

ABDUL RAOUF AL-KASSEM'S POSITION ON EXTERNAL EVENTS 1982-1983 (HISTORICAL STUDY)

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Abstract

The study dealt with Abdel Raouf al-Kassem's positions and political views on the Israeli invasion. After the invasion took place, al-Kassem quickly sent his call to all Arab countries, calling on them to provide the necessary Arab capabilities to preserve Lebanon from the consequences of American-Israeli conspiracies. His view of that invasion, he described it as a movement that seeks to break up the steadfastness of the Syrian people and the Palestinian resistance, in addition to his position rejecting the May 17 Agreement as threatening the security of Syria, Lebanon and the rest of the Arab countries.

Keywords: the Israeli invasion, the Palestine Liberation Organization, slama Galilee, the May 17 agreement.

Introduction:

The study of political figures comes as an important part in the record of modern and contemporary studies because of the individual's role in changing their features or keeping pace with them according to what his ideas require, as such studies in turn open a wide space for the overall political developments witnessed by countries at the internal, regional and international levels, so the goal was It is from the study to look at Abdel Raouf al-Kassem's positions and political views towards the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the May 17, 1983 agreement, and these positions and opinions were not isolated from the positions and policies of the Syrian regime regarding the events that were taking place in turn that had a profound impact on Syria, hence the choice of the subject of the study It is tagged with "Abd al-Raouf al-Kassem's position on external events, 1982-1983".

As the period during which al-Kassem led the Syrian prime ministership was one of the tensest and turbulent eras in Syria, due to the external problems, one of the problems that Syria faced during that era was chosen as a subject for research, which is the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the May 17 agreement and the position of al-Kassem government on them, as the division of The study was divided into two sections, the first dealt with the beginning of the invasion, sabotage and indiscriminate bombing, while the second studied the May 17, 1983 agreement and relied on a number of sources, foremost of which were the unpublished documents of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA, D.), and the published documents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), documents of the Syrian Ministry of Information were issued by Dar al-Baath, and these documents had a major role in enriching the research and providing the study with valuable information that other references lacked. Then came letters and dissertations, including the position of the Syrian Arab Republic on the civil war in Lebanon 1975-1983 by Hamad Fathi Juma al-Hamid, The War Civilization in Lebanon 1975 - 1982 by Nazem Khalil Hassan Abdel Mamouri. Syrian books also had a prominent role in research, most notably Kamal Deeb, the Syrian war, the contemporary history of Syria 1970 - 2015, in which the researcher touched on the Israeli invasion and the accompanying events and developments through which the researcher was able to: Completion of the study, hoping to have completed the duties and academic foundations in any historical study.

Abd al-Raouf al-Kassem's position on the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon:

The decade of the eighties of the twentieth century has come and the Arab countries are going through complex and difficult circumstances. Local wars and regional conflicts are raging, and (Israeli) ambitions have no limit, in addition to the American - (Israeli) strategic coordination that seeks to tighten its grip on the Middle East ⁽¹⁾, and based on these circumstances (Israel) began its military preparations since February of the year 1982 AD to eradicate the Palestinian Arab resistance, as it

proceeded to mobilize its army near the Lebanese border, and it only had the irrefutable argument through which it launched its attacks on the Palestinian and Syrian sites in the Lebanese Republic ⁽²⁾.

In addition, it launched many raids without any reason to beg for a Palestinian-Syrian response, but it was often forced to cancel and dismantle its crowds due to the lack of a sufficient pretext for the attack ⁽³⁾. The current political situation in the region and what the (Israeli) enemy has done through the threats and moves it made in southern Lebanon, and the impregnable position of Syria, in which it bore the burdens of its steadfastness in the face of that aggressive policy ⁽⁴⁾. Over southern Lebanon, so we did not remain idly by” ⁽⁵⁾.

In mid-May of the same year, during his presidency of the Council of Ministers meeting, al-Kassem reviewed the recent events in Lebanon, especially the (Israeli) attacks on southern Lebanon and the security problems in the Lebanese arena. The American (Israeli) on the Arab nation, pointing out that Syria will not compromise, will not surrender, and will face all kinds of pressure and threats ⁽⁶⁾.

