

Tribal Structure and Its Impact on the Yemeni Qaisi Conflict in Andalusia

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Abstract

The Arab - Qaisi Yemeni conflict - is one of the most influential conflicts in the history of Andalusia because of its impact on the nature of the political events that the country witnessed. This bloody conflict weakened the power of Muslims in general in the country and led to the disintegration of their structure and the collapse of their state, as it ignited the fire of hatred and hatred in the country. The hearts of the two parties throughout the extension of the Arab-Islamic presence in the country, and even in times of peace between them, are always fire under the ashes in need of the events that inflame them, and this conflict has contributed to the negative impact on all aspects of life in the political, military and social countries, which the Christian kingdoms exploited in control. On many Islamic lands, which ended with the fall of the last fortress of the Arab Muslims in the country, which is the city of Granada.

Kew words: Tribal; Andalusia; Islamic; History

Introduction

The tribal conflict between the Arabs themselves - Qaisi and the Yemenis - constituted an important event in the history of Andalusia, as it had clear repercussions on the cause of the country's unity and its destiny. Its important effects on the political, social, intellectual and economic levels.

This conflict was led by the leaders of the Arab tribes - Qaisi and Yemen - some of them had ambition, competition and influence in the policy of the state, which derives its strength from the tribal structure to which it belongs, as the leaders of some tribes had a great influence on state policy through the strength of their position in this region or That, these leaderships sometimes put their hand in the hands of the state and their influence would be in the interest of the country, and at other times they stood against the state and rebelled with other tribes against the state in a way that served its interests and its impact was harmful to the country, as the state's conditions, especially the political ones, depended on the extent of its relationship with the tribes. And its leaders, who had personal tendencies and desires rooted in their behavior and character in their original places, and the money and spoils that they benefited after the conquest and expansion of

neighboring lands helped increase their influence, which made them covet, whether at the level of tribes or at the level of leadership..

A group of primary sources and modern historical references was used in this study, and among the most important of these sources is the book (News of a group in the conquest of Andalusia and mention of its princes, may God have mercy on them, and the wars that took place between them), by an unknown author, and the book (Al-Bayan Al-Maghrib fi Al-Andalus and Maghrib News), by Ibn Adhari, (Died.: about 1296 AD), the most important references are the book The State of Islam in Andalusia by Muhammad Abdullah Annan (Died: / 1985 AD), and the book (The Dawn of Andalusia), by Hussein Monis.

Tribal structure and its impact on the Yemeni Qaisi conflict in Andalusia

The roots of the Yemeni Qaisi conflict in Andalusia go back to the conflict between the Baladis and the Levantines, as the name Al-Baladiun is applied to those entrants with the governor Musa bin Nasir to Andalusia in the year (712 AD), while the name of the Shamis is applied to the entrants with Belj bin Bishr al-Qushayri to Andalusia in the year (743)⁽¹⁾, and the roots of the conflict between them go back when the governor, Abd al-Malik bin Qatan (741-742) allowed Belj and his companions, who were besieged in Septa by the Berbers, to cross to Andalusia in return for conditions: one of which is that the Shamans hand over ten hostages. From each soldier to ensure their departure from Andalusia within one year after they defeated the Berbers and the governor Abd al-Malik pledged to transfer them to North Africa at once without exposing them to the danger of a surprise attack from the Berbers, and the hostages were taken to an island in Andalusia located in front of the Green Island called Umm Hakim Island⁽²⁾, and after The defeat of the Berbers at the hands of the Levantines. The governor, Abd al-Malik ibn Qatan, asked Belj and his Levantine companions to leave Andalusia for Morocco immediately, with the spoils and gains they had obtained. Africa However, the governor, Abd al-Malik, did not possess all those capabilities to transport them at once and insisted on transporting them in batches to the port of Ceuta. Belj and his companions refused this matter, as they considered their transfer to Ceuta as a departure from the agreement and exposing their lives to the danger of the attacks of the Berbers on them⁽³⁾, and Abd al-Malik ibn Qatan could not stand And his communal companions saw the Levantines sharing with them the rule and authority in Andalusia, as well as their fear of changes in the tribal and political equation in the country that might be caused by the presence of the Levantines⁽⁴⁾, so Abd al-Malik urged them to leave, so they entered the palace and turned against him, and Belj became the governor of Andalusia and in the meantime One of the Levantine hostages died on the island of Umm Hakim of thirst, and he was from Ghassan, one of the nobles of Damascus, which prompted the soldiers of Balj, especially the Yemenis, to ask him to hand them over Abd al-Malik in exchange for the Ghassanian man.

