

Barber's Typological Analysis of President Erdogan and President Putin

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ABSTRACT

This research attempts to compare of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin's personality traits according to James David Barber typologies of leadership styles. Both leaders are enigmatic, powerful and controversial in their country political life and on the world stage. Thus, research pursues to find out the similarities and differences between two leaders who hail from different countries using Barber theory. Barber theory consists of 4 categorizations composed of active - positive, active -negative- passive-positive and passive-negative. Barber formulated this typology for the USA presidents to analyses their decision-making process and policy outcomes in association with their personality style. For such method, the data is acquired from the leader's autobiography, leadership traits and environment. Utilizing the Barber typology, the research attempt to describe both non-western leaders' traits and find out the answers for the question, Does such typology work for analyzing both leaders?

Keywords: Political Leadership, Political Psychology, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Vladimir Putin

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INTRODUCTION

This research is to discuss and apply Barber presidential traits typology to Turkish and Russian presidents. First of all, it is essential to look briefly into background of each country that produced current leaders. The research inquiries the possibility to use Barber typology for both leaders. Mentioned leaders are the most controversial leaders in their style are the reason behind the selection. In order to make sense of the commonalities and differences between Turkey and Russia, it is important to understand the importance of economic events as well as the political and ideological matters. Turkey and Russia are two countries in the spotlight for various reasons. Both countries share commonalities in Twentieth century history. Both countries have experienced similar events, often parallel events in recent times. Between Turkey and Russia, there are many similarities, as well as differences. Some of the similarities between Turkey and Russia even magnify the differences.

Turkey and Russia are countries that geographically and culturally straddle both Europe and Asia. Turkey and Russia have witnessed the violent fall of monarchical governments in the early twentieth century, and the radical social, political and economic changes associated with such. Both countries experienced waves of economic and political reformations (liberalization) in the 80s and early 90s. Both countries have witnessed a "conservative resurgence", usually resulting from economic and political difficulties shared by both countries during the "Turbulent 1990s," In both Russian and Turkey, conditions allowed strong and charismatic

leaders and political parties such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the 'Justice and Development Party' (AKP) and Vladimir Putin and 'United Russia' into power. The main of the research is to look behind the economic, political and social similarities, but to compare the leadership style that society produced.

Erdogan and Justice and Development Party's (AKP) rise to power came as a response towards the 1997 Military Memorandum against the government of Necmitten Erbakan and his Welfare Party. The bloodless coup was still fresh on the minds of the Turkish public and it has upset the conservative Islamic segments of Turkish society, who felt violated by the Turkish military's actions. The AKP in the early 2000s was also able to gain popularity among a wide array of voters, not only from political-minded Muslims, but also nationalist rural voters and cosmopolitan urban voters. A very important element of the AKP's victory in 2002 was the widespread dissatisfaction shared by a large number of the Turkish electorate over political instability and economic difficulties that plagued Turkey in 90s. The AKP, with a youthful and macho Erdogan representing it was seen as a fresh new face, not marred by the bitter politics of the 1990s (Cagaptay, 42-43: 2002). From the November 2002 elections to the present, the AKP would become the dominant party in Turkish politics. Only to have its dominance challenged after a major defeat in the June 2015 general elections. However, the Justice and Development Party was able to recover following an authorized Snap Election in November 2015, winning back a comfortable majority in the government and avoiding any need to form a coalition with other parties.

Russia's situation was similar to Turkey. While

many parts of the world were enjoying a “Roaring 90s”, Turkey and Russia experienced a “Turbulent 90s.” Russia’s Post-Soviet liberal political order had failed to satisfy the Russian public and keep Russia stable. The turbulence of the 90s’ was more acute in Russia. Homelessness and unemployment were high. The Russians experienced a drastic drop in standards of living following the collapse of the USSR. Russia became embroiled in a series of bloody conflicts in the Northern Caucasus. The Russians were naturally attracted to the notion of a powerful ruler. However, “powerful” Russian ruler did not start with Putin, but rather the “liberal” Boris Yeltsin, who attempted to create a powerful Russian presidency following the ratification of the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 1993.

