

## Reanalyzing Thailand and China's Diplomatic Recognition Process in the Détente Era, 1971-1975

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### ABSTRACT

During the dynamic Cold War, many various components collaborated, both outside and inside changes. They made different frameworks affecting each state's behaviors in the foreign relations' circles. Many developing nations' experience after the decolonization, territory clash, civil wars, the junta has flowed a blend of great powers; however, Thailand and China are dissimilar. With the divergent elements, Beijing and Bangkok's arrangements prioritized the essential choice to keep up resources and interests with bilateral diplomatic recognition to maintain their status quo. Normalization between a great power state, China, and a small state, Thailand, has gotten a model for other nations in Southeast Asia in the Cold War. This article outlines the process of Thai-Chinese diplomatic recognition and the key factors shaping their interactions to show the successful formations of their engagement and the significance of international and internal constraints causing Beijing and Bangkok's bilateral diplomatic tie between 1971 and 1975.

### Keywords

Thailand, China, Diplomatic Recognition, Process, Détente

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### Introduction

The appearance of the Cold War battle has contributed to a matter of prolonged-historical discourse, a wide range of verifiable roots, and sequential beginning and defining moments. The improvement of bipolarity between the Free World and the Communist World was overwhelmed by the United States and the Soviet Union's doctrinal confrontation structure. Furthermore, the presence of support states and intermediary wars turned into the main thrust for the two realms' struggle. Additionally, conflictual improvement has made other states' interchangeable and impacted states' international strategy to experience the Cold War diversity. Just as in Asia, China and Thailand obliged and reassessed their relationship under the Cold War superpowers' extensive competition. Thailand, a non-colonized state, was one of the front line areas in the Free World, driven by the United States with a containment strategy against the Soviet Union. Thailand and the United States have a long engagement since 1833 when Thailand was the primary Asian country to sign a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the U.S. The long chronicled connection incredibly affected Thailand as a stable union with the U.S. over time World War and the after war dynamic. In the Cold War's principal time, Bangkok chose to counter the Communist approach and control the nearby connection with the United States through bilateral and multilateral stages.

For instance, building up the collective defense with the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, SEATO, in 1954 (Modolski, 1962) and marking the Thanat-Rusk Joint Communique in 1962. Even though the Free World's philosophical term was majority democracy and freedom, Washington upheld numerous Thai junta governments and gave more extensive collaboration in political, financial, and security. Besides, when the Containment strategy was worked in the Indo-China and Southeast Asian region,

Thailand assumed a prominent part as the U.S. partner. In any case, when the vitally changing incidents occurred at the global and regional levels, they affected the connection between Thailand and the United States, inevitably. (Nuechterlein, 1965) They caused Bangkok to reconsider its relationship with Beijing. For China, after the Chinese Communist Party's triumph and the founding of the People's Republic of China under Chairman Mao Zedong in 1949, China did not have a particular strategy toward Thailand. However, it saw Thailand as a small state in the Southeast Asian region. China actualized its international design by leaning toward the Soviet Union. (Yu, 2001)

Notwithstanding, China's objective also needed to have cordial neighbors in the South. Chinese global system has been changed to seek a cushion zone in the South against American domination and later counter the Soviet Union impact. China proposed the discipline of "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence" at the Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. (Wilson, 1967) China intrigued numerous Southeast Asian nations, particularly Thailand. The gathering between Prince Wan Waithayakorn, Thai Foreign Minister, and Zhou Enlai, Chinese Premier, and Foreign Minister happened to exchange diplomatic normalization between the two nations. They impressed each other with the intention of a tranquil collaboration enhancing the two nations' effort to clear their previous doubts and suspects. (Phathanothai, 1976) Thereby, the Thai military government under Prime Minister P. Pibulsongkram saw an opportunity to rethink with Beijing; he worked on a secret mission by sending a group of Thai delegations visited China, which was well-received by Zhou Enlai. (Pirom, 1981) During the 1960s, domestic changes had drawn the connection between Beijing and Bangkok again into the strained and ambiguous climate. After the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, China diverted to United Front from Below, energized Communist Parties in

Southeast Asia to oust the legislatures, such as PKI in Indonesia and CPT in Thailand.

