Street-Level Bureaucracy Study In The Implementation Of The First Middle School Education (Case Study In Kupang Regency)

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ABSTRACT:

Purpose: The research was conducted with the aim of examining the phenomenon of effective and efficient implementation of the street-level bureaucracy in several schools in Kupang Regency. This is because the executors of the education policies (street-level bureaucrats and managers) still consider themselves to be the holders of the authority to regulate, so that there are a number of aspects in the bureaucracy that are ignored. It is hoped that the street-level bureaucracy will encourage the improvement of the quality of education in Indonesia. If the opposite happens, then the hope for an improved quality of education cannot be achieved.

Research Methodology: The type of study used in this research is a case study with the school organization as the unit of analysis. The informants in this study will be selected purposively. In analyzing the data, the writer used Miles and Huberman's analysis model.

Results: This research produces findings in the form of important factors that influence the implementation of street-level bureaucracy. These factors are divided into two, namely supporting factors and inhibiting factors.

Limitations: This study only focuses on few schools in Kupang Regency, so that the findings and discussion in the study do not describe the condition of the education bureaucracy in Kupang Regency in a comprehensive and detailed manner.

Contribution: The results of this study can be used as a scientific basis for evaluating the implementation of street-level bureaucracy in schools in Kupang Regency. In addition, this research can be scientific information for students of Administration science.

Keywords:

Bureaucrats, Education, Schools and Street-level Bureaucrats.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Government of the Republic of Indonesia holds the National Examination (UN) every year at every level of education from basic education (Elementary School and Junior High School) to senior secondary education (Senior High School/Vocational High School), except in the 2019/2020 Academic Year due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The determination of passing the National Exam up to 2014 is based on the National Exam Score Standards, which means that the National Exam scores are the main determining factor for student graduation. Many parties object to the implementation of the National Examination as a determinant of graduation because the 8 (eight) National Education Standards (SNP) have not been fulfilled for all schools in Indonesia, but the government continues to implement it with the aim of mapping the quality of education in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the determination of graduation is left to the school.

The facts show that in Kupang Regency, the efficient and effective implementation of the street-level bureaucracy is still in place because the implementers of education policies (street-level bureaucrats and managers) still consider themselves as individuals who have the authority to regulate. This results in a number of aspects in the bureaucracy being sidelined, such as regulatory aspects in the form of quality standard rules that have not been adhered to and the division of tasks that is not in accordance with the disciplines occupied due to the lack of teachers. This results in the emergence of inefficiencies and ineffectiveness in the administration and management of education, which in turn results in the emergence of low quality education. At the basic education level, most of the elementary and junior high schools in Kupang Regency have a passing rate of 100%, but the National Exam/School Exam scores are still below 55,

the standard score set by the National Education Standards Agency (BSNP).

Looking at the facts above, the researchers tried to explore the factors causing the low quality of basic education (Elementary Schools and Junior High Schools), but due to budget constraints and seeing the critical point of a very large problem, it even had an impact on the level of public trust in public organizations, namely Junior High Schools as institutions. Junior High School prepares human resources to enter into the selection of competency fields of expertise or majors in educational units above it, so that the researchers only conduct studies related to the low quality of education in Junior High Schools based on existing empirical evidence.

Empirical data prove that in the implementation of junior high school education in Kupang Regency, the average National Exam (UN) score is still below the average score set by BSNP since the last 5 (five) years for both the Paper-based National Exam (UNKP) and the Computer-Based National Exam (UNBK). The following table shows the data on the average UN score for the last 5 years (Table 1) as follows:

Table 1. Average Middle School National Exam Score for the Last 5 Years.

School Year	Average National Examination Score				Information
	Indonesian	English	Mathematics	Natural Sciences	
2014/2015	57.03	47.75	39.39	46.10	Paper-based National Exam
2015/2016	54.78	42.19	32.71	42.61	Paper-based National Exam
2016/2017	52.93	44.02	39.28	41.14	Paper-based National Exam
2017/2018	56.34	40.81	32.78	39.29	Computer Based National Exam
	55.75	44.34	34.95	40.74	Paper-based National Exam
2018/2019	56.63	41.38	35.42	40.05	Computer Based National Exam
	59.22	38.89	38.93	39.07	Paper-based National Exam

Source: Kupang Regency Education and Culture Office, 2019

Meanwhile, the data for the ranking of the UN scores for the last 3 years in Kupang Regency are shown in Table 2 as follows:

Table 2. Data on the National Exam Rankings for Kupang Regency for the Last 3 Years.

School Year	Rating	Number of Regencies/Cities Participating in the National Examination	Information
2016/2017	21	22	Paper-based National Exam Participants in 22 Regencies/Cities
2017/2018	19	22	Paper-based National Exam Participants in 22 Regencies/Cities
2018/2019	20	20	Computer-Based National Exam Participants in 20 Regencies/Cities

Source: Kupang Regency Education and Culture Office, 2019

The decline in the scores of junior high schools in Kupang Regency is caused by various factors, including: 1) The role of the street-level bureaucracy that has not been running efficiently and effectively, as shown by facts and empirical data that there is a conflict of purpose between managers and street-level bureaucrats and clients (students, parents and society), there is no unified purpose between managers and street-level bureaucrats and clients, there is a relationship gap between street-level bureaucrats and clients, the behavior of managers, street-level bureaucrats, and clients that are not yet right in supporting the teaching and learning process, the limited resources of the first-level bureaucrats, etc. The implementation of School Based Management (SBM) has not been running well, which is shown by the weaknesses of the leadership in organizing work and conducting supervision. The Quality Assurance System (SPM) that has been implemented has not run optimally, both internally and externally, which is shown by the absence of a quality culture established in standard setting. Internally, education stakeholders, such as school principals and teachers still think that the aspects of Internal MSS in the form of Quality Standards, Quality Mapping, Quality Plans, and Quality Fulfillment and Evaluation are not too important to be implemented because 8 (eight) SNPs have not been fulfilled, even though they are related to school self-evaluation. In addition, aspects of Quality Standards, Quality Mapping, Quality Plans, and Quality Fulfillment and Evaluation have not run well as a system; coupled with external SPM which has not been carried out properly; 2) Government policy regarding the authority given to the school to determine the graduation of exam participants at each level of education, so that the school and other stakeholders in the education sector and exam participants feel less burdened in facing the National Examination. This means that whatever National Exam score obtained does not affect student graduation, because the school determines graduation; 3) Educational Administration in the sense of cooperation between stakeholders to achieve goals that is still partial and does not become a

movement in an effort to improve quality. Teachers only carry out teaching assignments, so that there has not been good cooperation between teachers and parents or teachers and school principals in order to jointly improve the quality of education; 4) Competition or competitiveness that has not appeared in the organization (Education Office/school), teachers, and students, which is still related to quality as something that is mediocre, so that there is no need to fight over and fight for; and 5) the personalities of educational stakeholders that have not been put in place. There is a tendency for schools and teachers to pass students whose grades have not reached the standards due to psychological factors. Teachers and schools do not want to see their students sad because they do not graduate. Teachers and schools hide in the "frame" of Standard Operational Guidelines (POS) issued by the National Education Standards Agency that the school determines Graduation. Personal attitudes must be avoided and they have to promote impersonality and enforce the graduation standards that have been set.