Recently, Turkey has allowed the November 2015 snap elections to take place, wherein Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party were able to reverse many woes encumbered during the June 2015 elections. While both countries appear to be heading into an authoritarian path, there are still some differences between the routes Russia and Turkey are taking. Both country are more overtly authoritarian, Turkey under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party has utilized functions typical of democracies from constitutional referenda, to snap elections to retain power at the first of year of the rule , However, unlike Putin’s more clear approach to maintain power, Erdogan’s use of democratic institutions then end up in autocratic rule does not guarantee stability beyond the short term. Both leaders desire to be remembered the longest politician in modern political history of their country thus Erdogan’s 2018 presidential system which is referred “Turkish presidential type” that bypassing parliamentary and powers, projecting his future goals set by 2023, similarly with Putin’s “ resetting the terms of presidency” that allows him to be in power until 1936.

Despite thematic similarities and the recent period of diplomatic cordiality, Turkey and Russia are increasingly at odds over their own national interests, the Frozen Conflict in the Caucasus and the Syrian Conflict. Turkey and Russia are starkly opposed to each other in these arenas. Some of the aforementioned similarities, particularly the current governments and political orders in both countries are contributing factors to the cooling of relations between Moscow and Ankara. The leadership styles of both Putin and Erdogan make hardline stances towards each other more likely. This emphasis towards centralized power has enabled the current trend of the tough-man image. Like discrepancies in democracy (that makes Turkey appear more democratic than Russia), there is clearly a discrepancy between Russia and Turkey in terms of military and economic power. Russia surpasses Turkey militarily and economically, sometimes using hard-power as leverage against Turkey on occasions.

Both countries have had ambitions to “become European.” If it was not formally joining the European Union, it was being seen as a close associate to Europe. This urge to be included in Europe comes from Turkey and Russia straddling Europe and Asia, both

geographically and culturally. In common dichotomy, the West (Europe) is associated with modernity, individualism, and liberalization, whether political, social or economic. The East (Asia) is associated with tradition, collectivism and paternalism. Following the era of Enlightenment in Europe, the Industrial Revolution and the primacy of Western imperial power, it became more attractive for many nations outside of Europe to associate with the “west” as opposed to keeping with old traditions. In Russia, it came earlier on after the reforms of Tsar Peter I in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. In Turkey, attempts to reform the Ottoman Empire’s politics occurred almost parallel to Russia’s reforms, starting in the early 18th century with the “Tulip Era.” Both Turkey and Russia have experience moving between both sides of the commonly understood dichotomy between East and West. Now, with the acceptance of strong executive power, enshrined by Russia’s 1993 Constitution and Turkey’s 2010 Constitutional referendum, there is a noticeable reverse to the trend.

On the world stage, Russia flexes its muscles as a reinvigorated power with a powerful military that rivals and possibly surpasses that of the western nations. Turkey attempts to make itself a regional and respected power in the Middle East. In this regard, it is important to discuss the different arenas in foreign affairs, notably Syria, the Black Sea and the Caucasus.

LITERATURE REVIEW: LEADERSHIP STYLE OF ERDOGAN AND PUTIN

There is wide range of corpus analyzing both leaders’ personality and leadership style. Many articles analyses only each leader separately. In the literature, these have been extensively investigated in an attempt to analyses both leader’s leadership style. This research in that sense is unique to compare and contrast chosen leaders along with Barber typology. In recent years there is a quite interest in political psychology, assessing leadership based on their personalities. In this regard, there are studies using different typology and personal traits to analyses the leaders’ personality and decision making. For example, along with Baber typology, (Hermann, M. G. (2005). Assessing leadership style: A trait analysis. Hermann typology has been used to analyses by President Erdogan by Görener, A. Ş., & Ucal, M. Ş. (2011). This study explores the traits of Erdogan and outcome of foreign policy. Another author who extensively studied Turkish leaders’ personality is Baris Kesgin (2013), (2012), (2020) in his articles, Kesgin explore the leadership style of political leaders of Turkey in term of their ideological and foreign policy structures. Studies by Görener, A. Ş., & Ucal, M. Ş. (2011) and Kesgin (2013), (2012), (2020) use empirical research to answers their questions about the leaders and foreign policy analysis. Özdamar, Ö. (2017) uses “operational code” to analysis Islamist leadership of Erdogan.

For Russian leader’s personality and leadership, there are couple of studies to mention for this research. White, S., & McAllister, I. (2008). Discuss Putin “super presidency” and dimension of his cultic personalities.

Foxall, A. (2013) explores the culture of populism, Putin masculinity through his biographical detail and photography.

