Pakistan has a variety of missiles ranging from tactical battlefield weapons to medium-range ballistic systems with the ability to hit any target in India.<sup>20</sup>

### 3.5 FULL SPECTRUM DETERRENCE

The Cold Start Doctrine has forced Pakistan to transform its Minimum Nuclear Deterrence posture

<sup>19</sup>Dinshaw Mistry, "Missile proliferation and Deterrence stability in South Asia", in *Deterrence stability and escalation control in South Asia*, ed. Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson ( Washington: Stimson, 2013), 125

<sup>20</sup>. "Pakistan Missile", *NTI*, November, 2019, <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/pakistan/delivery-systems>



into Full Spectrum Deterrence Posture and the institutionalization of nuclear-triad to deter the coercive military strategy of India. Realizing that the minimum nuclear deterrence posture has limitations, Pakistan has modified its nuclear posture. On September 5, 2013, Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA) announced that Pakistan would maintain a full spectrum deterrence capability to deter all forms of aggression. The Full Spectrum Deterrence relies on the interplay of conventional, strategic and tactical battlefield forces.<sup>21</sup> Full Spectrum Deterrence came into force when Pakistan tested the tactical nuclear weapon HATFIX/NASR in 2011.

According to General Khalid Kidwai Full Spectrum Deterrence include the development of a nuclear capability to bring every Indian target into Pakistan's striking range and acquire appropriate weapons yield coverage and the numbers to deter the adversary's policy of massive retaliation. Kidwai also specified that another tenet of FSD is the liberty to select from a range of counter value, battlefield, and counterforce targets. Full Spectrum Deterrence maintains Pakistan's India-centric policy and posture. Additionally, it seeks strategic equivalence vis-à-vis India and to deter threats ranging from sub-conventional to strategic levels. Moreover, though Pakistan regards nuclear weapons as weapon of last resort, it reserves the option of first-use against a nuclear weapon state. Also Full Spectrum Deterrence involves deterrence of all forms of aggression through a combination of conventional and strategic forces. In response to India's Cold start doctrine, Pakistan is trying to gradually fill the strategic gaps in its force posture with nuclear-tipped missiles through air, sea, and land-based delivery systems to deny India any advantage in the warfare domain.<sup>22</sup>

### 3.6 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Tactical Nuclear Weapons are described as battlefield, tactical, sub-strategic and non-strategic

nuclear weapons. One simplistic definition describes the TNWs as a nuclear weapon which is designed to be used on a battlefield in military situations. As per the US Dictionary of Military & Associated Terms, TNWs can be employed by land, sea or air forces against opposing forces. These weapons may be employed in support of a military mission of limited scope or in support of the military commander's scheme of maneuver.<sup>23</sup> TNWs can be described as lower yield nuclear weapons designed for usage on a battlefield denote limited war as opposed to strategic nuclear weapons that may be used as political weapons of deterrence or aimed at disrupting the enemy's war raging capability.<sup>24</sup>

According to William R. Van Cleave and S.T. Cohen, the term TNWs in the closest approximation refers to battlefield nuclear weapons, for battlefield use, and with deployment ranges and yields consistent with such use and confined essentially in each respect to the area of localized military operations.<sup>25</sup> TNWS are increasingly being seen by the Pakistani strategic planners as part of their design to achieve conventional parity through strategic coercion. Pakistan's decision to develop TNWS is predicted on the basis of three logics. Firstly low yield battlefield nuclear weapons strengthen its defensive fence and assist in tackling the asymmetries between India and Pakistan. Secondly due to the uncertainty about the tactical result of TNWS. Thirdly the employment of low yield nuclear weapons would create the fear of the possibility or near certainty of escalation onto the

<sup>21</sup> Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "Full Spectrum Deterrence: capability and Credibility", *Pakistan politico*, June 7, 2018, <http://pakistanpolitico.com/full-spectrum-deterrence-capability-and-credibility/>

<sup>22</sup> Sannia Abdulla, "Pakistan's full spectrum Deterrence: Trends and Trajectories", December 13, 2018, *South Asian Voices*, <https://southasianvoices.org/pakistan-full-spectrum-deterrence-trends-trajectories/>

<sup>23</sup> Inderjit Panjra, "Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons", (New Delhi: Vij Books Pvt., 2018), 39.

<sup>24</sup> Aditi Malhotra, "Pakistan's Flirtation with Tactical Nuclear Weapons", *Scholar Warriors*, Autumn (2012): 76, accessed June 15, 2020 <https://www.claws.in/journal/journal-scholar-warrior/>

<sup>25</sup> V. Sahay, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons Deterrence Stability between India and Pakistan", (New Delhi: Gaurav Book centre, 2015), 50

strategic nuclear level.<sup>26</sup> Pakistan believes that TNWs provide warranty against the serious threat posed by the eight division sized IBGs. TNWs also signify Pakistan's attempt to lower the nuclear threshold. Threat of use of TNWs, thus, aims to bring about a psychological shift in India's stance. Pakistan believes that lower-yield weapons pose a more proportionate and therefore credible threat against localized, shallow border incursions by IBGs.

Pakistan's security establishment believes that TNWs will strike fear in India thereby either dissuading an Indian blitzkrieg in the first place or achieving intra-war deterrence by threatening TNW strikes on attacking IBGs. Pakistan is confident that TNWs are a boon for deterrence stability, and this sentiment is well represented in public statements by prominent officials. Meelaha Lodhi explains that the purpose of Pakistan's TNWs is to counterbalance India's move to bring conventional military offensive to a tactical level. Michael Krepon has interpreted TNWs as Pakistan's perceived need to counter adventurous Indian military doctrine. So the apparent objective is deterrence and not military effectiveness. The primary purpose of TNWs was to add deterrence of conventional attack of any magnitude, and counter them if necessary, by confronting the enemy with the prospects of consequent escalation of the conflict.<sup>27</sup>

#### 4. CONCLUSION

The Cold Start doctrine represents a significant advancement in India's conventional capabilities but it also risks a crisis on the subcontinent that could breach the nuclear threshold. Pakistan views the doctrine as adventurous, destabilizing and antithetical to its security and stability of the region. In response, Pakistan is modernizing its defense forces while also developing its nuclear capability especially by developing tactical nuclear weapons. Pakistan's

NCWF (New Concept of War Fighting, Full Spectrum deterrence, Strategy of Offensive-Defense, missile development, Tactical Nuclear Weapons and military exercises are designed to mount a counter-offensive even before India fires the first shot Pakistan is proving itself that it can deter India from any kind of challenge.

<sup>26</sup>Arun Sahgal, "Logic and Options For use", in *Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons Conflict Redux* ed. Gurmeet Kanwal and Monika Chansoria, (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2011), 96

<sup>27</sup> Manpreet Sethi, "India's Response Options", in *Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons Conflict Redux* ed. Gurmeet Kanwal and Monika Chansoria, (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2011), 221