The king, because he is from Mudar like him, and Abd al-Malik was in his house in Cordoba and he was an old man who had reached the age of ninety, so the soldiers took him out of it, and they called him: We asked for our revenge in eating animals and leather! Then you wanted to get us out to the killing!” Then they hastened to kill him and crucify him, then they crucified a pig on his right, and a dog on his left⁽⁵⁾.

Balaj bin Bishr was a Shami Qaisi, and in his army were soldiers from the Yemenis, and Abd al-Malik bin Qatan was also Qaisi from Mudar, and he is from the municipal people of Hejaz. With this tribal rapprochement, Balaj bin Bishr allowed his Yemeni companions to kill the governor, Abdul Malik, who is like him from Mudar, which indicates the strong influence The tribal structure that allowed Balj to kill the governor Abdul Malik in order to preserve the unity of his tribal composition and not to disperse their position in retaliation for the detained Yemeni Ghassanian man who died of thirst. It was to unite the position of the Levantines if he allowed Balj bin Bishr to become the governor of Andalusia with the full testimony of his soldiers, Qaisiya and Yamaniya⁽⁶⁾

The murder of the governor, Abd al-Malik bin Qatan (741-742), led to the disintegration of the tribal structure after it unified in the face of the Berbers, as the feelings of hatred and resentment were inflamed and chaos prevailed in Andalusia, as Abd al-Malik bin Qatan had two cotton boys and a mother who fled from Cordoba after The killing of their father, and they were preparing to take revenge on Belj and his Levantine companions, so one of them went to Zaragoza and the other went to Marda⁽⁷⁾, and the Arabs united around Qattan and Umayyah, the sons of Abd al-Malik, as the governor of Abd al-Malik joined them in the area of Narbuna (Abd al-Rahman ibn Alqamah al-Lakhmi) The Yemeni, in addition to the Berbers joining the Baladis, in order to avenge the Levantines for what they did to them in Morocco and Andalusia, and to preserve their remaining interests in Andalusia. The two municipalities, Qaisi and Yemenis, as well as the Berbers, in an army of one hundred thousand, and it was said that only forty thousand were against the Shamans, who had the majority of Qaisi and numbered ten thousand men⁽⁸⁾.

When the Caliph Hisham bin Abd al-Malik (724-743) reported what had befallen the municipal Arabs in Andalusia, especially the Yemenis, then he consulted his nephew al-Abbas bin al-Walid, who was one of the people of Shura with him, so he advised him to take over one of the Yemeni men over Andalusia and said to him: “Oh! Amir al-Mu'minin, the last of this matter is not correct except with what was corrected in its first, so turn your eyes and your good opinion to this Qahtaniyah.” The caliph and the order of Hanzala bin Safwan al-Kalbi (742-745 AD agreed with the appointment of his cousin Abu al-Khattar (743-746) against Andalusia to stop the strife between the two municipalities and the Levantines, so Abu Al-Khattar came to Andalus in the year 743 AD, with him the record of his mandate over Andalusia with thirty men from the Levantines, whom

he called the second rise from the Arabs of the Levant⁽⁹⁾.

The governor, Abu al-Khattar, worked on housing the two sides in cities far from the cities of the other side, as he distributed the people of the Levant to the Andalusian cities and regions, in order to reduce their turmoil and work to find a tribal balance between the Yemenis and the Levantines, and he was keen in distributing them to their housing in areas and places that are very similar to the places from which they came. In the east, when the people of Homs encamped in Seville and called it the soldiers of Homs and the people of Damascus in Granada and they called it the soldiers of Damascus and the people of Jordan in Malaga, and they called it the soldiers of Jordan and the people of Egypt in Murcia and they called it the soldiers of Egypt and so on in the form of military fiefs. Its giving and the increase goes back to the treasury in return for military support to the state by providing a number of their sons at the time of the war and with this distribution the new governor eliminated the nervous blocs and worked to make the tribal society a single structure after the party bloc of the two parties had disappeared, but this only lasted for a very short period as the war returned to the Formation of neurons between Yamaniya and Qaysiya⁽¹⁰⁾.