If the 5 (five) factors above are ignored and continue to be sustainable in Indonesia, then nationally, the efforts to educate the nation's life will actually experience a setback, while on the other hand, in the face of such a competitive and tight world of work demands adequate quality Human Resources. Moreover, since 2017, the system for admitting Candidates for Civil Servants has been implemented online by the Ministry of State Apparatus Utilization and Bureaucratic Reform (PANRB) by setting a threshold score/minimum score as an effort to increase capacity and performance in government administration and public services.

If we look at the output of the education policy and the selection system policy by the PANRB Ministry to get very qualified and competent State Civil Servants in their fields of expertise, then the two contradict each other. The government's hope of obtaining qualified State Civil Servants with National Score Standards is not in line with the preparation of human resources by educational units or educational institutions because the graduation of students is no longer determined by the

National Exam which has a National Minimum Score Standards, but it is determined by the Schools Organizing National Exams and School Exams. In other words, a Double Standard has emerged and has been implemented by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, which in turn has resulted in social injustice.

To ensure and improve the quality of education in Indonesia, the government has issued Government Regulation Number 19 of 2005 concerning National Education Standards (SNP) as the minimum criteria for the education system in all jurisdictions of the Republic of Indonesia. The SNPs referred to are 1) Graduate Competency Standards, 2) Content Standards, 3) Process Standards, 4) Educators and Education Personnel Standards, 5) Facilities and Infrastructure Standards, 6) Management Standards, 7) Education Financing Standards, 8) Education Assessment Standards and due to budget constraints, not all schools have fulfilled the 8 (eight) SNPs by 2019, which has an impact on the low quality of education.

In facing empirical problems and policy problems (normative) as described earlier, it is necessary to find solutions based on theoretical studies. Because the low quality of education is allegedly closely related to the weakness of the bureaucracy in Indonesia, the theory and implementation of the bureaucracy should be of concern.

Weber's hopes that the implementation of the bureaucracy would run effectively, efficiently, flexibly, quickly, rationally, and have clear rules and impersonality to meet the needs of the public vanished when the Bureaucratic Oversupply Model Theory, Niskanen (1971) highlights Weber's bureaucracy regarding organizations that are too large, so that it needs to be minimized and its role is legalized to the private sector. This contradicts the New Public Service Theory (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000) stating that the public sector cannot be replaced by the private sector because it has its own management and this has become a criticism of Weber's bureaucracy.

In addition, Mariana (2006) argued that the facts showed that the bureaucracy of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia occurred inefficiently, the quantity was too large both in structure and number of people, and tended to be slow and rigid in providing public services. These criticisms were often expressed openly, even though no one overtly responded. This is a sign that even though the bureaucracy is ridiculed, the bureaucracy remains resilient, as stated by du Gay (2005) that the collapse of the bureaucracy has been anticipated, and demanded, many times throughout the history of management thought, as well as in modern social and political theory. However, despite the constant ridicule on it, the bureaucracy, both as an organizational ideal and as an organizational instrument of various formats, has proven to be very resilient. The report of its death was premature. This is not a defense of the bureaucracy and ignores the facts showing that bureaucracy needs to be managed.

Sanrego Nz and Muhammad (2013) argued that a bureaucratic system that was still chaotic and full of intervention makes the bureaucracy run on its own path without any comprehensive improvement in its entire structure. The existence of a development setback in Indonesia is a form of poor representation of the bureaucratic system, so that socio-economic diseases have plagued the Indonesian government and caused the development system to become stagnant. Based on the description of the opinions above, it can be argued that the implementation of the Weber bureaucracy in Indonesia is still at the conceptual level and has not been implemented properly in all aspects of life because Indonesia is a country that has different socio-economic characteristics from western countries, so that it needs adaptation.

Seeing the different characteristics of each country, David Osborn and Ted Gaebler also spoke through scientific studies and Modern Bureaucratic theory, which argued that the implementation of the bureaucracy used the following principles: 1) Control, 2) Community empowerment, 3) Promotion and competition, 4) Achievement of missions, 5) Result orientation, 6) Prioritizing society, 7) Productivity and efficiency, 8) Anticipatory, 9) Participative, 10) Market power. The ten

principles stated above are the theory of modern bureaucracy (David Osborn and Ted Gaebler, 1996), which should assist the government of the Republic of Indonesia in carrying out development because in developing the government, the task is to control, empower society, promote and create healthy competition, be flexible in enforcing rules for mission achievement, results-oriented, prioritizes the interests of the community, prioritizes productivity and efficiency, be anticipatory and participatory in nature, and pays attention to market forces.

To develop the Indonesian people completely, the government has made efforts to carry out bureaucratic reforms in various development sectors. In the economic sector, the government has been de-bureaucratized by deregulating various rules for accelerating development, as a short-term goal. With the existence of deregulation, the government can encourage and empower the economic sector of the community, such as MSMEs, which according to Jati et al. (2017), have the reliability and resilience in facing economic crisis situations in Indonesia. However, it has not yet reached the long-term goal of creating a more capable administrative capacity for the development of human quality. For this purpose, it is necessary to develop a suitable new administrative system, namely an administrative system that has a more open structure or is adaptively organic in nature as suggested by Bennis (1969).

Effendi (1987) argued that the development of human quality included five dimensions, namely the capacity to produce, equity, giving greater authority to the people, awareness of interdependence between humans and their environment as well as relations between regions and between nations, and also an emphasis on the principle of sustainability. Observing the problems of the quality of education in Indonesia in the last five years, especially in Kupang Regency, these five dimensions are very important to find alternative solutions.

Riggs (1957) raised the existence of a traditional administrative system that produced inefficient administrative ritualism as a result of bureaucracy or the result of Weber's theory of

bureaucratization. What Effendi said actually challenged or criticized Weber's theory because of the problems that occur with human quality. The quality of humans can be determined by the quality of education. Quality of education is influenced by various factors and one of the factors is bureaucracy. Therefore, de-bureaucratization that is a part of the educational bureaucracy becomes an alternative in building the quality of people and society.