The “strong” leadership styles of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin are often compared by many observers. Both leaders have become increasingly authoritarian in their approaches to governance in recent years. Both figures have embraced nationalist machismo as their style, and personal complements and applause on toughness and between Erdogan and Putin during their meetings are common exchanges. Social conservative and anti-western rhetoric are commonly employed by both Erdogan and Putin. (Eissenstadt, 4-5: 2015). Erdogan’s Islamic nationalism is popular with many conservative Muslims outside of Turkey, while Putin’s macho appearance, Russian patriotism and embrace of Orthodox Christian conservatism is alluring to some conservative and right-wing people in Western Europe and North America, despite the pugnacious relationship between Russia and the West. Erdogan is considered a “modern-day Sultan.” Putin is interchangeably considered a Soviet or Tsarist nostalgic, depending on whether Putin’s past association with the KGB, the military buildup in Russia under his leadership, or his embrace of the Russian Orthodox Church and promotion of social conservatism are emphasized. A large part of leadership and styles of leadership is psychological. An analysis with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian president, Vladimir Putin, can be done with through psychoanalysis and bringing to question the impact of emotional factors that play into the quality of leadership. Psychoanalysis has been done with many U.S. Presidents starting with Woodrow Wilson, and infamous leaders such as Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. (Hudson, 34-35: 2006). The use of psychoanalysis is common in discovering faults within a leader's past. It is important to understand youth experiences, environment (especially in upbringing) and perhaps traumatic experiences that molded leaders today. It can be illustrated that psychological phenomenon accrued even in a leader's youth can have far reaching and extensive impacts on the world scene. Psychological character analysis tends to manifest behavior as acclimatized by psychological attributes strongly developed in childhood and reinforced gradually. The expectation is to comfortably generalize and forecast conduct based on the individual’s character. According to Pfiffner (2003), presidential style or personality has a significant impact on how presidents manage and structure their policies. The fundamental elements, as Pfiffner indicates, are the leader’s cognitive style, orientation toward political strife, and sense of competence and efficacy. Clifford (2018) asserts that traits perceptions represent an important type of societal evaluation and strongly aid in reviewing politicians.

According to Neustadt’s manuscript, *Presidential Power*, presidential personality could prove valuable to political scientists by demonstrating that effective leadership stems largely from such personality-affiliated intangibles as self-confidence, political skills, persuasiveness, and reputation of the leader (Neustadt,

1990). The institutional sophistication of this office has gradually grown tremendously, the chief’s adeptness as the administrator of a decision and policy-making bureaucracy highly governs the level of president’s performance (Campbell, 1993). Thus, a president’s management style is somewhat a personality function as Simonton (1987) broadly explored. Personality or psychoanalysis approach faces numerous critics including such rational choice theorists as Moe Terry and pluralist theories including Lowi Theodore and Robert Dahl (Lyons, 1997).

Lyons assert that the contemporary form of presidency has been particularly institutionalized, rendering it captive to unwarranted public expectations, among other exterior constraints, which makes the occupant’s personality matter less significantly in their political outcomes. Moreover, these theorists’ mistrust most of the existing studies on character psychoanalysis (Campbell, 1993). For instance, they classify difficulties linked to generalizing and generating testable hypotheses from these scholarly works. With pessimism, they often settle that research ought to center on other variables since the prospects of psychoanalysis research positively influencing the presidential leadership theory seem elusive (Moe, 1993). Although other critics hardly reject the personality constructs method emphatically, they perceive the operationalization problematic (Campbell, 1993). Campbell states that psychoanalysis or personality theory comprise a predicament of illusive intuitions, concepts, and subjective frameworks.

Critics have given Barber’s *The Presidential Character* a lot of attention in which he differentiates presidential personalities alongside two supposedly sovereign dimensions of variation. Barber (1977) distinguishes between activity versus passivity regarding individual input to execute a policy agenda as well as negative versus positive emotional rejoinders to the president’s experience in exercising power (p.3-14). The outcome demonstrates a four-cell typology, whereby the Active-Positive (AP) category is the model of focused poise and confidence, while the Active-Negative type precariously epitomizes insecurity. However, the resulting hypothesis as Lyons (1997) indicates, is testable as exhibited impressively in Barber’s 1969 forecast that President Nixon, as an Active-Negative (AN) type, would be suited to ensnare himself through a self-destructive plan (p.793).

Less imposing were predictions grounded on Barber’s depiction of Jimmy Carter, the President elect, as an Active-Positive (AC) type. According to Nelson (1984), Barber’s typology has faced lots of criticism for its confusion regarding the connotation of Positive-Negative (PN) dimension, high simplicity, and its obscure association with recognized personality theories. Convolution of dependent and independent variables within the PN of the typology is another major problem. Negative or Positive personality type exemplifies independent variable based on the President’s emotional reaction to his/her entry into office. However, these reactions are part of the leader’s performance in office,

which, in Barber's structure, is the dependent variable.