The policy of neutrality pursued by the governor, Abu al-Khattar, had an important impact in stabilizing the situation in Andalusia, but this policy did not last long, because of the departure of the governor Abu al-Khattar (743-746) from it and his intolerance to Yemen, which angered al-Qaisiyya, as this new policy led The lack of neutrality of the governor, Abu al-Khattar, led to the loss of tribal balance and the collapse of the peace that had been established between them, which caused a great tribal war⁽¹¹⁾, and the reason that prompted the governor, Abu al-Khattar to abandon the policy of tolerance in Andalusia was a simple dispute between two men, one of whom is Mudari Qaisi and the other from the Kalb tribe. The two men resorted to the governor, Abu al-Khattar, who ruled in favor of the Yemeni, intentionally or unintentionally. Al-Madhari was not satisfied with this ruling, who thought that the ruling was intolerance on the part of the governor because he was Yemeni. He resorted to Al-Samil ibn Hatim, who was the leader of the Al-Madhariah Al-Qaisiya in Andalusia, and complained to him about the Yemeni governor's behavior with him⁽¹²⁾, Al-Sammil bin Hatim went to the governor, Abu al-Khattar, to reach an understanding about solving the problem. However, Abu al-Khattar (743-746), who was afraid of Al-Samil, took the opportunity to insult Al-Samil by insulting him and poke him and ordered the soldiers to beat him until his turban tilted so that when he came out of the palace angry He intends to take revenge. Some of the headscarves told him: "Set up your turban, O Abu al-Khattar."⁽¹³⁾ He said: "If I have a people, they will set it up." In another narration, he was told: "We see your turban tilted! He said: If I have people, they will set it up."⁽¹⁴⁾ These are many hidden signs that warn of revenge and war. He meant by his words that he would seek help from his Qaisi tribe in order to wash away this shame and humiliation inflicted on them by the Yemenis⁽¹⁵⁾. Al-Samil went to his house with

the fire burning in himself and upon his arrival he convened a tribal council for the elders of his Qais tribe and spoke to them What happened to him at Abu al-Khattar, and they said: “We follow you! He said: By God, I do not like to expose you to the Qadha’iyah or to the Yamaniyah! But I will be gentle, and pray for Elb Marj Rahit, and pray for Lakhma and leprosy, and we present a man who has a name and we have luck.”⁽¹⁶⁾ Bin Hatim from this meeting is to isolate Aba Al-Khater from the Andalus state and end the rule of Yemenia in Andalus⁽¹⁷⁾

From the foregoing, it becomes clear to us that the economic situation, influence and power have an important impact on these conflicts and alliances, as wars are a means of enrichment, allowing powerful tribes to enslave the defeated tribes and control them politically and economically and increase social disparities within the tribes in general, constituting a resource for the wealth of the tribal aristocracy and in the first place gives the right to a Sheikh The tribe monopolizes the lion’s share of wealth and spoils. All this helps to form interests and alliances with other tribes to achieve private interests ⁽¹⁸⁾.