Moreover, Thailand's new military government unequivocally remained the counter Communist policy. China continued embracing the Communist Party of Thailand's rebellion exercises as the report in 1965. Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi stated: "We would like to have a guerrilla war going in Thailand before the year is out." (Lovelace, 1971). Although China continued telling the Thai leaders during the diplomatic recognition endeavor that the supporting to communist party relations would not influence the state to state relations, Thailand suspected and worried about standardizing the connection with China since the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) proclaimed the People's Liberation Army in the nation in 1968. In any case, the realignment in the triangle relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China significantly affected Thai international strategy when the Sino-Soviet split by their contention over Damansky or Zhen Bao island began in 1969. The Soviet Union turned into a security danger to China while the United States was currently pulling out from Vietnam, which monstrous depended on Soviet help. It implies that the Soviet Union turned into the fundamental adversary for China and the United States, which they could be brought into an assembled front to dissuade Soviet hegemonism.

### **The process of Thai-Chinese diplomatic recognition, 1971-1975**

During the Cold War, the global political uncertainty created the divergent framework influencing the state to manage their interaction in the foreign affairs' circles. Seemingly, many developing nations' experience after the decolonization, for example, border clash, civil wars, military overthrows, has pathed an intervention of the great powers; however, Thailand and China are different. Their relationship transformation is remarkable to highlight the opportunity from crisis to cooperation and converting the antagonism to amity in Thai-Chinese relations, with the secret effort from Bangkok to Beijing in 1955 and temporarily paused by the firm opposite policy in the 1960s. In the Cold War of the détente atmosphere, many superpowers' diplomatic transformation has occurred. China and the Soviet dispute in 1969 and the normalization between the United States and China in 1971 those incidents brought about the reassessment of Thailand and China relations to survive in the changing international politics. Beijing and Bangkok actively negotiated a practical diplomatic recognition throughout the early 1970s until they can establish official diplomatic relations on July 1, 1975. The rapprochement between the two countries can be described in three aspects; pollical stance adjustment, multi-channel communication promotion, and the historical friendship recall.

First, the Thai-Chinese political stance adjustment was the primary process to show Beijing and Bangkok's willingness to engage further. On account of foreign relations' changing circumstances, Thailand needed to have peaceful cooperation with mainland China. Thailand started to

reexamine its international strategy against China before the People's Republic of China (PRC) became a permanent United Nations member in 1971. (Luard, 1971) Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman attempted to contact China in 1970 through the third nation, Yugoslavia, and Sweden. (Panyarachun, 1990) Bangkok desired to expand on the informally existed diplomatic relations since the Bandung Conference when the impressive gathering between Prince Wan Waithayakorn, Thai Foreign Minister, and Zhou Enlai, Chinese Premier and Foreign Minister. The exertion of the Thai Foreign Minister and his group indeed demonstrated the readiness of building strategic acknowledgment with China. For this purpose, Thanat attempted to convince the Thai military government to vote for Taiwan's replacement with the People's Republic of China at the United Nations General Assembly meeting in October 1971. However, the Thai government disagreed since they suspected and worried about China's perspective and strategy. The Thai administration of Field Marshall Thanom Kittikachorn and his security division did not content with the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs' disposition toward China. ("Thanom bars MPs," 1971) Nonetheless, the Thai agents from Foreign Ministry battled to adapt to China's chance of correspondence by reaching numerous channels, both open and close strategies.