METHOD AND METHODOLOGY

Barber laid out a typology of **leader's** character to understand the American president, according to him, there are four types of leadership, the active-positive, the active-negative, passive-positive- passive-negative. In the book, the widely known American presidents have been profiled under these categories. James David Barber in the book proposed a set of personality types used for different presidents. For this research the typology of Barber is used to describe Turkish President Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin so as to contribute to psychoanalysis and leadership in Political Sciences.

Active-Positive: Where the leader is confident, flexible, and proactive, cherishes the exercise of power, optimistic, enjoys adapting to the environment and situations and sees the wielding of power as a means to achieve beneficial results. They are viewed as adaptive.

Active-Negative: Wherein the leader sees the use of power as a purpose to achieving self-realization. They spend a lot of energy on tasks, but they rarely do they feel accomplished. They are constantly worried about whether they are succeeding or failing. They are rigid thinkers and prone to aggressive behaviors. Unlike the Active-Positive, they prefer to manipulate the environment around them, rather than adapt to situations. They are viewed as compulsive.

Passive-Positive: This type of leader are people pleasers with low self-esteem. They prefer to react than initiate. They may be apparently optimistic, but their show of optimism is often a means to curry favor with others. Unlike active leaders, they are more servants than they are true leaders. As such they are viewed as compliant.

Passive-Negative: They take up positions of leadership out of a sense of duty. They dislike holding power and they have low self-esteem which is compensated through service. They are adverse to risk. Unlike active leaders, they do not like to 'rock the boat' and initiate change out, and would much rather follow rules than make them. Unlike them passive-positive leaders, they are loyal to principles and rules over people, making them averse to politicking. They are viewed as withdrawn (Barber, 1992)

OPERATIONALIZATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS, COMPARISONS OF TWO LEADERS

This operational code analysis is important in the understanding of how administrators construct order and reality through their belief systems. The process exhibits the typical worldview of decision and policy makers. Therefore, determination and effort to develop an inclusive profile of a prominent leader provides reviewers with indispensable data on his or her predictability. Moreover, it is of significance in the interpretation of contentious strategies and risk-pursuing attitudes during political crisis. The chief inquiry of philosophical perspectives centers on political life. For instance, Putin acknowledges that rules and laws are inseparable and fundamental components of political universe (Derman &

Oba, 2017). Putin asserted this in an open letter to the Russian citizens in 1999 when he said;

"... stability, certainty, and the possibility of planning for the future-theirs and that of children for years and decades. They want to work under conditions of peace, security, and stable legal order" (Derman and Oba (2017) as cited in Daddy and Ickes, 2002, p.212).

Putin clearly stated that harmony in politics can only be achieved if people followed established rules and norms. He also believes in a dual political university, which implies that when governed by law, harmony is felt, or else, anarchy reigns. As an effect to his pledge to legal-centered political lifestyle, the leader epitomizes his rivals as unruly and seldom hesitates to enforce the military into action against them. For instance, according to CBS News (2014), Putin stated that Moscow has the absolute right to deploy military to protect its citizens from Ukraine if situation forces the country to do so.

Apart from devotion to rules, Putin occasionally demonstrates his totalitarian tendencies against those he considers to be anarchists. For instance, Radikal (2014) indicates that Putin asserted that although people were demanding radical change, such transformation cannot be allowed at the expense of following established rules. On an equal ground, Erdoğan's master principle is stability's importance. As Türk (2014) indicates, his philosophical attitudes concerning the global political landscape can be engineered around this fundamental principle: rules and laws ought to be made according to the sustainability and solidity of the system. Besides, the significance of the political universe stems from the relationship between stability and laws, which he reflects in his public speeches.

For instance, Türk (2014) quotes Erdoğan saying that when a country enjoys stability, security is tight as well and when a nation is secure and stable, then the world would wish to associate with it, "otherwise nobody would come" (p. 223). His consistency with his confidence in a robust sense of command in the administrative jurisdiction, he perceives his opponents as impediments to stable governance. Moreover, his opinion towards them comprises a vast range of elements. This perception encompasses those from institutions, events, or actors deemed to cause volatility and is prone to being an impending threat suddenly (Türk, 2014, p. 291). Examples of such events include the terrorist acts by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the December 17th to 25th operation raids, and the Gezi Park protests. Although these threats vary in form and content, Erdoğan indiscriminately targets these foes as a whole. Another quite significant similarity between Putin's and Erdoğan's attitude towards the political universe is the mutual frustration by the Western-controlled world order. For example, Putin's rhetoric against the West strikingly echoed at Munich Security Conference, on February, 2007. Then, he penetratingly accused the United States of seeking to become a global monopoly power. Putin's stance went further and was evident in policy enactment as well (De Haas, 2010, p. 108). He put security measures into action and included flipping the energy card against

