

Delirium as a psychic structure of the social

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ABSTRACT:

The study intends to present the essential arguments to introduce the complexity of the construction of reality, which is anticipated and constituted throughout the work of thought in history. It seeks to establish the concepts of Phenomenology and Hermeneutic Phenomenology, serving as a basis in the exploration of the psychoanalytic discourse on the relativity of truth, announcing the limit of its approach, thus limiting the conceptualization of its access, excepting the analysis of the subject as an approach to the subjectivity that composes its experience, whose reality is located within the coordinates of delirium.

Keywords:

Delirium, Hermeneutic Phenomenology, psychoanalytic discourse.

Introduction

The recognition of representation, the vitality of symbolization, is the entrance to neurosis in Freud and to psychosis in Lacan, however the alluded algorithm is not a coherent sequentiality in the strict order of the language of analytical logic, beyond the enunciation and the representative description of a logic that concurs in cognition, the phrase, the alluded sequence takes on a spectral validity, as in a postmodern photograph, that is to say a moment, a possibility in the definition of reality, an exercise of hermeneutics, which pretends, but does not say absolutely everything about reality.

The intention word that will take on a greater meaning in the elaboration of the discourse, will become relevant to the extent that the terms treated are contextualized, the same ones that intend to reveal the transformation of the concepts of human knowledge throughout its history, a history of language, of speaking, of understanding and of historical discourse, giving rise to a moment where a sample of a totality or infinite possibilities of registering reality is transited.

2. Analysis of theories

The preludes of the occurrence of reality lead to unravel in the first instance to define phenomenology in Husserl, which can be deduced from his famous Logical Investigations, published in 1900-1901, whose central theme is what he calls phenomenology and theory of knowledge as a descriptive analysis of intentional experiences. In it, he affirms that the fact that the object of analysis is precisely the experiences perceived in the consciousness constitutes the psychological moment of

the intentional act. Likewise, it must be kept in mind that these experiences are structured in parts and aspects, in such a way that the phenomenological act consists in deconstructing, that is, separating these parts, and in describing them; in decomposing these objects of internal perception in order to be able to describe them adequately.

In other words: in the consciousness there is something that is the real content of the consciousness, the intentional experiences. But since no intentional experience is something simple, since it always has parts and aspects, it must be decomposed into its essential parts, since it is provided by the representation and the object itself.

1. "Phenomenology is the study of human experience and the ways in which things present themselves to us in and through that experience. Phenomenology aims to restore the sense of philosophy that one finds in Plato" (Introduction to Phenomenology by Robert Sokolowski. Ch. I.p. 10).

According to Kolakowski, Husserl's immense effort to construct his phenomenology sought "to restore hope in the return to an absolutely primordial intuition in knowledge and in the victory over relativism and skepticism" (Kolakowski, 1983: 11). Bolio, Antonio Paoli Husserl and transcendental phenomenology: Perspectives of the subject in the sciences of the twentieth century *Reencuentro*, no. 65, December, 2012, pp. 20-29 Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana Unidad Xochimilco Distrito Federal, Mexico.

The Heideggerian position on phenomenology

Based on the above, it can be said that the Consciousness-Object (pretends to describe the fact by unraveling the representations of this), that is to say, the tree would be described without its subjective representation to the extent that it is described and in its description the same subjective representation would appear, however, the brilliant conceptualization of Husserl, his disciple Martin Heidegger presents a more finished conception of the same to condense the

Beyond Husserl's philosophy, Heidegger proposes to turn phenomenology into hermeneutics, since phenomenology is not free of prejudices, nor can it be considered a neutral and transparent description of the real, nor can consciousness itself be considered an impartial self. Phenomenology must not start from "intuition" if this intuition is understood as the intuition of objects, but from the understanding of what is real.¹

Heidegger defines the concept of phenomenology in *Being and Time* as: what is shown, to bring to light, to make something visible in itself, to bring to light. Now, that which can be shown, in itself, by itself, in different ways, depending on the mode of access to it. There is the peculiar possibility of the entity showing itself as something which, however, it is not. Such an entity is called a phenomenon, something that shows itself in its own sense without appearance. Phenomenology is research on the being of entities. The being of entities is comprehensible as "phenomenon", that is, insofar as it shows itself in its how.²

Heidegger's main objective was to understand how the world is comprehensible for human beings, a phenomenon for Heidegger is what is shown by itself, what is made manifest at a given moment, an event can manifest itself in different ways depending on the consciousness that abstracts it, he gathers the phenomenological intentionality of his master, but this is contextualized in the social bond or the relation with its other pair or with the other in anthropological terms, also ascribed in a great Other with a capital letter that would be the prevailing ideology of the time, such an event is captured in a world whose intentionality is framed and defined in the sub-particularities of truths, of beliefs that formed it throughout the personal history of the subject, subject that is subjected in itself to the ideas previously alluded to

subjective experience, moving away from the analytical logic that conceptualizes the final phenomenological description in the establishment of the existential-positivist conception of experience, since the same notion of exactitude never abandoned the "intention of Husserl" perhaps the idea that emancipated Husserl in a first moment was inspired.