Al-Samil’s intention in winning over these Yemeni tribes and allying with them was to pull the rug out from under the governor, Aba Al-Khattar, because he was aware of the small number of Levantine Qaysiyah with the large number of Yemenis, so an agreement was made with them to stand with him and fight the governor Aba Al-Khattar (743-746) in exchange for Some positions and privileges in Andalusia, including the assumption of the leader of the Judham tribe Thawabah bin Salama al-Judami (746-747 AD) as governor of Andalusia, apparently because all matters were at the disposal of the Samil⁽¹⁹⁾, and on the other hand, not all the Qaisi tribes were in complete agreement, as they were Ghatafan is isolated and deviant in Istjah because its leader, Abu Al-Ata’, was at odds with Al-Sumayil, and he was envious of him for his leadership of Al-Qaisiyah. Lakham and Qatfan, when the men of these tribes gathered to march to Cordoba and dismissed the governor, Aba al-Khattar⁽²⁰⁾. B He and Al-Samil about the leader of Ghatafan Aba Al-Ata’. Al-Samil said to him: “Won’t you speak?” He said: “Speak to one, I don’t have another.” He said: “And what is it?” He said: “If you are hostile to coming to Abu Ata’ and your command is scattered, our command will not be fulfilled and we will perish.” An ancestor between you, and his diet moved him to you, so he answered you to what you want, so Al-Samil said to him: “You are correct.” Indeed, Al-Samail took advice and reconciled with Abu Al-Ata’ against Abu Al-Khattar, and the result was in favor of the Qaisi tribal assembly in Andalusia⁽²¹⁾.

When Abu al-Khattar learned of these movements, he hurried out to them and was unaware of what al-Samil had conspired about the conquest of Lakham, leprosy, and the disintegration of the Yemeni tribal structure front, so the confrontation occurred at Wadi Laka, which witnessed many Muslim wars. He was forced to flee from Aba Al-Khattar, who was in the

army of leprosy in the army of Al-Sumail, as they left the governor Aba Al-Khattar and fled from him. His tenure lasted for two years⁽²²⁾.

Abu al-Khattar's families did not stay in his prison in Cordoba because his supporters from the Yemeni Quda'ah tribe gathered and presented themselves Abd al-Rahman ibn Na'im al-Kalbi, who gathered two hundred men and forty knights and attacked the prison, so he expelled Abu al-Khattar and fled with him to Bella, so he resided in a dog and tribes from Homs; So they surrounded him and prevented him, and that was the year (746 AD)⁽²³⁾.

After Abu al-Khattar (743-746 AD) called on the Yemenis to support him against al-Qaysiyyah al-Madari, and a large army gathered for him, so he came with them to the city of Cordoba. Al-Yamani al-Qaisi⁽²⁴⁾, the two sides clashed. During the fighting, a man from Mudar called out by saying: "Oh, the Yemeni community! Why are you subjected to war against Abu al-Khattar, and we have made the emir among you? I mean, he is from Yemen, and if the emir is one of us, you were apologizing in Your fighting for us, and we only say this out of embarrassment from bloodshed and a desire for well-being for the common people." This call was planned by Al-Samil, and it had a great impact in the bloodshed and the division of the Yemeni tribal structure from Abu Al-Khattar and his loss of the battle, when the people believed it and said: "Be true, God, the Prince From us, why should we fight our people?" So they left the fighting, and the people split up, and Abu Al-Khattar fled, so he caught up with Beja, and Thawaba returned to Cordoba⁽²⁵⁾.

After this battle, in the year (746 AD), Thawabah bin Salama died and a great tension occurred in the structure of the Yemeni alliance al-Qaisi. Ali Abd al-Rahman ibn Katheer al-Lakhmi to consider the provisions on a temporary basis due to the tense conditions of the caliphate in Damascus⁽²⁶⁾. The tribal alliance was Yahya bin Huraith, but Al-Samil was not satisfied with leaving the matter to one of his Yemeni rivals, fearing that he would be tyrannized by him, although he could declare himself the ruler of Andalusia, because all matters are actually in his hand, but he was smarter than that because he knew that this matter alienated him. Yemeni allies and tearing apart the alliance that is its leader, so he started looking for a weak and docile person who would be satisfied by the Yemenis, and the Qaisyians would be safe from his side, and he would be the one in charge of it⁽²⁷⁾. As the Samil would not have been satisfied with handing over the state of Andalusia to a person who strongly hated the people of Levant, who persecuted them and declared their hatred, like Yahya bin Harith, who used to say: "If the blood of the people of Levant was watered, I would drink it in a mugThe consensus of the people of Andalusia on Yusuf bin Abd al-Rahman al-Fihri was at the suggestion of al-Samil, because Yusuf al-Fihri (747-755 AD) was a man of good age, soft and weak-willed. He was a Qaisi like Al-Sumayl himself⁽²⁸⁾, so that Ibn Al-Atheer⁽²⁹⁾ said about Andalusia during the rule of Yusuf Al-