The appropriate opportunity (for Israel) to carry out its attack on the Palestinian sites in Lebanon came when its first ambassador, (Argov-Sh) ⁽⁷⁾, was subjected to an assassination attempt on the third of June 1982 AD in the heart of the British capital, London, outside the British (Dortchester) Hotel by armed men. They are affiliated with Abu Nidal ⁽⁸⁾, so the (Israel) government seized the opportunity and used the assassination as a pretext to invade Lebanon ⁽⁹⁾. The next day of June, the Israeli planes rushed to launch a different air attack on the cities of Lebanon and destroyed a number of them, such as the Sports City (the largest military base). of the Palestinian resistance) and its surroundings ⁽¹⁰⁾.

The (Israeli) invasion began on June 5, 1982, with a series of air, sea, and land raids, with various types of weapons, on southern Lebanon and the main center of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) ⁽¹¹⁾ in Beirut, according to an operation called (the safety of the Galilee) ⁽¹²⁾. To establish a demilitarized zone at a depth of (40) km ⁽¹³⁾, and in this regard, al-Kassem broadcast on the same day his stance on that invasion, saying: “There is a new Zionist crime associated with suspicious movement and enemy planes are bombing camps, residential neighbourhoods and innocents in Lebanon.” Al-Wazzan⁽¹⁴⁾, the Prime Minister of Lebanon, in a phone call, Syria’s principled and firm stand by Lebanon against the (Israeli) attack on the Lebanese people and the Palestinian camps. Syrian unity of destiny between the two countries and the need for cooperation, solidarity and concerted efforts to confront the current stage to achieve victory ⁽¹⁵⁾.

It should be noted that the goal of the invasion is to achieve a number of main goals, including striking the Palestinian resistance and the Syrian army, removing them together from Lebanon, and changing Lebanon's political system ⁽¹⁶⁾, in addition to imposing a treaty between Lebanon and (Israel), and establishing a Maronite government dependent on Israel ⁽¹⁷⁾, but the truth is that there are two goals (Israel) that it seeks to achieve, first: the total annihilation of the Palestinian resistance, and secondly: evacuating the lands adjacent to the borders of (Israel) from the fedayeen ⁽¹⁸⁾, and mainly controlling the waters of the Litani River ⁽¹⁹⁾, on the other hand. The Lebanese government submitted a complaint to the Council calling for a cessation of hostilities. As a result, the UN Security Council issued Resolution No. (508) on June 5, 1982, expressing its concern over the serious incidents and the deterioration of the current situation in Lebanon, calling on all parties to stop fighting and military activity inside Lebanon. The borders of the Lebanese territory, but (Israel) ignored this and continued its military operations ⁽²⁰⁾.

The Council issued its second Resolution No. (509) on June 6, 1982, and its most prominent statement is the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of Israel’s military forces to Lebanon’s international borders, respect for the sovereignty and political independence of the Republic of Lebanon, and the immediate cessation of all military operations ⁽²¹⁾. (Israel) ignored the ceasefire as in the previous time, and attacked the Syrian and Palestinian positions in Beirut with artillery and aircraft ⁽²²⁾, noting that the Iraqi News Agency had reported that the Zionist enemy passed in front of the Syrian forces and besieged Beirut to expel the Palestinian resistance, and Assad did not move ⁽²³⁾, for (Israel) announcing that it would not be exposed to the Syrian forces ⁽²⁴⁾.

The (Israeli) forces entered Lebanon from four land axes and a sea axis, and violent clashes took place between the enemy forces and the Syrian-Palestinian forces. The enemy forces occupied most of southern Lebanon ⁽²⁵⁾, and fierce air clashes took place on the seventh and eighth day of June of the same year between the Syrian aircraft - and (Israeli), which led to the downing of 25% of the Syrian planes, and on the ninth day of June, the (Israeli) aviation managed to bomb and destroy the Syrian

anti-aircraft missile bases (SAM-6 battery) of the Syrian army in the Bekaa ⁽²⁶⁾, and on 11 June A ceasefire was negotiated ⁽²⁷⁾.