The notion of accuracy was inspired by the exactitude of his mathematical training, however, his conception, as we have already pointed out, would serve to trigger the hermeneutic-phenomenological position conceptualized by Heidegger in *Being and Time*.

1.- This author denounces philosophy's lack of authenticity: "I do not mean that philosophy is an imperfect science; I am simply saying that it is not yet science, that it has not yet begun to be science".¹¹ He points out very clearly that it is not that philosophy is an imperfect science. He points out very clearly that it is not that philosophy is an imperfect science, since all sciences (even the exact ones) suffer from a certain imperfection insofar as they are faced with an "infinite horizon of problems" still without solution and present. Moreover, "deficiencies in their doctrinal content already developed" ¹². However, the imperfection proper to philosophy is of a totally different order: "It is not that it has an imperfect system of doctrine, incomplete in its details, but simply that it has none at all. In it, absolutely everything is debatable; every attitude is a matter of personal conviction, of school interpretation, of point of view" ¹³ (DRA. FRANCISCA TOMAR ROMERO, University Francisco de Vitoria).

In other words, to paraphrase Heidegger, being is language and time and our contact with things is always mediated by prejudices and expectations as a consequence of the use of language. Any answer to a question about reality is manipulated in advance, since there is always a precompression about everything that is thought.

Psychoanalysis as Heideggerian hermeneutic discourse

To this extent, psychoanalysis appears on the scene as a discourse born of Western modernity. Its contexts refer to that of modern science, in whose movement it is inscribed and to which it is indebted, as Lacan indicates in his text *Function and field of the word and language in psychoanalysis* (1953), a text in which he precisely locates its function in praxis. Freud, in turn, also located psychoanalysis in relation to the prevailing social discourse of his time. For example, in *Psychology of the*

Masses and Analysis of the Ego (1921), he makes a clear analysis of European totalitarianism. There he also wrote that "individual psychology is simultaneously social psychology" to give rise to a homology between neurosis and society.

1.- Freud distinguishes two types of relational meaning. That of psychology and that of his own discourse (psychoanalysis). That these are pathways is clear from the fact that while psychology dismisses the forgetting of proper names as a problem to be investigated, psychoanalysis regards it as a real problem. For psychology, the explanation is due to the fact that proper names are easier to forget than other fragments of speech. As a consequence, psychology fails to grasp the logos that articulates the phenomenon. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, discovers the forgetting of the proper name in its meaningful structure. The reason for this is that in the discursive situation of forgetting one's own subjectivity is announced. Forgetting is significant in the context of my history, it has a subjective meaning. The reference of the proper name to the subjective position precisely underlies the structuring logos of the phenomenon of forgetting. Discourse analysis in Freud and Heidegger: An interpretation of the forgetting of proper names (Adrián Bertorello. Unconscious and Truth Proceedings of the I Colloquium of Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis. National Academy of Sciences of Buenos Aires).

2.-" The truth is outside the signs, somewhere else" modifies determines the modification of the rest, it has something (Lacan, 1975, Escritos . p.381)

3.- Psychoanalysis does not act on the organic substrate of the saying (the neurotransmitters, the brain) but operates on the saying itself as its substrate. For example: it has been studied that there is a biochemical substrate of dreaming, which in no way invalidates that its account be taken as a sign of writing, since it can be read or interpreted; which certainly did not begin with psychoanalysis, which rather, with respect to all hermeneutics, came to provide the limit of the interpretable as a "navel", as a hole that stops what can be said and marks an impossible to know. PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE REALITY OF FICTION; THE FICTION OF REALITY Luis Gonzalo CAMPALANS PEREDA.