Nevertheless, the Chinese government perceived that Thailand was intent on the rearrangement of bilateral relations. China also needed to have peaceful relations with Thailand; therefore, sports tournaments' informal connections initiated in September 1972. China invited the Thai government to send the table tennis team to attend the Asian Table Tennis Union Championship held in Beijing. (Ruisheng, 2006) Thailand sent 20 Thai table tennis players, including private and public authorities such as Chumphon Lohachala, the head of the group, Prasit Kanchanawat, appointed by Thai military leaders to notice the Chinese perspective towards Thailand nearly. (Kanchanawat, 1990) After the Thai table tennis crew showing up in Beijing, Cheng RuiSheng, Director of the Southeast Asia Division of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, companied with Prasit as a caretaker all through fourteen days of his stay in Beijing. ("13 Sportsmen picked, 1972) Also, Prasit was welcome to meet with Chinese leadership, including Liao Chengzhi. Focal Committee of the Communist Party of China and Foreign Minister, Han NianLong, Deputy Minister of the Chinese Foreign Affairs, and Liqiang, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of China. Above all, He met and gave Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai a conversation about the Thai concerned issues, for instance, the twofold identities of overseas Chinese and the Chinese assistance to the rebellions in Thailand. (Kanchanawat, 1990) Zhou Enlai stated to Prasit that China did not advance the twofold identities; however, instead of needing them to take the nation's ethnicity, they lived.

Moreover, China would not like to meddle in the concealment of socialism in Thailand since China regarded Thai domestic issues and sovereignty. (Wannakorn, 1996) China underlined that if Thailand was not prepared to shape formally diplomatic relations, China could wait, yet the two nations ought to interface on exchange and social trades.

Second, the promotion of close and open multi-channel of contacts between the two nations. The ping-pong diplomacy in September 1972 was an introduction to arranging the reclamation of relations among Thailand and China. Later in October 1972, the Thai Consul-General in Hong Kong was reached by Chinese agents in Hong Kong to invite the Thai delegation to join the 32<sup>nd</sup> Guangzhou Expo. The Thai government sent the exchange agents comprising Prasit Kanchanawat, the top of the advisory group, Vicharn Niwatwong, Acting Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Commerce. He was the personnel delegate, and Pracha Gunakasem, Consul-General, was a consultant and 12 Thai traders. This second Thai assignment visiting China likewise had a meeting with the Chinese Deputy Premier Li Xiannian, Director-General of the Asian Department, Lu Wenchao. Furthermore, the channel of communication among Thai and Chinese representatives additionally expanded, particularly at the 27<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly in October 1972 when Thailand posted as the leader of the Asian nations. Along these lines, Thailand got the opportunity to meet with Chinese agents and examined numerous issues. At the United Nations, Pote Sarasin, head of the Thai delegation, and Anand Panyarachun, the permanent representative of Thailand, met with Chiao Guanhua, a Deputy Minister of Chinese Foreign Affairs the Chinese delegation; it was the official authority meeting and discussion in the international organization. Additionally, the Chinese diplomatic staff likewise went to the Thai King's birthday ceremony to show respect. (Chinwanno, 2005)

Afterward, the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs permitted the Thai representatives to contact the Chinese diplomat in the nations that Thai and Chinese consulates to imply Thailand's generosity. Again, The principal casual gathering among Thai and Chinese negotiators were made in April 1973 by the meeting between Cheng Ruisheng, Director of the South East Asia Division, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Tej Bunnag, Director of the East Asian Division, Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the forum of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) in Tokyo, Japan. ("Red Chinese Team," 1973) Afterward, they met again during the table tennis tournament in Thailand; Cheng Ruisheng, the Chinese team's deputy head, was welcomed by the Thai Table Tennis Association in June 1973. Tej came to embrace and had an informal meeting with Cheng Ruisheng. Afterward, Lieutenant General Chatchai Choonhawan, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, invited Cheng Ruisheng to the guesthouse to discuss Thai-Chinese relations, and Cheng Ruisheng also invited Chatchai to visit China. The Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported in this casual meeting that "It helps strengthen relations between China and Thailand." (Chulacheeb, 2005) In the same year, there was a domestic occurrence in Thailand by the student uprising in October 1973, making the military government crackdown. The interim government under Prime Minister Sanya Thammasakdi tried to balance the inside and outside circumstances. Political changes permitted the improvement of contacts among Beijing and Bangkok to arrive at more significant diplomatic arrangements.