Regarding debureaucratization, Eisenstadt (1959) also spoke through the results of his research that in order to maintain a balance between whether bureaucracy was needed or not, an equilibrium dynamic was needed, which Eisenstadt described as moving between: (1) Maintaining autonomy and power; (2) Bureaucratization; and (3) Debureaucratization. What Eisenstadt has argued shows that the last discussion regarding the dynamics of equilibrium is debureaucratization. The facts show that the implementation of the bureaucracy looks stiff and sluggish, as a result of which public services have not been maximized. The effectiveness and efficiency aspects are not yet visible and still dominated by efforts to maintain regional autonomy and power, bureaucratization, and debureaucratization. In other words, our bureaucracy is not qualified. That is why in this study, the researcher raised the theme of bureaucracy, especially street-level bureaucracy in the implementation of junior high school education.

Education is an interesting, relevant, and never-ending theme to be discussed anytime and anywhere. Even in developed countries like the United States, education is always being discussed. It is not because education in developed countries is problematic, but to support progress in the education sector, it demands to be discussed. Moreover, education in Indonesia is shrouded in various problems that have almost brought the quality of education to the brink of collapse. Education must have the main place for discussion. Seeing this condition, the government continues to make efforts to improve the quality of education by means of quality control. Tola (2009) argued that education quality control is essentially the control of human resources

whose competency achievements can be known through a number of National Education Standards.

Today's National Education Standardization has become a target in a science war between a group that accepts National Education Standardization, as it is today an objective, on the one hand, and a group that is cautious about National Education Standardization, which is something subjective one, on the other hand. Tilaar (2012) argued that the academic debate on National Education Standardization was not aimed at seeking agreement, but rather looked at the problem of National Education Standardization from various perspectives that actually led to disagreements so that it needed to be discussed and formulated a new, clearer paradigm. This is solely for improving the quality of education in Indonesia. Therefore, to be able to improve the quality of education, Street-Level Governance is needed in the implementation of basic education, namely the management of education that is carried out by basic education units in the spirit of School Based Management (MBS) which is in an Internal Quality Assurance System (SPMI) which is processed with the spirit of New Public Service, Good Governance, Inclusive Education, proper discretion, relationships of good behavior and performance, and creating a culture of quality to get a good level of public service satisfaction for public governance, corporate governance, civil society, etc.

Starting from the empirical problems, policy problems, and theoretical problems that have been described previously, the researchers are interested in conducting research with the title, "Street-Level Bureaucracy Study in the Implementation of the First Middle School Education (Case Study in Kupang Regency)".

2. Literature Review

2.1 The Concept of Bureaucracy and Its Development

Max Weber, related to bureaucratic relations and economic development, first introduced the concept of bureaucracy. Max Weber defined bureaucratization as a prerequisite for economic development and the creation of modern industry. Giddens (1985) argued that for Weber to achieve a modern economy, rapid industrialization and take off, sustainable growth, and bureaucracy were needed. What Weber conveyed deeply touched development in the economic sector, despite the fact that there was still excessive bureaucratization in developing countries, such as Indonesia, where it seemed that bureaucratization was a burden that hindered economic progress.

Evers (1985) analyzed three patterns of bureaucratization as follows: First, bureaucratization was a process of rationalizing government procedures and state administrative apparatus. This process was a part of Weber's theory, so that Evers called it Weberization or Weber's bureaucratization. The second one was the bureaucratization process in the form of increasing the number of civil servants and enlarging government organizations. This kind of pattern is called Evers' Parkinson's Bureaucratization. Third, bureaucratization was a process of expanding government power with the intention of controlling the economic, political, and social activities of the community by means of rules, regulations, and if necessary, coercion. This pattern was called by Evers by the name of Orwell's Bureaucratization. Based on the 3 (three) patterns of bureaucratization above, which are relevant to the problems that occur, they are actually related to the first pattern, which emphasizes the process of rationalizing government procedures, so that the bureaucracy that is implemented is actually carried out regularly with clear boundaries of authority according to hierarchy authority owned.

Bureaucracy actually starts from the rational relationship of a group of people to achieve certain goals. Hummel (2015) argued that the goal of bureaucracy was "rational" action. Action is rational for two reasons: first, if an action is a logical means of achieving a clear goal; second, if and only if the action is performed in such a way that the ends of the logic are visible. Action in the bureaucracy does not just have to be action; it must also be subject to control. If it cannot be controlled, then it is not an act. Or, to be more precise, it might be an act, but the bureaucracy itself cannot take official attention to it.

Organizational goals, as expressed by Hummel, will be achieved if there is a good relationship with each member of the organization to gather and build agreement in achieving organizational goals. Weber reminded that good relations of organizational members are shown by the behavior of organizational members. This is what is studied in bureaucracy, as stated by Thoha (2017) that bureaucracy is a system that tries to understand behaviors in an organization that can remain rational, so that efforts to achieve organizational goals are effective. Therefore, the bureaucracy remains because nothing has replaced its structural system and because it offers a stable, durable, and reliable institutional arrangement for governance and administration in the public and private or non-profit, local, national, and global sectors (Berman, 2009). Thus, organizations are in dire need of bureaucracy.

A good and organic organization, at least characterized by Weber's bureaucracy, is as follows: 1) the relationship between people in the organization must be regulated in the form of regulations, so that each person knows the role, authority, and clear boundaries. 2) A hierarchical level and level of authority must be made, so that those at the top level have authority and control at the lower level. 3) Must be based on written documents. 4) People who occupy positions in the organization must be trained people, and 5) the working relationship between people in the organization is based on a relationship of impersonality, which is not based on personal relationships, such as compassion, heartlessness, and pity because of relatives/family/good friends, etc.

Regarding the bureaucracy, Weber presents the main ideas that are still relevant, such as: 1) the bureaucracy carries out regular activities needed to achieve organizational goals, is distributed in certain ways, and is considered official tasks. A strict division of tasks makes it possible to employ only experts with certain specializations in certain positions and make them responsible for carrying out their respective tasks effectively, 2) Office organization follows a hierarchical principle, namely: that the lower units in an office are under the supervision and development of a higher unit, 3) The implementation of tasks is governed by a system of abstract rules that are consistent and include the application of rules in certain cases. 4) Ideal officials carry out their duties in the spirit of *sine ira et studio* (formal and not personal), without feelings of resentment, lust, like it or not, and without interfering with personal matters, 5) Work in bureaucratic organizations is based on technical qualifications and protected from unilateral dismissal, and 6) Experience shows that the type of administrative organization that is purely bureaucratic from a technical point of view will be able to achieve the highest level of efficiency.

The bureaucracy overcomes the problems that stand out in the organization, namely how to maximize efficiency in the organization, not just solving individual problems. The characteristics of Weber's bureaucracy stated above can be studied and made bureaucratic innovations to reform education policies so as to improve the quality of education in Indonesia.