The Israeli warning came to Syria in the midst of that hot atmosphere on June 15, 1982, to heat up the situation. Syria did not remain silent and respond to the warning, so the response came from the Syrian government, especially the Prime Minister, pointing out that the Syrian forces entered Lebanon by virtue of a decision and an official request from the Lebanese government and with the will of a free Syria ⁽²⁸⁾.

The (Israeli) forces arrived in Beirut on June 15, 1982, and imposed a severe siege on it and its suburbs. The enemy forces also used the scorched earth policy (a military strategy in which anything is burned) in the siege of Beirut by bombing it by air, sea and land with the aim of expelling the Palestinian forces and controlling the western part of The capital, Beirut, but it collided with the Lebanese resistance and the Syrian-Palestinian forces ⁽²⁹⁾, and it should be noted here that this is the first time in the history of (Israel) that its armies reach the heart of an Arab capital and impose a siege on it ⁽³⁰⁾, and as a result, the Security Council issued Resolution No. (512) on June 19, 1982, in which he appealed to all conflicting parties to respect human rights (the right of civilians) and to take all appropriate measures to alleviate the suffering caused by conflicts and to provide humanitarian assistance on the widest scale ⁽³¹⁾.

During the cabinet session on June 21, 1982, al-Kassem addressed the current situation in Lebanon and the results of the (Israeli) invasion, which put the region on the brink of an all-out war. The Palestinian and Lebanese national forces are against the plans of subjugation and the policy of imposing a fait accompli and stressed the necessity of confronting the (Israeli) invasion and implementing a Syrian plan in defence of the Palestinian revolution and the national will in Lebanon and forcing (Israel) to withdraw from all Lebanese lands ⁽³²⁾.

In the period between July 24-27, Israel destroyed SAM-8 batteries in the Bekaa, in addition to escalating military operations by air, sea and land in West Beirut and its southern suburbs ⁽³³⁾. On the other hand, the Security Council condemned in accordance with Resolution No. (513) issued on July 4, 1982, All acts of violence against the population, and requested the resumption of normal supplies such as water, electricity, food and medical supplies, especially in Beirut ⁽³⁴⁾, and in light of this, the Council of Ministers headed by Kassem reviewed on July 5, 1982, the latest military and political developments in the Lebanese arena related to the results of the (Israeli) invasion. For Lebanon ⁽³⁵⁾, and on the sidelines of the conclusion of the Lawyers' Conference held in Damascus on July 31, 1982, under the slogan (the steadfastness of the fighters in the face of the barbaric invasion of the land of Lebanon), al-Kassem stated: "Our people know their friends and enemies and that fighting does not depend on the soldier alone, and that all The wars won by a great army are won by a great people," indicating that they were the first to call for Arab solidarity to stop the Zionist advance on Beirut.

At that time, the brutal bombardment of Beirut continued, which led to an outburst of anger at the Arab and international levels. As a result, the Security Council held its emergency session on August 1, 1982, and issued Resolution No. (516) to immediately cease fire and deploy international observers in Lebanon immediately ⁽³⁶⁾. At that time, al-Kassem made it clear that (Israel) put its intentions and the threads of its adventures to the test of reality, so it invaded the Lebanese territories from the south under the pretext of removing the Palestinian artillery range from the Palestinian north 40 km ⁽³⁷⁾. And the political and military developments because of the Zionist invasion of Lebanon. The Syrian efforts exerted in confronting the military and political pressures exerted by America and (Israel) on Lebanon were evaluated. It also showed Syria's position and firm determination to defend Lebanon ⁽³⁸⁾.

As a result of the difficulty of reaching a solution formula in order to stop the fighting in Lebanon and the continuation of the enemy's siege of Beirut, the American administration intervened and was able on August 19 of the same year to reach a final agreement between the Palestinian forces, (the Israelis) and the Lebanese government that included a cease-fire on Beirut, and the exit of the Palestinian armed forces From Lebanon and in light of this, the withdrawal of Palestinian forces from Beirut began in the form of batches and under the supervision of multinational forces (American-French-Italian) for the purpose of supervising the process of the withdrawal of Palestinian fighters from Lebanon ⁽³⁹⁾. As a result, the Palestinian organization and the Syrian forces left from the capital Beirut in August 21 with (664) women and children ⁽⁴⁰⁾, and here came Reagan's statement about the success of the US initiative, saying: "The evacuation process was successful for the Palestine Liberation

Organization from the capital Beirut, and this peaceful step can never be completed without the efforts of the United States.”⁽⁴¹⁾.