Moreover, in 1973, due to the oil shortage in Thailand because of the global oil price crisis from the Arab-Israel War, the Bangkok government-appointed Chatchai, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited China for oil purchasing negotiation. (Akrasanee, 1980) Zhou Enlai reported the Thai trade objective to the Chairman of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong. The latter finally affirmed and allowed Zhou to welcome and haggle with the Thai assignment. ("Chatchai January date," 1973) The two nations announced the documented exchange by the arrangement's consent to offer fifty thousand tons of oil to Thailand with a 'favorable price.' China's reaction extraordinarily improved the Chinese status for the Bangkok government and public. ("Rules on China, 1974)

The last process was the setting of the establishment of the formal diplomatic tie. After receiving the positive perception from Thailand and the Chinese perceiving the amicable aspect of Thailand, both nations drastically undertook the path to set a bilateral relation. In April 1975. Locally, Thailand had another non-military Prime Minister, Kukrit Pramoj, and his regulatory groups comprising many vital people closer to China, including Chatchai, appointed as Foreign Minister. (Morell, 1981) Specifically, the Thai Prime Minister critically chose to enhance diplomatic ties with mainland China by sending a working group to pre-negotiate with the Chinese delegation in Beijing to establish a diplomatic relations agreement consisting of many concerned agendas from both nations' consent. ("A Plea to Beijing," 1975) After the discussion, the Chinese agent informed that Premier Zhou Enlai welcomes Thai Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj to visit China officially. ("Zhou Enlai sends," 1975) It means that the Highest Head of State's invitation was the significant ramifications that China acknowledged and concurred on the Thai plan. On June 30, 1975, Kukrit, Thai Prime Minister, had the first state-visit in Beijing with Chatchai, Foreign Minister. They initially visited Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese Deputy Premier, before being informed that they were permitted to gather with Chairman Mao Zedong the following day. ("A Warm Welcome," 1975)

Therefore, on July 1, Kukrit, together with Chatchai, made a trip to Zhongnanhai and met with the eighty-one-year-old Chairman Mao Zedong in the library. Under a benevolent meeting, Mao Zedong welcomed the Thai PM and stated that 'the Prime Minister come to meet a Communist, do not you afraid of me.' Kukrit replied, 'No, not at all.' (Beek, 1983) With a friendly conversation and atmosphere, the two talked for almost sixty minutes. Mao Zedong said that he was getting old and was not long for this world; Kukrit replied that "No, you cannot be serious. You cannot die at all, Chairman. The world cannot stand to lose its number one antagonist as you know you are yourself." (Beek, 1983) The Chairman seemed to be tickled and like that response very much with his laugh and shook hand all around. ("Almost late," 1975) After the impressive and warm conversation with Chairman Mao Zedong, Kukrit had other round talks with Deng Xiaoping and invited him to visit Thailand. In the evening, Kukrit went to see Zhou Enlai at the Beijing hospital and set up the signing ceremony to officially establish diplomatic relations between the PRC and Thailand. Thailand turned into the 101<sup>st</sup> nation and the

third of ASEAN states that officially recognized the PRC government. (Thai Consulate, 1975) There were ten agendas of the Joint Communiqué, which also represented the reclamation of connections and the trade-off between them for shared advantage, albeit the two nations have philosophical, political, economic contrasts. The joint communiqué expressed that the two countries have grasped the five standards of peaceful cooperation and will against all incomparability from any nations or any groups. Thailand acknowledged the guideline of "One China," and Taiwan is a unified Chinese region area. It also pronounced the unacceptance of double citizenship of Chinese individuals in Thailand.

After the signing ceremony, Zhou Enlai has mentioned to Kukrit that "In the past several decades, our two countries have a very close relationship with each other, so it is very convenient to communicate especially by sea. So it was no different from being a relative." (Funghammasan, 2005) Moreover, he was sorry that he was unable to drink champagne to commend the marking of this special occasion to establish the diplomatic tie. He softly insisted that his physician disallows him to take any alcohol, so he should drink tea instead, as he told the Thai leaders, who all broke into a smile. Zhou warmly ended that he has to get Deputy Deng Xiaoping to deal with his sake. ("Sihanouk ready," 1975) He also accomplished that China and Thailand received this achievement because of Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai and his authorities' hard work in opening the path for Sino-Thai relations. ("Zhou sips tea," 1975) Kukrit wished Zhou Enlai a long life and gave him a cut bronze cigarette case, apprising him in English. "Although this is not very valuable. I am still very proud to give it to you." ("Almost late," 1975) After the whole ceremony lasted not less than ten minutes, Kukrit highly perceived the admiration and respect to Chinese leaders full of wisdom and abilities, including cheerful humor and kindness. (Beek, 1983) Thailand was very impressed by the warm Chinese welcome and a signing ceremony of joint communiqué, which brought the new phase of Sino-Thai relations from enmity to amity. Liu Yongqing, a Chinese-Thai translator in the signing ceremony, considered this memorable occasion that Kukrit's visiting China was the Premier Zhou Enlai last time's marking the welcome and invitation foreign guest from that point forward, Zhou Enlai was severely ill and passed away in 1976. (Chinwanno, 2005)