Bureaucratic innovation according to Muttaqin (2011) is a bureaucracy that has a capacity that can be seen from several factors that are interrelated and interact with one another. Those factors include: 1) Individual factors of bureaucratic apparatus, with capacity indicators in the form of knowledge, ability, and competence; 2) Institutional factors, with capacity indicators in the form of leadership, resources, decision making, and information systems and management; 3) Community (public) factors, with capacity indicators in the form of knowledge, control, cooperation, and proactivity; 4) System factors, with capacity indicators in the form of Regulatory framework and supporting policies.

The factors presented above allow the innovation of the government bureaucracy in order to improve the quality of public services. Banga (2018) stated that if the bureaucracy wished to improve service quality, there were at least 2 (two) things that needed to be considered. First, creating creativity for the bureaucratic apparatuses, and second, creating a competitive climate among the bureaucratic apparatuses. The two things described above should be important components in the effort to

improve the quality of education because they contain aspects of creativity and competition.

Bureaucratic development or bureaucratic reform has been implemented since the new order. However, it seems that the implementation is still running in place or in other words, why is the bureaucratic decline being neglected? Do the bureaucratic elites lack academic guidance to carry out bureaucratic development? The above problems can only be answered by using academic references based on the three major paradigms of public administration as suggested by Keban (2014) and Rahayu and Juwono (2019). The three paradigms referred to by Keban, Rahayu, and Juwono are Old Public Administration (OPA), New Public Management (NPM), and New Public Service (NPS). If examined more deeply, OPA is a part of Classical Bureaucratic Theory, while NPM and NPS are parts of Modern Bureaucratic Theory. Each paradigm can be described in detail in the following sections.

2.2 The Role of Street-level Bureaucrats

Lipsky (2010) suggested that street-level bureaucrats were public service workers who represented the government in providing services to the community. The actions of most public service workers are actually services provided by the government. Public service workers are street-level bureaucrats. When the individual actions and decisions of public service workers are carried out simultaneously, they become institutional policies. The place, where public services are provided, is called Street-level Bureaucracy (SLB).

School is SLB. Teachers are Street-level bureaucrats whose role is to convey government policies to citizens (parents, students, and society). As public service workers, teachers interact directly with citizens and have substantial discretion in carrying out their work as street-level bureaucrats, teacher's structure, and in rewarding students as their clients.

Furthermore, Lipsky stated that street-level bureaucrats limited the movement of their clients because they had certain goals to be achieved. Therefore, the extension of service benefits must be accompanied by an extension of state influence (authority) and control. This

hope disappeared when reality showed in the opinion of Lavee and Cohen (2017) that the main challenge for street-level bureaucrats was to be placed in a relatively low position in the organizational hierarchy and they did not have the authority or formal justification to be involved in policy design. This contrasts with the NPM paradigm, which requires a more selfless, and client-oriented form of SLB, where in practice, street-level bureaucrats consider their interests, organizations, and clients (Lavee and Cohen, 2017). As providers of public benefits and custodians of public order, street-level bureaucrats have been the center of attention of political controversies. They are constantly attacked by demands of service recipients to increase their effectiveness and responsiveness to the demands of citizen groups.

Street-level bureaucrats dominate political controversies over public services for two main reasons. First, it is the debate about the appropriate scope of public services and the focus of government services which is basically a debate about the scope and functions of public servants. Second, street-level bureaucrats have a great impact on people's lives. Street-level bureaucrats play a role in socializing to citizens about the expectations of government services. They also play a role in determining whether or not each citizen is worthy of receiving a government award or punishment. They supervise the services received by citizens in programs provided by the government.

Thus, in a certain sense, the street-level bureaucrats implicitly mediate aspects of the constitutional relationship between citizens and the state. Therefore, first, street-level bureaucrats generate political controversy because they must be directed if policies are to be changed. Second, street-level bureaucrats tend to be at the center of political controversy which is the closeness of their interactions with citizens and their impact on people's lives. Policies conveyed by street-level bureaucrats are often direct and personal. They usually make decisions on the spot (although they sometimes try not to) and their resolve is focused on the individual. The decisions of the

street-level bureaucrats tend to be redistributive and allocative.

A defining aspect of the work environment of street-level bureaucrats is that they have to deal with clients' personal relationships to their decisions, but they overcome the implications. The work of street-level bureaucrats is not much different from the ideal bureaucracy, which emphasizes impersonality in decision-making. In the world of large organizations, it seems that impersonality holds the key to the importance of the principle of benefits, sanctions and opportunities, and the ambiguity of work boundaries that pass on the expectations of a client.

In carrying out their duties, street-level bureaucrats play an important role in regulating the level of contemporary conflict based on their role as agents of social control. Citizens who receive public benefits interact with public institutions that require certain behavior from them because the focus of citizens in protesting against the SLB actions can be associated with familiar relationships with public institutions. Street-level workers also exercise close supervision and maintain close surveillance in attempts to deviate from organizational behavior. In public education practice, disciplinary policies and instructions are more flexible or disciplinary punishments appear to be more rigid.

From the point of view of citizens, the role of street-level bureaucrats is as broad as government functions and intensive experience, such as daily routine which requires them to interact with related institutions. In general, street-level bureaucrats absorb a large proportion of public resources and are the focus of public expectations while maintaining a healthy balance between public service providers and the burden of public services. As individuals, street-level bureaucrats have hopes for citizens to get fair and effective treatment by the government.

The street-level bureaucrat's social control function requires a response in the discussion of the place of public service workers in the larger society. The public service sector plays an important role in clarifying the impact of the education system primarily on those who are not beneficiaries and encouraging people to

accept neglect or incapacity of primary education and social institutions.

Lipsky (2010) revealed that in general, street-level bureaucrats had different job priorities from managers. At least, workers (bureaucrats) have an interest in minimizing job hazards and inconveniences and maximizing income and personal satisfaction. This priority is of interest to most of the management simply because it is related to productivity and effectiveness. In SLB, workers at lower levels tend to have much less difference with management. Worker compliance is affected by the degree to which the manager's request is considered legitimate. Street-level bureaucrats may perceive a manager's right to provide direction as legitimate, but they may perceive the manager's policy objectives as invalid. Teachers are asked to participate in educational programs instead where they do not believe they reject policy objectives in various ways.

One of the ways in which the interests of street-level bureaucrats depart from managers is their need to process workloads quickly and free of real and psychological threats. The fact that street-level bureaucrats have to exercise discretion in processing large numbers of jobs with insufficient resources means that they have to cut corners and simplify things to cope with the burden of responsibility. Coping mechanisms (problem solving) developed by street-level bureaucrats are often not approved by managers.

Managers are interested in achieving results consistent with organizational goals. Street-level bureaucrats are interested in processing work consistent with their preferences and only agency policies are so prominent that they need to be backed up with significant sanctions. These sanctions must be limited. If everything gets priority, nothing will work.