Fihri and Al-Sumayl: "The name of

the emirate was for Yusuf and the rule belonged to Al-Sumayl.” Also, Al-Samil’s choice of Yusuf Al-Fihri’s person for the state of Andalusia was due to other factors, including the father of Yusuf Al-Fihri Abdul Al-Rahman bin Habib aspires to the state of Andalusia, but Aba Al-Khattar dwelt between him and it, and there is no doubt that this incident left in Yusef Al-Fihri’s soul a bit of resentment against Aba Al-Khater. Against Aba Al-Khattar⁽³⁰⁾, Al-Samil looked at the situation of Andalusia and found that the Levantine Qaysians alone were not fit to lead and rule Andalusia due to their small number and the large number of their Yemeni opponents. For the two municipalities with the Yemeni majority, so he chose Yusef al-Fihri, who accepted the municipalities because he is among them and the Shamis are willing to submit to him because of their misfortune, so it was agreed between the two men that the emirate would be Joseph and Al-Samil would be his advisor and his opinion. The matter settled on that in the year 129 AH / 746 AD. Temporarily ending the crisis⁽³¹⁾.

As for the consensus of the people of Andalusia on the assumption of Yusef al-Fihri (747-755 AD), it was due to several factors, the most important of which are: that he belonged to Uqba ibn Nafi Fateh al-Maghrib, the builder of the city of Kairouan, and he had great prestige among the people. At that time, he was isolated in beera with the people of religion and goodness away from disputes, as he was a man of neutrality at that time, which made the litigants step down to respect him and his neutrality, all of these factors had a great impact on his acceptance by the people of Andalusia⁽³²⁾.

As for Omar bin Thawabeh and Yahya bin Harith from Yemen and their calls to take over the state of Andalusia, Al-Samil dealt with them with great intelligence, as Omar bin Thawabeh was persuaded to give up his demand because his father was the governor of Andalusia before Youssef Al-Fihri and it is not permissible for the guardianship to be transferred from father to son by heredity until It is not said that the Yamaniya overtook the state of Andalusia and turned it into a king. As for Yahya bin Harith, Al-Samil gave him the mandate of Koura Rayyah and he would have a taste, so Yahya was convinced of that. Thus, Al-Samil removed all rivals of Yusuf Al-Fihri from Al-Yamaniyah⁽³³⁾. His rulership over Andalusia, but he refused, and they said to him: “If you do not do that, then sedition will occur, and the sin will be on you.” He agreed and then walked to Cordoba, entered it and the people obeyed him. “Al-Samil only wanted the matter to become harmful, and he sought among the people until the strife erupted between Yemen and Mudar”⁽³⁴⁾.

Yahya bin Harith and the scribe of Abu al-Khattar (125-128 AH/743-746 AD) became angry with him for allying with him against al-Samil and Yusuf al-Fihri. Abu al-Khattar said: “I am the deposed prince! Yahya bin Harith replied to him by saying: “Indeed, I do it, because my people are more than yours!” When Quda`ah and Lezam the Yemenia saw what Yahya bin Harith was calling for, they liked to collect the

whole word of the Yemeni, so they answered him and presented him⁽³⁵⁾.

Things came to the point of the collapse of the structure of the tribal alliance that existed between the Qaisiya and the Yemeni, and the reason for this was the failure of Al-Samil to respect the agreement that existed with the Yemeni by handing them over to the state of Andalusia after the end of the term of Yusef Al-Fihri's term, which led to the Yemeni bloc with a united front to break the thorn of Al-Samil in particular. And the Qaisiyyah in general, when the choice of the Yemenis caught up with Ibn Harith from every army, and the choice of the malicious Qaysiyyah caught up with Yusef and al-Samil, so much so that the neighborhood went out to bid farewell to each other and every man joined his people, so this was the first war and sedition in Islam with this call⁽³⁶⁾.

The two parties met in Sheqanda, south of Cordoba, on the banks of the Wadi al-Kabir River, and it was a violent battle that ended with the defeat of the Yemeni and the victory of al-Qaysiyah⁽³⁷⁾. Ibn Adhari⁽³⁸⁾.