### **Factors influencing the Thai-Chinese diplomatic tie in the détente era**

Since the Cold War period of the politically philosophical confrontation of socialist and liberal majority rule government, the world is separated into two camps: the Communist World Camp and the Free World Camp. The distrustfulness between the philosophical superpowers and nations in each center stressed worldwide relations. However, in the early 1970s, the global power structure turned into the era of détente being easing tensions between world powers and ideologies. Confrontation is reduced, and there is a peaceful dialogue between superpowers to lessen the conflict. In short, Détente brought about the tension

reliefs in world policy throughout the 1970s. Notwithstanding, several global political issues, both internationally and regionally, influence Thailand and China's connection during their diplomatic recognition process from 1971 to 1975, which can be analyzed into three levels of investigation, international, regional, and internal stages.

At the international level, there are principally four factors that influence the Thai-Chinese diplomatic acknowledgment measure. Firstly, the Ussuri River contention between China and the Soviet Union in 1969 mainly affected China's foreign policy strategy. (Clubb, 1979) The Soviet Union turned into the real rival for China and the United States. The triangle relationship concerned Chinese leaders' view of the assembled front coalition. (Robinson, 1970) The arrangement between China, the Communist World state, and the U.S. as the Free World state was begun to dissuade Soviet hegemonism. Secondly, China and the United States' normalization was organized by welcoming the U.S. ping pong team to play in China in April 1971. Later, a secret visit to Beijing by Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's National Security Adviser, in July 1971. (Kissinger, 1979) This starting cycle altogether affected global political issues and all through Asia, including Thailand. Obviously, Before visiting China, Henry Kissinger had halted in Bangkok to emphasize security affirmations yet left well enough to visit China.

Additionally, in 1972, China and the U.S. signing the Shanghai Communiqué (Rhode & Whitlock, 1983) had stunned the Thai government, particularly favorable to American Thais. In this changing Cold War circumstance, China arose as the new arrangement companion for Thailand. Thirdly, the People's Republic of China's entrance into the United Nations by replacing Taiwan in October 1971 suggested the international community recognizing China. (Luard, 1971) Thailand understood the dynamic of the superpower states' system and obliged the presence of Communist China and its job on the world stage. Thai leaders prepared the political and diplomatic recognition path to establish bilateral relations with China after the two-decade of dubious and tense relations since the Chinese Communist Party took over Mainland China in 1949. Lastly, the higher oil cost managed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC, during the Arab-Israel battle in 1973 resulted in more costly and insufficient global oil value. (Ovendale, 1999) This aggressive and persuasive oil strategy from OPEC had somewhat affected Washington's usage by utilizing the military to help Israel since American just imported around five percent of its oil from the Middle East. (Alroy, 1975) However, this oil crisis affected those countries without an oil asset base and needed to import oil supply from abroad. Accordingly, without its oil fields, Thailand was attempting to purchase oil from new sources, including the People's Republic of China, which brought about the oil purchasing with friendly price from China. (Pyo, 1990)