Lower-level workers develop coping mechanisms that go against institutional policies but they are actually the basis for their survival. Street-level bureaucrats have a vested interest in securing job completion requirements. Meanwhile, managers are result-oriented. Street-level bureaucrats are concerned with performance, the costs of supporting

performance, and only those aspects of the process that accompany them to close scrutiny.

Another aspect of the importance of the role of street-level bureaucrats is the desire to maintain and expand autonomy. Managers seek to limit workers' discretion to obtain certain outcomes, but street-level bureaucrats often perceive such efforts as illegitimate and having more or less succeeded in stifling them. Street-level bureaucrats have some claims of professional status but they also have bureaucratic status that requires compliance with superior directives. This means that street-level bureaucrats will perceive their interests separated from those of the manager. Therefore, street-level bureaucrats will seek to secure these interests using existing administrative rules and regulations to avoid reforms that limit their excretion. Work combined with the worker's desire to continue serving a particular client restores the discretionary power that the new rules are designed to eliminate.

Another source of continuing differences in the interests of bureaucrats and street-level managers is their ongoing interactions with clients and the varying degrees of complexity in these interactions. Modern bureaucracies gain legitimacy with a commitment to standards of fairness and equality. However, street-level bureaucrats are constantly faced with the real injustice of treating people alike. The teachers acknowledge that all children deserve their attention but also think that some children need more attention than others. Not only are standards of fairness insufficient to determine the level of concern, but street-level bureaucrats, like everyone else, have personal standards of whether a person is appropriate or not. In some circumstances, it may be appropriate to apply service standards with respect to personal and institutional characteristics. Most street-level bureaucrats want broad discretion because society does not want computerized public services and the adoption of rigid standards at the expense of responsiveness to individual conditions.

2.3 SLB Working Conditions

Lipsky (2010) revealed that SLBs were consistently criticized for their inability to provide responsive and appropriate services.

The experience of seeking services through a bureaucracy that processes people is considered by many to be inhuman. The results obtained from the rigid and unresponsive behavior pattern of street-level bureaucrats' substantial discretion are carried out in a specific work context. Like other policy makers, they work in an environment that conditions the way they perceive problems and find solutions to them. The work environment of street-level bureaucrats is structured by general conditions that give rise to general patterns of practice that influence the direction of the patterns taken. It is basically adapted to the shared situational context of street-level work, which allows generalizations about political and social roles.

Street-level bureaucrats work in uncertain conditions, so that they have relatively higher levels of policy. Usually, they face the following conditions: 1) Inadequate resources compared to the task they are assigned to do, 2) Service demand that tends to increase to meet input, 3) Expectations of institutional goals that tend to be ambiguous, vague, or conflicting, 4) Performance-oriented towards achievement of goals that tends to be difficult to measure, 5) Clients who are usually not voluntary.

2.4 Why Resources Are Inadequate In SLB

One of the difficulties faced by special schools is insufficient resource. Personal resources are always limited for SLBs to do their jobs because the demand for services always increases to consume the marginal supply (Ellis, Davis, and Rummery, 1999; Lipsky, 1980; Murray, 2006). Lipsky (2010) revealed that most executives stated that their institutions did not have the resources or at least were constrained by resource constraints. This is generally experienced by public organizations, but does not pose a threat because they do not have direct contact with citizens as experienced by special schools. SLB is experiencing chronic resource constraints.

A distinctive feature of street-level bureaucratic work arrangements is that the demand for services tends to increase to fulfill services. If additional services are available, then the demand will increase to take advantage of them. As more resources become available, demands for additional services that make use of those resources will arise. One of the

dimensions of service demand is quantity. Public expectations and demands for public services increase over time. In the case of police, for example, the society expects them to intervene more in social conflicts, such as racial violence, attacks on black people, family disputes, etc.

In order to understand the relationship between resources and practice, one concern is to understand the meaning of demand in public services. Demand is not only a part of the transaction between citizens and government but it is also a transactional concept. This means that it does not only require requests, but services that must also be of concern. In more concrete terms, the demand for services can be predicted but ultimately cannot be known abstractly. Excessive expressions of demand for services tend to be more responsive to changes in service availability perceptions than to changes in underlying conditions that should generally affect demand. In other words, the perception of service availability "attracts" demand, not the other way around.

The proposition that the demand for services will increase is valid both qualitatively and quantitatively. In line with this proposition, there are at least three things that need attention. First, as previously mentioned, SLBs usually prefer additional services to service upgrades if they have insufficient resources. Second, claims of quality improvement in the form of spending more time are often overlooked. Caseload is often divided informally into active and inactive categories. Inactive cases are often not really inactive but they are cases that street-level bureaucrats cannot avoid in their day-to-day activities. Their priorities are considered low for reasons that have little to do with clients but much to do with pressure on workers. A social worker is required to make more home visits. Third, the change in value can be achieved through reducing caseload and the results tend to be small. With limited resources, it may be desirable to add more specialists rather than to alleviate all classes equally. However, the problem remains that the burden on general classroom teachers will not be fixed. This is not to condemn such developments, but simply to raise the question of whether a substantial

increase in public workers' budgets can reduce workload stress enough to make a difference in the way clients are processed if other working conditions remain the same.

When special schools experience a decrease in demand (few students) due to population movement and uneven age distribution, lightening the caseload may not translate directly into acceptable bureaucratic behavior. In particular, a reduction in caseload cannot be expected to result in the improvement seen in practice. Inadequate resource pressure may still be responsible for questionable practice because: (1) variations in caseload do not cross a threshold which substantially improves practice; (2) caseload pressure contributes to the environment that remains even though conditions are slightly improving; and (3) the working context of the special school has several components that interact with each other. The caseload pressure can interact with other factors to determine behavior without having to vary directly with the intended behavior.

A complication in providing services via SLB arises because the demand for services is sometimes unpredictable. People using or claiming services cannot be relied on to allocate time needed for bureaucratic emergencies. This is clearly the case in emergency services, where the essence of adequacy is the capacity to deal with the unexpected. Street-level bureaucracy works in situations where resource issues in cases cannot be resolved. Inadequate resources are devoted to marginal quality improvement.

Analysis of the service-demand problem should not be taken as hopeless. Public policy requires consideration of the tradeoffs seen in providing additional resources for co-benefits and incurring additional costs. With additional resources, more people can be served. Service-demand problems in SLB indicate that problems with the quality of service delivery will not easily result in increased resources. Another thing that is assumed to be the same is that increased capacity results in reproduction of a higher level of service quality at a higher volume for each increase in resource availability. This proposition is very important because it explains why the steady increase in

available resources, or SLB, has not resulted in quality improvements.