After the evacuation and the cessation of the fighting in Beirut, Bashir Gemayel ⁽⁴²⁾ was elected on August 23, 1982 AD, as the new president of the country ⁽⁴³⁾, and in light of this, the (Israeli) Prime Minister Menachem Begin sent a congratulatory telegram to him on the occasion of his election as President of the Lebanese Republic ⁽⁴⁴⁾, and following the That is why, on August 26 of the same year, Abdel Raouf al-Kassem, the head of the Syrian government, gave a speech in which he stressed the cohesion between the Palestinians and the Syrians to stand up to the (Israeli) enemy and to eliminate the conspirators and agents ⁽⁴⁵⁾.

Suleiman Franjeh arrived in Damascus on August 30, 1982 AD and met with Syrian Prime Minister Abdel Raouf al-Kassem. The impact of these positions granted the Islamic Resistance Committee led by Hassan Nasrallah the tireless efforts made by al-Kassm to support and support the Lebanese resistance against the (Israeli) invasion ⁽⁴⁶⁾.

At the beginning of September, Israel achieved the largest part of its plan by occupying southern Lebanon, reaching Beirut, imposing its man, Bashir Gemayel, as the new president of the Lebanese Republic, and expelling the forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Syrian army from the capital Beirut ⁽⁴⁷⁾, and on the fourteenth of September 1982, relations began to be tense between the forces. The Syrians and the Maronites, which led to a series of assassinations that affected several prominent and important figures, led by the Maronite leader Bashir Gemayel ⁽⁴⁸⁾.

The (Israeli) invasion resulted in the occupation of a large part of the Lebanese lands, the disruption of political life and the displacement of thousands of Lebanese families, as Lebanon inflicted huge human and material losses ⁽⁴⁹⁾. As for (Operation Safety of Galilee), it led to the killing of more than (340) Israelis and the injury of others. (2000) others ⁽⁵⁰⁾, and it also led to the martyrdom of more than (1,000) fighters of the Palestinian organization's forces and their allies from the Lebanese divisions, as well as the martyrdom of (20,000) unarmed Lebanese citizens and the wounding of thousands of them during the period of the (Israeli) invasion of the Lebanese Republic, As for the missing, their number reached three thousand ⁽⁵¹⁾. On the other hand, the (Israeli) government announced that it: "was able to limit the military capacity of the Palestinian organization in Lebanon and prevent it from carrying out any Palestinian commando action that threatens its entity" ⁽⁵²⁾.

Al-Kassem indicated that America carried out aggression against Lebanon using its tool (Israel), pointing out that the Syrians offered thousands of martyrs and wounded in the mountains of Lebanon and the Bekaa in front of the American-(Israeli) forces that used their latest, most advanced and violent weapons ⁽⁵³⁾, and he also referred to the national and national stance that And the endowment of the Syrian country, which made Syria the sole base for confronting the plans of imperialism - (Israel) and its agents, and not only that, but referred to the imperialist and (Israeli) hostile attack aimed at the Nile from Syria ⁽⁵⁴⁾, and in the same context al-Kassem referred to the consequences of that invasion on The Lebanese economic situation, which suffered from a stifling deficit in the balance of payments and the state treasury, amounting to 1.2 billion Lebanese pounds, and the resulting economic problems borne by the Lebanese people ⁽⁵⁵⁾.

Al-Kassem spoke in the cabinet session about the (Israeli) threats against Syria and Lebanon, saying: "These threats are closely related to the plans of the American policy that wants to strike the Arab will with Israeli aggression, and it knows that Syria is the center of the Arab will in the region. We are ready to confront any Zionist aggression. ⁽⁵⁶⁾, He also spoke about the situation in the Arab arena at the time in light of the imperialist-(Israeli) attack and the dangers arising from it and called for the need to confront it ⁽⁵⁷⁾. We support the Lebanese people in confronting the (Israeli) occupation forces and all the conspiracies of division and domination, and Lebanon must return to being independent and united ⁽⁵⁸⁾.