4.- In Seminar I. In the class "Truth emerges from equivocation" given in 1954, he will put it differently when he explains that language can only be conceived as

a weft, a network that extends over the whole of things, inscribing on this plane of the real another plane called symbolic. It is through the word that the emergence of meaning is introduced into the world, thus imprinting on the real the dimension of truth. Serra, M. L. (2013). *Sobre lo que puede decirse de la verdad. Perspectivas En Psicología, 9(3), 110-114. Recuperado a partir de <http://200.0.183.216/revista/index.php/pep/article/view/>*

5.- According to Lacan, the subject is the subject of desire, which is the essence of man. This subject once entered into language will be divided and marked by the ineliminable lack of a lost object, a void, which very often tries to fill and cover up in a pathetic or pathological way. "Originally split is as an effect of language", responsible for his separation and alienation. Lacan and the Other. Benjamin Hoezen Polack. Aparte rei Magazine 21.

Although all discourse is, after all, a fictional production that explains and orders the world, that is to say, there is an intentionality that is always a desire, a desire that is directed to an object and shapes it and constructs it of another and of a great Other, but with an inherent trace to its desiring attitude that shapes it into a particularity. Therefore, there is no pure experience absent of subjectivity, therefore delirium, construction of a particular reality within a uniform context, often massively, sometimes emancipated in groups, it is the function of the analyst to respect the individual production of each person, in order not to lose sight of the subjective dignity. Now, is there social madness? If madness is defined as the absence of answers (responsibility) of the subject, it occurs when this subjective dignity is lost in the name of a massive discourse, that is to say, what stated above, when the delirious emancipated reality is standardized and taken to the realm of truth. Mother's love is unique and unrepeatable", "happiness is the supreme goal of every human being", "the love of a mother is unique and unrepeatable", "happiness is the supreme goal of every human being".

Lacanian Psychoanalysis and the Invention of Reality

Lacan placed the coordinates of the trajectory of psychoanalysis in the concatenation of signifiers, a beyond the linguistic norms of the meanings that enunciate the officiality of what is said or pretends to say, a beyond the ideologized discourse there is hegemony that runs in an imaginary-meaning, in the palpable and

possible pretension of belief, the imaginary as representational meaning, the vitality of it creates the delirium as the very notion of reality, how do we know that we see what we see? If others do not see it beyond the descriptive notes, these are the coordinates of belief, singularities that are deconstructed from the officiality of a construction that becomes legitimate in front of others, references that anticipate without rhyme or reason in the veracity of the feelings, but that serve as interpretative reading as far as the words reach, it must be so, the words must translate the feelings, in an analytical logic, in a logo-centric knowledge, but what about the words that are enunciated of the most nonsensical beliefs to give them validity to the most nonsensical feelings of a reality that contemplates it as abnormal, where the residue of the sum must always be exact and where everything must fit in the diachrony of what is right and what is wrong?

What happens with the suffering of a subject, where the complaint is the inseparability of an attachment that shows itself to be senseless in itself, how to love something that cannot be when it is, how to address me fruitlessly to someone who is nothing more than the incessant memory of what I suffer for his absence, when I am convinced that he also loves me for some strange reason?

Promoted by desire, its intentionality, man ignores the logic that capitalizes emotions and turns it into a metonymy, a figure that translates the cause into its effect and vice versa and reveals the weakness of the rectitude of analytical logic, also announces the incessant complaint of an unsatisfied desire in its major exemplification, in other words the illogical is possible to be logical and emancipate itself in a context that has the validity of reality for the subject to its truths constituted by his beliefs.

That announces a moment of size; a hint of a behavior that must the principle of pleasure and ethical resolution in its most lurid battle; "in a Swann's love as masterfully recounted in Marcel Proust's book, there the hero is ardently in love with Odette, who no longer loves him. In his terrible suffering, he first believes that what he really wants is to stop being in love with her in order to escape his suffering. But after analyzing his feelings more carefully, he realizes that this is not the case. Instead, he wants his feelings to end as long as he himself remains in love, because his experience of the pleasure of love depends on the latter condition. The problem is that, despite knowing that his suffering would end if he were to stop being in love with Odette, if he were to be

"cured" of his love for her, that is what he least wants to happen, since in the depths of his morbid condition he did not fear death itself any more than he feared such a recovery, which would resemble the death of all that he now was, in other words cured of his condition he would no longer be the same subject, so he would no longer find either pleasure in Odette's love or pain in her indifference and infidelity." (Alenka Zupancic-Ética de lo Real-Kant, Lacan 2010).