During the battle, Al-Samil initiated a plan similar to tribal pride, as he ordered Yusuf Al-Fihri (747-755 AD) to send a messenger to the people of the market in Cordoba inviting them to the aid of their Qaisia people. Indeed, Yusuf's messenger arrived in Cordoba and gathered about four hundred men with sticks, wood and a few swords and the butchers came out with their knives when they reached the battlefield. They had nothing to do but kill, and they had a great impact in achieving victory and spreading terror in the souls of the Yemeni front, as their resolve became enraged and the death thickened among them⁽³⁹⁾. Abu Al-Khattar (743-746 AD) was captured by the hand of his enemies. As for Ibn Huraith, he ran away and hid under the mill bed in the wood-selling place in view of Abu al-Khattar, and when Jund al-Samil wanted to kill Abu al-Khattar, he felt his inevitable fate, so he indicated the location of Ibn Huraith and said: "Not to miss! But without you Ibn al-Sawda!" Abu Al-Khattar Ibn Harith mentioned his words about drinking the blood of the people of Levant, so he used to say: "If the blood of the people of Levant was watered, I would drink it in a cup!" Abu al-Khattar said to him, "Oh, son of a black woman! Is there anything left in your mug that you did not drink?" They were killed, and it was in this incident after me, when Ibn Huraith was competing with Abu al-Khattar in the Yemeni leadership, so Abu al-Khattar wanted to take revenge on him and make him participate in his killing. This disagreement is apparent from the words of Abu al-Khattar to Ibn Huraith when he called him Ibn al-Sawda⁽⁴⁰⁾.

Yusuf al-Fihri (747-755 AD) and al-Samil dominated the conditions of Andalusia with strength. Stand up for them until the Umayyad emir Abd al-Rahman Al-dakhil⁽⁴¹⁾.

The Battle of Sheqanda was a tribal rivalry between the Yemenites and the Qaissians. After this battle, the

Yemenis were subjugated in the south of Andalusia, but in the northeast, especially in Zaragoza, many Yemeni tribes were investing in the fertile lands there. The matter was not satisfied by Al-Samil, so he himself went to Zaragoza in a year (749 AD). Some indicate that it was Youssef al-Fihri who removed al-Samil from Cordoba and offered him the Wilayat of Zaragoza to get rid of his influence and authority. Of the lands and privileges they obtained during the conquest⁽⁴²⁾.

In the year (753 AD) Amer agreed with one of the Yemeni leaders in Zaragoza called al-Habbab bin Rawahah bin Abdullah al-Zuhri and informed him that the Abbasid Caliph Abu Jaafar al-Mansur (754-775 AD) wrote a record for him in the Wilayat of Andalusia, and the two agreed with some The Berbers tried to get rid of the Qaisi tribes in Zaragoza⁽⁴³⁾, so they marched towards Zaragoza to besiege and get rid of Al-Samil and the Al-Qaysians there. For not being relieved by his preoccupation with strife and famine, When Al-Samil felt Yusef Al-Fihri's failure to support him, he decided to seek the help of his people, declaring to them the hardship that he was facing in Zaragoza. And they sent a message to Al- Samil informing him of the arrival of the supplies, and when Al- Samil learned of this, he rejoiced and his determination intensified until the besiegers from Bani Amer and Bani Zuhri lifted the siege on him after they knew the news of the supply⁽⁴⁴⁾, Al-Samil received his supporters, Al-Qaisiyyin and those with them from the Umayyad loyalists, receiving the heroic saviors. Abd al-Rahman bin Muawiyah inside, then they went out to Cordoba⁽⁴⁵⁾.

The alliance between the Qaisi tribes and the loyalists of Banu Umayyah was not on the same goal, so the goal of the Qaysians was to lift the siege on Samil, while the goal of the Umayyad loyalists was to win the friendship of the Umayyads to ensure that he stood by them in order to build the Umayyad state that would be led by Prince Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil⁽⁴⁶⁾ Amer and his Yemeni partner al-Habbab al-Samil left Zaragoza and attacked and captured it, but he was forced to abandon the city under the pressure of the strikes of Yusuf al-Fihri (747-755 AD) and al-Samil. And Zaragoza returned to the control of Yusuf and Al-Sumayl, and to get rid of the influence of Al- Samil, Yusuf Al-Fihri appointed him as governor of the city of Toledo⁽⁴⁷⁾.