Al-Kassem made it clear that the (Israeli) aggression against Lebanon and its occupation of vast areas of southern Lebanon and its suburbs is only with the support of the United States of America, and that Syria, under the leadership of its president, cannot leave this reality in Lebanon, the Golan and others, explaining that (Israel) must withdraw from all the lands that it occupied. It occupied it by force and aggression ⁽⁵⁹⁾, noting that there is no peace in the Middle East unless (Israel) withdraws from all the lands it occupied by force ⁽⁶⁰⁾, and finally he referred to the sacrifices made by the Syrian forces in Lebanon, reviewing a number of details related to the (Israeli) invasion of Lebanon and the

battles of Beirut, the Mountain and the Bekaa, stressing that Syria was sincere in its commitments without caring about losses and burdens ⁽⁶¹⁾.

The researcher sees from the above that the (Israeli) invasion of Lebanon in 1982 showed the weakness of the Syrian forces and the Palestinian resistance alike in the face of the hostile forces.

Abd al-Raouf al-Kassem's position on the May 17, 1983 agreement

In view of the political developments, the assassinations of Lebanese personalities, the bombings, the Lebanese civil wars, and the (Israeli) invasion of Lebanon in 1982, all these events forced Lebanon to search for solutions with (Israel) to end the crises and the state of war, and as a result, negotiations between Lebanon and (Israel) began on December 28 1982 in the city of Khalde, south of Beirut ⁽⁶²⁾, and as a result, the Lebanese Communist Party, the Lebanese National Movement and the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party in Lebanon on May 15, 1983, demanded from the Lebanese government not to sign the instrument of surrender, pointing out that the compliance agreement is much more dangerous than the Camp Agreement. David ⁽⁶³⁾.

It should be noted here that after thirty-four rounds the agreement was signed on May 17, 1983 between Lebanon and (Israel) under the auspices of the government of the United States of America and in isolation from Syria ⁽⁶⁴⁾, and with the approval of the majority of the Lebanese Parliament, the agreement obtained ⁽⁶⁵⁾ votes and two opposition votes. As for the (Israeli) Knesset, it obtained (75) votes in favor of (6) against (6 members) and (45) abstentions, as the approval of the agreement resulted in twelve articles, maps and several appendices, including: canceling the state of war between the two parties, and (Israeli) withdrawal. In addition to establishing liaison offices at the diplomatic level between them, negotiating commercial agreements, establishing eight Lebanese-Israeli joint groups to pursue saboteurs, establishing a security zone inside Lebanese territory, and forming an American-(Israeli) committee A Lebanese woman who is supervising the implementation of the provisions of the agreement ⁽⁶⁶⁾.

As a result of these changes, Syria did not stand idly by what is happening in the Lebanese arena. Rather, it declared its fight against it firmly, according to Prime Minister al-Kassem when he declared on May 17 of the same year: "Syria will do everything in its power to prevent the implementation of the Lebanese-(Israeli) agreement, and that The Soviet Union stands firmly on the side of Syria." He also indicated that his government would cut off relations with the Lebanese government if the agreement was signed ⁽⁶⁷⁾, and on the other hand, the Lebanese opposition described the agreement as "a mini Camp David" ⁽⁶⁸⁾, while al-Kassem's government described it as worse than Camp David a million times ⁽⁶⁹⁾, as for Syria, it described it as (the agreement of submission) ⁽⁷⁰⁾.

The signing process provoked a wide wave of Arab and international condemnation, as media agencies reported the Syrian position strongly rejecting the conclusion of the agreement, which led to a wide national movement, a general strike and loud demonstrations in Beirut, Baalbek, the Bekaa and the Jabal on May 18 of the same year against the signing of the agreement ⁽⁷¹⁾, and on May 21, al-Kassem addressed the latest developments in the Lebanese arena and the dangers of the Lebanese-(Israeli) agreement, noting that Syria is not afraid of the challenges launched by Washington and Tel Aviv, and his government indicated on May 24 of the same year that the agreement of humiliation and shame contradicts the interests and the aspirations of the Lebanese people and the Arab nation because it makes Lebanon a Zionist protectorate ⁽⁷²⁾.