What happens when love, ardently in battle, is pushed away in an ephemeral burst of an imaginary-meaning that is conceived as enduring, what happens when frantic and sublime love is not rubbed into the smelly flesh of an intercourse and the most allusive imaginary is kept in force in the achievement of an impossible desire in its act, but which is conceived as the perfection of a love? If the lack of abnegation in the subjective history of a subject can cause such a narcissistic wound provoking the most sublime ardent and fervent fantasies that a subject can conceive as an unsatisfied desire, we wonder if it is possible only the imaginary act to fight the battles of an effort to forget a trauma that lies in the absence of gratification? here we can appreciate the logical-analytical-positivist fall consequent of a trauma and its sublimated realization and with it we solve the symbolic question, even so its understanding surpasses the own notion of accuracy that alludes the precepts of science enunciated as such, but let's go further, what happens when the sublimation is not enough and the pleasure is conceived in an expected desire in its redundancy? That desire which, not being satisfied, takes on the validity of a symbolically possible happiness and is reworked in the capitalist principle as the ideological imperative of always being happy, does it not throw the individual into an emptiness impossible to be satisfied and only to be sublimated in a logic that only resists time in the imaginary? In other words, the possibility of achieving abnegation as a conceived desire is only possible in its totality in a love impossible to be seen in a circumstantial and permanent evidence, the minimum instance will be judged as a possibility of realization and at the same time as impossible, the more sublime, the greater the logic of its ethics in being conceived as normality, we will only have an image, a meaning of that abnegation that is lost in the totality of the un-lived and it is only possible the incursion of a moment of a photograph, a scratch of an unattainable truth. Reality then is conclusive with the particularity of a subject in all its signifying chain conforming veracity and belief, impossible to catch, impossible to determine, only interpretatively in an act of

language, trying to capture the moment of the sequence that can feel its totality lost in the absence of what it never was; that abnegation that never had.

It is possible then that delirium is a flame that cheers the disparate understandings of the most ardent discourses of happiness and suffering, without the need to suffer in an objective-ideologized reality and at the same time subsequently survive in a perfectly normal anguished life.

Is the subject destined to live in the delirious madness of a platonic discourse of love in the strict sense of the word and does the attainment of a desire have to be carried out with the possibility of an imaginary-meaning? Apparently yes, man is a mammal and the imaginary gives him the solidity of his ethics and the differentiation with the other animals, which is perfection in the imagination, which is happiness if you imagine it ; what is more authentic than an impossible love and even incessantly loving oneself all one's life, absolute pleasure, perpetual happiness, the imagination is necessary for the resolution of pleasure and ethics at the service of a life whose primordial characteristic is delirium?

1. The subject is bound and subjugated to his pathology (human condition according to Kant) in a way that is not without ambiguity, for what the subject fears most is not the loss of this or that particular pleasure, but the loss of the very framework within which his pleasure (or pain) can be experienced as such at all (Alenka Zupancic-Ética de lo Real-Kant, Lacan 2010 p.25)

2.-Tótem and tabú [1913], Electronic book.

3.-Psicología de las masas y análisis del yo [1921]. Electronic book.

4.-El malestar en la cultura [1930].

5.-Jacques Lacan. Escritos 1. Siglo XXI Editores. Electronic book.

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3.Conclusions

The preludes of the occurrence of reality lead us to unravel in the first instance to define phenomenology in

Husserl, we can infer from his famous Logical Investigations, published in 1900-1901, whose central theme is what he calls phenomenology and theory of knowledge as a descriptive analysis of intentional experiences.

We can say then that the Consciousness-Object (pretends to describe the fact by unraveling the representations of this), that is to say, the tree would be described without its subjective representation to the extent that it is described and, in its description, the same subjective representation would appear.

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Lacan placed the coordinates of the trajectory of psychoanalysis in the concatenation of signifiers, a beyond the linguistic norms of the meanings that enunciate the officiality of what is said or pretends to say, beyond the discourse there is hegemony that runs in an imaginary, in the palpable and possible pretension of belief, the imaginary as representational meaning, the vitality of which creates delirium as the very notion of reality.

Man is a subject, not a human being, in factual terms he resolves his permanence in the world through discourse, such is imminently sheltered from language, thrown into the word to its enunciation, alone, finding himself in a world already constructed, he wonders about its meaning, sense that emerges as the goal of his existence and that he fulfills to perfection according to the

contextualization of his time and the micro-senses acquired from his environment that constitute him, the intention, his desire distributes the intentionality of his search, when this is in reality an accident, his conscience, the realization that he breathes and thinks constitutes the possibility of constructing god or gods that enliven the sense and move him away from the only feasible thing; evolution; that man is an accident in strictly biological terms; that man is an accident in strictly biological terms; that man is an accident in strictly biological terms.

We are delirious, reality is not subjectively commensurable, it is only a picture of possible interpretations, but lacking in authenticity, only reserved for the belief and validity you want to give them.

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