SLB is often trapped in the cycle of mediocrity. The better the program and the more responsive it is to citizens' needs, the greater the demand for these services. Greater demand forces agencies to artificially restrict services or charge clients in the absence of a pricing mechanism. Imposing a lower amount of fees charged to clients or difficulties in receiving services will continue to have an impact on client needs. The more successful the organization, the more likely it is to face this dilemma.

In government agencies, usually, government programs that are in free demand will increase to the point where the goods or services can be provided. In response to this request, the agency providing the goods or services will charge both monetary and non-monetary costs to limit demand effectively. SLB has also developed a rationing mechanism for charging service fees.

SLB should not provide rationing services. The SLB must provide evidence of striving to avoid service reductions. SLB is asked to reduce costs that are not really important, but do not reduce the quality of services or the quantity of vital services. It is the best secret in government about how agencies find expenditures that are not too important to cut and services that are not too important to be eliminated, but never affect the "vital programs" and "needed services".

The dynamics of the SLB service-demand provide additional understanding of chronic (persistent) understaffing. Unfulfilled demand for services in basic social programs results in institutions typically responding, and being forced to respond by adding services or clients or by replenishing existing resources under tight budget pressures. Public service ethics require that SLB provide more than what is done or given rather than using additional resources to improve the balance of demand and resources. Sometimes, institutions enjoy freedom from tight control over spending. Furthermore, institutions can add quality improvements or reduce caseload pressure as educators can over time.

After the elaboration of the theory and its correlation with Street-Level in the implementation of Junior High School education, to analyze the Street-Level Bureaucratic Study in the Implementation of Junior High School Education in Kupang Regency, the researcher used Lipsky's (1980) Street-level Bureaucracy Theory as a knife of analysis, which emphasized that Street-level Bureaucracy must have the following criteria:
1. Discretion;
2. Resource;
3. Behavior;
4. Performance;
5. Relation;
6. Conflict of Purpose;
7. Control;
8. Administrative inequality;

These criteria will be discussed and related to the phenomena occurring in Kupang Regency in the discussion chapter.

3. Research methodology

The paradigm used in this study is interpretive. The type of study used in this research is a case study. The unit of analysis in this study is the School Organization because schools are organizations that are directly competent in providing education. In selecting informants, researchers are expected to be able to see the abilities of the informants, so that the research objectives to be achieved can be answered. The informants in this study will be selected purposively, namely the determination of informants based on certain considerations, such as being able to know the development of education in schools, and will be selected using the snow-ball technique, namely the technique of determining informants who are initially small in number then enlarged until the data are declared saturated. The location of this research is in Kupang Regency, East Nusa Tenggara Province, namely at State Junior High Schools or Private Junior High Schools that have or have not implemented SBM, which sufficiently fulfill 8 (eight) SNPs and which have not yet been used as a comparison by looking at better test scores and schools that have or have not implemented SPMI. After the data were collected, they were then analyzed. In analyzing the data, the writer used Miles and Huberman's analysis model. Miles and

Huberman (1992) stated that qualitative data analysis was carried out interactively and continued to completion, so that the data became saturated. Data analysis activities consist of several stages, namely data reduction, data display, and verification/conclusion drawing.

4. Results and discussions

4.1 Street-Level Bureaucracy in the Implementation of Junior High School Education in Kupang Regency

a. Discretion

SLB (managers and street-level bureaucrats) have the authority to plan, implement, evaluate, and carry out follow-up efforts. Internally, special schools create discretion in preparing the school curriculum. Externally, the policy in the form of discretion comes from the Kupang Regency Regional Government which affirms and seeks to improve the quality of junior high school education by paying attention to educational resources (street-level bureaucrats), namely by dismissing teachers who only have high school diplomas. Paying attention to the minimal resources they have, street-level managers (school principals) perform discretion in the form of action by trying to approach the office to find competent teachers. Another thing that is interesting and becomes a supporting factor for discretion is related to the ability given to special schools to determine student graduation. SLB has discretion in determining the passing of the final exam participants. In addition, street-level managers can exercise discretion through the decision to continue to divide tasks by upholding specialization and professionalism, so that it can be argued that discretion has a special place in SLB, so that it requires the manager's courage to do so, as long as it is done only for the sake of improving the quality of education.

Discretion is one of the critical success factors in special schools. In an effort to improve the quality of school education, the school is given the authority to determine student graduation. However, the authority given to manage BOS funds is limited because its use still follows or is subject to technical guidelines given by the government, so that schools do not manage it freely (have limited discretion), even though the schools are aware of the problems they are facing.

The technical guidelines for the management of BOS funds limit the authority of special schools in developing their schools. On the one hand, it is good because it fulfills government demand, but on the other hand, it is not good because it does not answer the needs of SLB. Even so, schools still adhere to technical guidelines because they do not want to get in touch with the law. Schools have limited discretion due to technical guidelines issued by the source of funds, thus becoming an obstacle in implementing programs in schools as special schools. Street-level bureaucrats (teachers) also have limited discretion in educating and guiding clients (students) because they are limited by various rules, let alone those in direct contact with human rights. Limited discretion shows relative autonomy, as stated by Garston (1993) regarding the Marxist class analysis that bureaucrats and organizational managers only have relative autonomy. As a result, teachers (street-level bureaucrats) are not free to educate students for fear of committing human rights violations. Therefore, in exercising discretion, the safety factor is an important concern. Discretion is not only in theory in SLB, but in its implementation, it is regulated in Law Number 30 of 2014 concerning State Administration, in particular article (1) number (9), which specifically regulates discretion.

b. Resource

One of the determining factors in special schools is resource. SLB has minimal resources to survive. The survival of the junior high schools is built by the Kupang Regency Government because of the minimal resources they have. In order to increase the resources of special schools, street-level bureaucrats have to be upgraded through the Subject Teacher Training. Human Resources above are really a concern because special schools require specialization in carrying out street-level jobs. There is a minimum standard of educational qualifications that SLBs must adhere to in recruiting resources (street-level bureaucrats). Responding to the minimal resources possessed by junior high schools in Kupang Regency, namely junior high school students taught by

teachers with high school certificates, Kupang Regency is firm and dismissing these teachers as a form of support for efforts to improve quality because teachers with high school certificates do not meet the qualifications mandated by government regulation Number 16 of 2017 that Junior High School Teachers should have at least diplomas or bachelor's degrees. In addition, specialization is an important factor in street-level work. This is invisible and becomes a limiting factor because the specialties work outside the specialization. Limited resources require managers to exercise discretion to answer client's needs as the main target in SLB services. Apart from the obstacles that arise from street-level bureaucrats (teachers), human resource constraints arise from the street-level managers themselves because most of the managers (principals) at junior high schools in Kupang Regency do not have the competence as school principals.