The situation deteriorated at the political, security and military level after the signing of the agreement of submission, and the explosion of violent clashes in the mountain in early June of the same year, and the Syrian bombing suddenly extended to Beirut, as the explosion preceded the visit of Assad to Libya in order to agree with Gaddafi on the need to confront and undermine the compliance agreement and assisting Lebanon in liberating its lands by all means ⁽⁷³⁾, and in the same context, al-Kassem affirmed on June 3, 1983, Syria's categorical and absolute refusal to conclude an agreement of submission, as it does not represent Lebanon's interests, and makes Lebanon politically and economically occupied, and places it under direct (Israeli) supervision, as it threatens the security of Lebanon. Syria and the Arabs alike, so the Lebanese government has no right to agree to this agreement. In addition, al-Kassem stated: "This agreement is illegal and it is our duty to help the

Lebanese government and the Lebanese people in their resistance to the occupation”⁽⁷⁴⁾, and on June 11 From the same year, al-Kassem spoke about the current situation in the region and dealt with the affairs of the Arab arena in light of the American-(Israeli) attack and the dangers resulting from it, calling for confronting the conspiracy against the Arab nation⁽⁷⁵⁾, and not only that, but al-Kassem affirmed on June 25 of the same year that Syria could not, in any way, accept the transformation of Lebanon into a base for the (Israeli) Mossad⁽⁷⁶⁾.

As usual, (Israel) added a clause that it would not withdraw from Lebanon until after the withdrawal of the Syrian forces, but Assad refused that and called for mobilizing the efforts of his allies in Lebanon to stand by the Syrian forces⁽⁷⁷⁾. As a result, the “National Salvation Front” was formed on July 23 in the year 1983 AD, which swore to fight against the agreement of submission and occupation (Israeli)⁽⁷⁸⁾, and on the other hand, Kassem received on July 26 of the same year Levi Farah (Cuban Minister of Construction) in Damascus, and the discussion took place between them about the situation in the Middle East, including the occupation of (Israel)) for southern Lebanon and the agreement of May 17, 1983 AD⁽⁷⁹⁾.

In addition, al-Kassem indicated on July 27 of the same year, saying, “Syria rejects the agreement of submission and that the Arab street is well aware of their complete rejection of the agreement, despite the attempts to mislead and rumours being raised against Syria. To the death and death of this agreement and the fall of the policies it made and supported, he added, “We are not alone in this world. The peoples and free countries are with Syria, as well as the socialist countries with Syria, and the Soviet Union is with Syria, and they are all with us because they believe in the justice of our cause and trust our determination to respond to every aggression”⁽⁸⁰⁾.

During the first qualitative conference of the Federation of Textile and Textile Workers, which was held on August 29, 1983, in Damascus, Al-Kassem indicated in Haditha: “No to conferences, no to the agreement of submission, because we say no, but we declare our readiness and our ability to confront economically and politically and to thwart any conspiracy or betting on our own capabilities.” He added, “The enemies of Syria and the enemies of its firm national position have realized that no political solution can be imposed on it by means of pressure, no matter how different its methods and tools are, and all this is thanks to the people”⁽⁸¹⁾.

At that time, on September 8, 1983, the Syrian government demanded from the Arab League to punish the Lebanese government for signing the agreement with the rulers of (Israel) because the agreement turns Lebanon into an (Israeli) protectorate, in addition to causing violent damage to the unity and sovereignty of Lebanon and the public interest. On the other hand, Syria and the Lebanese national forces refused the eight-point plan for settling the Lebanese crisis was presented by Amin Gemayel⁽⁸²⁾, and the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs carried that plan and presented it to Al-Kassem at the request of the Lebanese government⁽⁸³⁾.

On December 22 of the previous year, al-Kassem indicated that Syria would respond to every aggression and that its position had not and will not change in its response to the American-(Israeli) projects and its refusal to comply with the agreement. Syria and the security and existence of the Arab nation, and he added: “The strategic agreement aims to achieve a direct US military presence in the Arab region and threatens the security and existence of the Arabs”⁽⁸⁴⁾, in addition to that, the al-Kassem government stated on December 30, 1983 that it opposes the agreement from a national standpoint because The agreement fundamentally contradicts the security, interests and sovereignty of Lebanon and the security and interests of the Arab nation, especially Syria⁽⁸⁵⁾.