This Amer al-Qurashi revolution has a kind of tribal influence, which is that the noble Arabs of the Quraish did not like Yusuf al-Fihri's use of the name of the Quraish tribe in his assumption of power. The sons of its region and its suburbs, which made them revolt against him until they formed an alliance that included those who resented the person of Yusuf al-Fihri from Mudar and Yemen all⁽⁴⁸⁾.

In order to return to the data of the formation of the Qaisi alliance when Al-Sumayl sent them to seek their help, there was a dispute in the beginning, but Al-Husayn bin Al-Dajan Al-Aqili, the commander of Jund Qansrin, and Sulayman bin Shihab, the master of Jund of

Damascus, did not respond to the call Sovereignty of the Qaisi tribes, and only one of the dogs, Obaidullah bin Ali, who gathered with him a number of the tribes of Kilab, Salim, Muharib, Hawazin, Banu Namir, Saad, Ghatafan and Salim bin Mansour. To the aid of Al-Samil, as the tribal structure and the fear for the unity of the class within the Qaisi tribal structure had a great impact on the completion of the formation of the alliance⁽⁴⁹⁾.

The end of the destructive war between Al-Qaysiyah and Al-Yemeni had catastrophic consequences for Andalusia, the most important of which was the drought that afflicted them in the year (750 AD), so famine prevailed, prices increased, and people became hungry⁽⁵⁰⁾. From the north and center of Andalusia towards the south, and from them across the sea to the Berber countryside, Tangiers and Asilah so that the Spaniards in this particular period did not take advantage of this opportunity because drought and hunger pervaded their lands as well⁽⁵¹⁾, These wars, whether between Arabs and Berbers or between Arabs themselves, were taking place in fertile agricultural areas, which led to their destruction and disorder. These wars also contributed to the migration of many of the inhabitants of these areas, Arabs and Berbers who were cultivating them. It is not surprising that the country is exposed to the danger of drought and starvation as a result of the lack of Crops⁽⁵²⁾, Zaragoza was the only province that escaped this catastrophe due to the large number of its farms and the abundance of its goods, and most of its Yemeni residents and a few of the Berbers had withdrawn from the strife. In his gifts between Arabs and Lords, or between Qaisi and Yemenis, he worked to gain people's approval and love and open his home to people with needs fleeing from famine "and neither friend nor enemy came to him, so he deprived him, so he became more miserable"⁽⁵³⁾.

\The bad situation that Andalus was going through, as a result of the strife and drought that befell it, helped the Christians of Andalusia from the Goths around their leader Bly in Gailicia, as they were able to establish an emirate from which they would extend their influence over the lands of the Muslims in Andalusia in the north until this emirate became a thorn that chokes the Muslim entity And threaten their presence in the north and began to plan to expel Muslims from all over the country⁽⁵⁴⁾.

Conclusion

The research reached a number of results that can be presented as follows:

- One of the strange events that took place in the era of the rulers is the emergence of hostility and discord between the Arabs - Al-Qaysiyah and the Yemeni - after the two participated in the Arab and Islamic conquest of Andalusia under one banner and one religion, this conflict that led to a major crack in the structure of the state in Andalusia.

- This hostility between the Arabs themselves led to the loss of many lands that should have been Islamic, as well as the cessation of the movement of conquests and jihad. The first of the Spanish kingdoms, which became stronger with the passage of time and continued until the fall of the last strongholds of Islam in Andalusia.

- As for the political aspect, the successive defeats of the Yemenis in this conflict made them take a new approach in their lives away from politics, as they moved away from seeking rule and sultan and started working in trade and agriculture and excelled in it until some of them became people of great wealth and some of them tended to seek knowledge and interest in literature and poetry. Many of them graduated as imams, hadith narrators and scholars who contributed greatly to spreading Islam among the Spanish Christians and spreading their Yemeni dialect, customs and traditions among the people of the great cities and metropolises in Andalusia.

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