In addition to human resources, special schools need to be supported by financial resources. Because of the free education program in Junior High Schools, the only financial resource comes from the School Operational Assistance (BOS) fund, the amount of which depends on the number of students. This is contrary to the principles of Local Governance (Shah, 2006), which has the authority to set quality standards, collect revenue, and provide services. This principle is used by other school that has small BOS fund and has good relationships with clients (students and parents) to pay teacher salaries. Financial resources are also a concern because SLB is faced with a difficult situation. However, special schools build relationships with educational stakeholders, such as parents of students, to get financial support. Financial resource support from the school committee is also carried out for the provision of learning facilities to support the learning process. In addition to the discretion made by schools as special schools in finding solutions for their minimal resources, stakeholders, such as the Education Office, provide financial resources to support the procurement of school infrastructure. This step was taken by special schools in order to meet the needs of 8 (eight) National Education Standards, specifically to

address the need for honorarium teachers. This is beyond the provisions regarding free education, but it is a special school's discretion in answering the needs of schools. However, the financial resources owned by schools are limited (minimum), so that they cannot meet the 8 (eight) National Education Standards. This has become an inhibiting factor in the implementation of junior high school education in Kupang Regency. Schools only rely on BOS funds. Inadequate financial resources become an obstacle to implement the SLB. Therefore, SLB must build good relationships with stakeholders in order to find a solution.

Infrastructure resources are a support for improving the quality of education. The availability of resources in special schools is not only supported by the school committee, but it is also the government's obligation as a public service provider and the fulfillment is carried out in stages. Inadequate infrastructure resources hinder the implementation of SLB, so that the infrastructure resources available at Junior High Schools in Kupang Regency do not meet the minimum standards required in the SNP.

c. Performance, Behavior, and Relationships

Measuring performance is essential for establishing efficiency benchmarks, comparing performance across time and providers, and assessing the effectiveness of public education investments (Lewis and Pettersson, 2009). In the SPMI aspect, client performance is the focus of attention. When clients (students) are well controlled by SLB (managers and street-level bureaucrats) and parents, then achievement (as student performance) can be achieved.

To support efforts to improve quality, it is necessary to have good behavior that emerges from street-level bureaucrats (teachers). Hoy, Miskel, and Tarter (2013) suggested that bureaucratic expectations determined appropriate behavior for a particular role or position. A teacher, for example, has an obligation to plan learning experiences for his/her students and has an obligation to engage students in an effective and pedagogical manner. The teacher's actions or behavior in involving students in learning are the hopes of

the bureaucracy. Good teacher behavior is shown through his/her performance and will emerge if it is done with awareness. The majority of informants stated that not only did they really carry out their duties but doing it with great patience was also a part of good behavior.

Hard work is the behavior that every SLB expects in carrying out his/her services because the evidence of hard work can be measured in performance if the manager wants to get good performance from every street-level bureaucrat. Street-level clients and bureaucrats as well as street-level managers do not only show good behavior because managers who manage SLB are asked to display good behavior and performance. Good behavior can result in good performance too. Good school principal behavior is also carried out in building relationships with stakeholders.

Based on statements from informants, it can be argued that good behavior can create good relationships and can support high SLB performance. According to Lewis and Pettersson (2009), the most important things for high performance are standards, information, incentives, and accountability. Furthermore, Lewis and Pettersson explained that Standards were criteria or benchmarks used to assess and inform educational policies, provisions, and performance that were transparent and publicly known. Incentives are financial or non-financial factors that motivate certain types of behavior or actions and can be positive or negative, that is, encouraging or hindering certain behaviors. Information in the form of clear definitions of outputs and outcomes combined with accurate data on performance and results that is collected regularly allows sanctions to be imposed if specified standards are not met. Accountability refers to holding public officials/service providers accountable for processes and results and imposing sanctions if the specified outputs and results are not delivered. The four aspects above are parts of governance in education. However, the behavior shown by students shows behavior that deviates from the curriculum because the curriculum requires a change in attitude (affective) in support of learning achievement

(performance). Dishonesty was also found in special schools.

Honesty is an important part of educating and guiding students in schools. Therefore, clients should convey what happens when they are not present at school. In addition, there are student behaviors, such as lack of enthusiasm in competing. Clients are not the only ones who show the behavior in SLB, but street-level managers also behave in violation of the rules. The principal as a street-level manager shows behavior that does not build an institution. The performance of schools as special schools is measurable in terms of accountability for the implementation of activities and management of funds against sources of funds. Measurable performance is from properly responsible governance and responsible governance is a part of bureaucratic values. This is in line with the opinion of du Gay (2005), which states that the value of a bureau lies not only in its efficiency and effectiveness, but also in its capacity to support and develop responsible governance. The same thing is expressed by Shah (2006) that responsible governance means having to do it right, namely managing its fiscal resources carefully. It must earn citizens' trust by working better and cost-effectively and by managing fiscal and social risks for society. Efforts must be made to improve the quality and quantity as well as the access to public services. To do so, it is necessary to compare its performance with the best performing local governments.

Fiscal accountability is presented to the sources of funds, to the committee if the source of funds comes from the committee and to the state if the source of the funds comes from BOS, DAK, DAU, or BANTAH funds. Schools that have good performance in terms of accountability will continue to receive support from the school committee. Support from education stakeholders to improve the quality of education will be realized if schools as special schools are able to show their performance. Good behavior results in good performance and vice versa. Teacher behavior that deviates from school rules can reduce performance as a professional. The street-level manager must know to position himself/herself as a manager who can distinguish between

institutional and non-institutional affairs, so that he/she can explicitly warn street-level bureaucrats. An attitude of impersonality must be upheld in the implementation of SLB instead of an interpersonal attitude that is thought and carried out because it will have an impact on organizational performance. Performance appraisal is a must in special schools. If the manager's behavior does not promote impersonality, then the performance appraisal will be something that is mediocre.

Another thing that affects behavior and performance is the amount of rewards or benefits street-level bureaucrats receive after providing public services. Teacher Honor Committee performance decreases when it is slow to receive honoraria, especially when the amount of honorarium is not sufficient for the teachers' daily needs. There is a behavior deviation in carrying out the duties of a teacher due to inadequate welfare as a result of small salaries coupled with the payment of honoraria that is not on time. Behaviors that deviate from expectations also emerge from parents of students as one of the education stakeholders.

d.   Conflict of Purpose

Goals are one of the most important parts of special schools. Purpose is the basis from which the organization is taken. Good goals must be clear and measurable. Purpose is the translation of the vision and mission of the institution. The facts show that junior high schools in the regency do not only have goals but also have visions and missions. This fact is evidenced by observations conducted by researchers and strengthened by documentation data in the form of pictures of the school's vision, mission and objective boards represented by several junior high schools, namelythe Vision, Mission, and Objective Board of the SMPN 1 Kupang Timur and the Vision, Mission, and Objective Board of the SMPN 1 Amfoang Timur.

