The role of the Australian Military Establishment in Greece in 1941

Abstract

The study is included four axes, The first axis is clarified  an overview of the roots of Greek-Australian relations until 1941, these relations date back to 1829, when seven Greek sailors emigrated, they convicted of piracy by the British Naval Court, they were sentenced to be deported to New South Wales Southeastern Australia,  at the official level in 1926,  they did not have political relations deserved to studying and research according to the viewpoint of the author, but they had economic relations that became more effective during the years (1937-1940), the second axis discussed the circumstances of sending Australian troops to Greece , its political and military consequences. The British government had motivated Australian Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies to send Australian troop to Greece, the Australian government promised to send more troops to Greece as well, and justified that to delay Hitler's planned attack on the Soviet Union, but the British government was not honest with the Australian government, the Australian prime minister blamed Australian forces commander Thomas Blame the last blamed the Australian government and the Australian press showed that the Australian government did not have detailed information before sending troops.

The third axis followed the problems which  faced by the Australian forces in Greece, the most important of which were not the loyalties of the Greek officers united towards the political class, moreover, the equipping of the Greek army and air force was French, Czech and Polish weapons completely incompatible with British equipment, in the event of fighting, these weapons are subject to rapid depletion and Greece was not prepared to buy or recycle weapons from the mentioned countries, so, it is obliged to independent on British weapons and then the total dependence on the Australian forces in addition to not informing the Australian government on the details of the intelligence work of the Allies, the fourth section studied  the lack of coordination between the Australian and Greek forces at the end of the campaign. More than once, the Greek forces refused to cooperate with the Australian forces on the ground, as well as the moral collapse of some Greek troops and ended the campaign with the occupation of German troops in Greece in 1941, and the Australians lost three thousand Australian soldiers, most of whom became prisoners of war with the Germans.