At the regional level, three significant changes shaped Thai-Chinese approaches for establishing bilateral diplomatic relations. First, The decrease of the U.S. impact in Southeast Asia opened another open door for Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. After World War II, Washington

significantly gave security backing toward the South Vietnamese government against socialist North Vietnam all through the 1960s. Nevertheless, the United States chose to end it with the Paris Peace Talks with North Vietnam in 1973. (Hersh, 1983) Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, the agents from the United States and North Vietnam, had the consent to end the battle by the withdrawal of the U.S. troops for South Vietnam. Because the United States diminished its rules in the region likewise influenced Thailand for the United States' intimate partner nation to change its position (Lewis, 1970), resulting in mainland China's reassessment in Thai foreign policy. Secondly, Communist triumph took over Indochina. After Communist North Vietnam held onto power in South Vietnam on April 30, 1975, the Khmer Communist faction held onto Cambodia from the Government of Lon Non on April 17, 1975. Afterward, the Pated Lao development could maintain Laos's full power, turning Laos's Kingdom into the Lao People's Democratic Republic with a socialist principle on December 2, 1975. (Poole, 1976) Thailand's neighboring nations became a socialist system resulting in Thailand's consideration to secure itself from communist expansion. Finally, expanding ASEAN nations' participation was one of the significant factors that impacted Thailand and China's recognition arrangement. Since the foundation of ASEAN by the five countries, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand in 1967, ASEAN was a significant development of regional collaboration between Southeast Asian countries. (Acharya, 2000) In 1971, ASEAN marked the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, outlining peace, freedom, and neutrality, including extending their participation to the financial and social measurement. This change was to keep undesirable intercession from superpowers and look for elective collaboration with the nations having an alternate political philosophy. ASEAN's role significantly boosts China and Thailand's negotiation under the multilateral forum, even if China perceived ASEAN as a threat previously. (Chinwanno, 2008) Still, after expanding cooperation in 1971, China sees ASEAN as an opportunity and comprehends non-state actors' role in world politics.

At the internal level, both China and Thailand experienced local changes that affected their policy implantation during the recognition process. After the chaotic Cultural Revolution with the assertive revolution approach between 1965 and 1969, China tried to build up more friendly and peaceful engagement with the international community by improving bilateral relations with all nations, including Southeast Asian countries. (Bridgham, 1967) Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was a pivotal person to assume a functioning policy in Chinese foreign affairs and endeavored to re-establish China's right path of harmony and stability. For Thailand, the Prime Minister and many state authorities and departments had pessimism about China, especially the National Security Bureau. The Thai military government was unprepared to improve China's formal relations since they speculated about China's goal. (Kim, 1981) Nonetheless, numerous Thai delegates from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MFAs, saw a positive collaboration with China since Thailand expected to secure itself to get by in the bipolar Cold War's erratic changes. From the Thai MFAs effort's various strategies, the junta government just

permitted sports, social, and trade commitment with China. Ultimately, the Thai student uprising in 1973 caused the Thai military government's breakdown and brought about the arrival of the regular civilian government headed by Prime Minister Kukrit Promoj, who had an optimistic insight about China. As a result, Thailand started the more profound diplomatic acknowledgment measure and the rapprochement with China. Finally, Beijing and Bangkok agreed on the joint communiqué and settled the formal diplomatic tie on July 1, 1975.

## Conclusion

The official establishment of China and Thailand diplomatic relations on July 1, 1975, was one of the most particular events in Thai-Chinese relations. The diplomatic recognition process's implementation was one of the ultimate performance and practice in Thailand's international strategy tasks, which was majorly supported by the Thai foreign ministry and Chinese leaders through both secret and open negotiation to facilitate peaceful cooperation. China and Thailand had consistently reevaluated their international strategies through the Cold War's tangle utilizing the tight and free bipolar framework and the détente period. Beijing and Bangkok significantly used political arrangements to accomplish their definitive objectives on various occasions. Notwithstanding, they acceptably organize what can give them to keep up the public resources and interests; political issues, security, including the economy—seeing that both China and Thailand would execute the military instrument as a last resort. As the purpose of being peaceful and compromising, the negotiation process was the critical instrument for recognizing diplomatic procedure that brought about the success of enhancing and strengthening the bilateral relationship. This achievement from the two countries in power and capacity differences demonstrated the changeable path from doubt to shared trust. It ended almost three decades of Bangkok and Beijing's antagonism under the Cold war transformation..

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