However, there is a conflict of purpose between managers, street-level bureaucrats, and clients (students and parents). Managers are results-oriented, while street-level bureaucrats emphasize processes. Managers want all test takers to pass 100%, while street-level bureaucrats emphasize good processes and prioritize predetermined quality standards. The

goal of parents enrolling their children to school is to be able to go to school. The only orientation is that their children can go to school and they have not thought about achievement and quality. This is where the conflict of objectives occurs, which in turn has an impact on the quality of education. The behavior shown by the parents in the informant's statement above actually illustrates the conflict between the objectives of the school (the teacher) and the objectives of the parents of the students.

e.   Control

Supervision of public services is a form of control that needs to be well planned and requires commitment to implement it. The control in SLB, which is in Kupang Regency, is more on process control, especially in the teaching and learning process. This greatly supports efforts to improve the quality of education. The facts show that control is exercised in learning activities.

To improve the quality of education, a planned and precise control is required. In addition, in general, schools in Kupang Regency in evaluating or in final exams carry out cross-supervision as a form of control over the implementation of the exam. This cross-supervision is programmed by the school and socialized to teachers, committees, parents and students. The cross-supervision program needs to be disseminated to all parties, so that it is known and encouraged, so that the essence of cross-supervision as a form of joint control can be carried out properly. Control is not only carried out by special schools, but it can also emerge from the community through the committee on the implementation of education in schools. The committee's monitoring of school management is a form of community control over public services in education.

Input control, work speed control (process control) and result control are important parts of SLB. Control is not only carried out by street-level managers, but also by street-level bureaucrats, clients (students/parents), and committees/communities. The facts show that SLB (street-level managers and bureaucrats), in this case the school principal and teachers in Kupang Regency, failed to control the input (student enrollment), because those who

entered Junior High School did not go through selection. No matter how many students are enrolled in the school, all of them are accepted because they are related to the 9-year compulsory education program and SLB fails to control the outcome (learning outcomes-exam results) because all students pass.

SLB controls the student learning process through homework. In the informant's statement above, it was found that there was students' behavior which was not serious about doing the given homework because it required proper control by the school while at school. Proper control can be exercised when teaching and learning activities take place but unfortunately, the principal cannot carry out proper control due to various additional tasks.

f. Policy Environment (content of implementation)

School administration needs to be well organized. Through administration, a number of information and data can be obtained. Data are very important for planning purposes because development planning, including development in education, is based on data. To make it easier to access data in the education sector, both primary and secondary educations, the government through the Ministry of Education and Culture provides the Dapodik (Education Primary Data) application, the DSS (Decision Support System) application, and the PMP (Education Quality Assurance) application. The applications mentioned in the informant's statement above are very helpful for special schools in conducting School Self-Evaluation.

By filling in the instruments provided in the applications correctly, the performance of the institution can be easily measured because the applications provided can be used to evaluate how much the school meets the standards required by the school as an education provider. Applications are a supporting factor for school administration.

However, there are still inequality in administration (imbalance in administration) due to conflicts between institutional norms or rules and biased practices. The resolution of a number of teacher administrations has become the institution's rules, but the relatively many administrations have caused complaints and

biased practices. The teachers finally choose to complete the administrative task because it is a requirement before carrying out teaching and learning activities. There is inequality in administration because on the one hand, teachers prepare themselves (learn) to teach, but on the other hand, school rules regarding teacher administration must be enforced. In addition, there are standard values that are set aside even though they have been determined by an institutional decision, which become institutional norms, due to the consideration of conditional factors experienced by the institution, which creates biased practices. Inequality in administration does not only occur when determining graduation, but also in assessing the performance of teachers and employees, there are still practices that do not advance institutional norms or established rules while teacher performance appraisals and employee performance appraisals are administrative matters, which if implemented properly have an impact on quality of service and education.

5. Conclusion

Based on the findings and previous discussions, several conclusions can be drawn. The factors that support the street-level bureaucracy include: a) There is discretion the school has. Schools as special schools have the authority to plan, organize, implement, supervise, evaluate, and follow up on education programs and activities. Regarding graduates, schools have discretion in determining student graduation. b) There are supporting resources in the form of government policies regarding the determination and distribution of School Operational Assistance (BOS) funds to support the delivery of education, c) There are behaviors, relationships, and measurable performance in the form of implementing MGMP and In House Training programs in schools to strengthen capacity of teachers and commitment from stakeholders (Education Authorities) in building relationships to provide education and training for teachers (street-level bureaucrats) and strengthening the competence of school principals (street-level managers), d) There are school visions, missions, and objectives as a direction for SLB policy, e) There are school administration applications in

the forms of Dapodik (Education Primary Data) application, DSS (Decision Support System), and PMP (Education Quality Assurance) application, f) There is a control, namely a schedule of classroom supervision, g) there is a relationship built by street-level managers with clients (students) to control public services (teaching and learning process). Meanwhile, the factors inhibiting SBM include: a) Limited discretion, in terms of the management of BOS funds, technical guidelines are prepared by the Ministry of Education and Culture, so that it does not answer the basic needs of special schools. In addition, teachers feel the limited discretion when determining student graduation because there is an intervention from the leadership, so that all students are passed. In addition, limited discretion is felt when teachers educate students because they are related to human rights violations and the intervention of parents of students in schools. b) Minimum resources in the forms of inadequate infrastructure, limited quantity and quality of teaching staff and education, limited amount of BOS funds due to the small number of students, the limited budget for education sourced from regional expenditure budget which has not reached 20%, c) There are deviant behaviors, relationships, and performances in the forms of unruly student behavior, teachers who are not aware of carrying out tasks, principals who supervise improperly, Performance Appraisal and Job Achievement that only act as a formality, and parents who like to intervene the task of teaching by teachers, d) Conflict of goals, namely the absences of a unified goal, result-oriented managers and clients, while street-level bureaucrats are process-oriented, e) Inequality in administration, namely inequality in the implementation of minimum standards. Managers are not firm in applying standards as norms or institutional rules, which have an impact on the quality of education, f) The ineffective implementation of control, namely input control that is not implemented because students are limited and there is a 9-year compulsory education program, process control is implemented but is not optimal because there are additional tasks (attending meetings and managing BOS funds), and there is no control

over the results because all students pass the exam, so that there is no evaluation of the results of the exam, which should have been done because they may not pass the exam in question, but the quality of education is problematic because the test scores are below the standards set nationally.

Limitation and future research

This study only focuses on certain schools in the Kupang Regency area, so that this research does not describe in detail the current situation of education in Kupang Regency, specifically the implementation of the street-level bureaucracy. Therefore, the authors suggest that further researchers be able to broaden the scope of the discussion and be able to research all schools in Kupang Regency.

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