Moreover, al-Kassem stressed the necessity of confronting all the conspiracies of partition and domination of Lebanon, and that the first thing that should be done was to cancel the May 17 agreement, which was carried out under the umbrella of the (Israeli) occupation⁽⁸⁶⁾. The first had fallen and with it the American-(Israeli) goals and the fleets did not succeed in overcoming the Syrian steadfastness and the Lebanese national resistance⁽⁸⁷⁾. It is worth mentioning here that on March 5, 1984, the Lebanese Council of Ministers decided in its session chaired by the President of the Republic to cancel the uncompleted agreement and consider it void. As if it had not been and all its consequences were cancelled⁽⁸⁸⁾, the world witnessed the fall of the May 17 agreement amid astonishment and admiration for the strength of Syria, and the world witnessed the (Israeli) withdrawal from most of the Lebanese territories under the strikes of the national resistance⁽⁸⁹⁾.

It can be said that the years of the Syrian-(Israeli) confrontation on the Lebanese scene between 1981-1983 confirmed the sincerity of the strategy of President al-Assad and his Prime

Minister al-Kassem and that the steadfastness of a small Syrian state with the support of its allies is enough to confront the policies of (Israel) and America, and the researcher must be aware of the reason for disrupting the agreement. And its failure came as a result of the strong reaction that rejected its conclusion from the Syrian side, which proved to everyone that any solution in the Lebanese arena cannot be or take place outside the Syrian umbrella.

Conclusion:

First: Despite the weakness of the Syrian position in the war, especially after the emergence of a huge gap in military and technical capabilities, and the best evidence of this is Israel's destruction of missile batteries in the Bekaa Valley, that Syria did not abandon Lebanon, but rather remained in constant combat with the Israeli enemy and remained a strong supporter of the resistance in all its forms. This was evident from the statements of al-Kassem and his ministers.

Second: We conclude that among the objectives of the Zionist entity in its invasion of Lebanon in 1982 is to destabilize the Syrian presence in Lebanon and expel the Syrian military forces present on Lebanese soil to prevent Syria from achieving a strategic balance with the Zionist entity, and for Lebanon to take a safety belt for the latter.

Third: Al-Kassem found that the defense of southern Lebanon is no less important than southern Syria, and he declared, prior to the invasion, that any hostile step against Lebanon initiated by Israel would be a motive for Syrian intervention, especially since Syria, according to him, does not consent to be idly by, and in light of Al-Kassem extended an invitation to all Arab countries in the hope of providing the necessary capabilities to confront the American-Israeli conspiracies, which would have wanted to harm Lebanon and the rest of the Arab countries, and his country expressed that it is continuing to face all kinds of pressure and threat.

Fourth: Al-Kassem viewed Israel's invasion of Lebanon from its first day as a Zionist crime, and explained his country's supportive and supportive stance for Lebanon in its ordeal because the two countries have a common history, destiny, and fate. Moreover, Al-Kassem interpreted that invasion as a first step that Israel wanted to break up the steadfastness of the Syrian people and liquidate The pockets of Palestinian resistance on the land of Lebanon. Al-Kassem also praised Syria's position, describing it as the axis of the Arab will and the only basis in confronting the plans of imperialism and Zionism.

Fifthly: the features of his officials appeared in various situations, especially in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 AD. His position also emerged, rejecting the May 17, 1983 agreement concluded by the Lebanese government with (Israel), considering that agreement is a million times worse than the Camp David Accords.

Sixth: Al-Kassem expressed his country's determination to prevent the implementation of the terms of the May 17, 1983 agreement, and indicated that Syria would not hesitate to sever its relations with Lebanon in the event the latter signed the agreement, reasoning that the signing makes Lebanon a Zionist protectorate and threatens the security of Syria and the Arabs alike.

Seventh: Al-Kassem stressed that Syria is always ready to confront any conspiracy targeting it, and therefore its enemies cannot impose any political solution through pressure, whatever the methods used against it.

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