the EU and NATO's interests allied to the New World Order. He believes that by using Russia's energy resources is vital in his Russia's influence and power reestablishment plans, and is therefore resolved to employ the energy card to gain his foreign policy objectives (Elletson, 2006, p.18). Sometimes, Putin perceives his enemies or 'outside forces' as attackers of Russian development, who employ local civic organizations as weaponries in the struggle or 'colored revolutions' (Gill, 2016). Turkey, unlike Russia, is known for its significant role in the democratic Western world. Yet, particularly during Turkey's accession to the European Union process, Erdoğan and most of the Turks had a perception that they were being treated unfairly (Erdoğan, 2016). The dishonest treatment is evident in multiple respects which makes the leader become critical of the Western hypocrisy. For instance, he once addressed his great frustration and disappointment by the West's domination and used a renowned rhetoric that the world is greater and deserves more from five (Derman & Oba, 2017). Erdoğan referred to the Security Council's five permanent members whose decisions are often unfair and unequal. Additionally, after his leadership experienced an attempted military coup, Erdoğan constantly blamed foreign powers claiming that the overthrow was planned outside Turkey (Derman & Oba, 2017). Therefore, despite the dissimilarities in the two nation's political interests, Putin and Erdoğan challenge the central system and existing international order, or rather, status quo.

With Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin, it is difficult to use Barber's personality metrics to define them, as they were intended for American presidents, whom operated within American political institutions as it is check and balance. For both presidents the check and balance can be structured within the leaders' character and shaped through their understanding of the politics. For American presidents check and balance is a system that presidents held accountable for. For both leaders, check and balance is transformational, fluid and shift. Turkish and Russian politics and governmental institutions are very different from American ones. Leadership mechanics outside American political and behavioral norms may also be different. A leader may be in one classification one day, but the next, the apparent psychological style of leadership may change drastically circumstance changes. The promising figure of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the early 2000s in the midst of a serious economic crisis is much different than how is viewed present, in the midst of a potential political crisis following the Gezi Park Uprising, and later failed coup purging thousands, arresting of journalists his rule of law controversy.

Although the typology and classification by Barber may not be applicable for both leaders, both leaders share bibliographical similarities before their political life. In the case of Vladimir Putin, the details of his early life would reveal his true personality type. According to a biographical source from Dale Herspring, Putin was something of a "go-getter." While Putin was still in high school, he surprised A KGB officer (working as a recruiter at his high school) with headstrong attitude,

eager to join up with the KGB. Putin's interests in the martial arts, particularly Judo and its emphasis on personal discipline, its attention to technique and Jigoro Kano's mantra of "Maximum Efficiency, Minimal Effort" and "Mutual welfare and benefit"¹. The discipline acquired from his passions in the martial arts, coupled with Putin's ambitious personality would shape him into an "active-positive" leader. Vladimir Putin himself even credits his participation in Judo as a "turning point" and possibly a gateway into the leadership (Herspring, 152: 2009).

Putin's background as a Judo star and committed KGB agent would help shape his role as a leader following the collapse of the USSR and in light of rough conditions that affected Russia during the following Yeltsin era. Putin's upbringing and circumstances have undoubtedly made him an active-positive leader. In the eyes of the western media, Putin is often described as a Machiavellian obsessed with power. From a glance, he would classify as an "active-negative" type leader. However, despite descriptions of him as a "stubborn" man, nothing could be further from the truth. Putin's description as an effective presidential aide during Yeltsin's rule and aspirations to create a strong Russian State was vital to Putin's ideological principles, however, he was willing to adhere to the democratic process, even favoring it (Herspring, 152-154: 2009). Putin to this day has restored Russia's place to position of world power, challenging the once dominant west, including the United States.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan came into power in the midst of an economic and political crisis in the late 1990s and early 2000s. When he came in, he appeared charismatic. He was viewed by people as a "man of the people", willing to adapt himself and his programs to Turkish political norms of the time. Overtime, after successive changes, especially following the Turkish Constitutional Referendum of 2010, he began to exhibit qualities of an "active-negative" leader, who is willing to pull any strings to maintain or increase his power. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, both Turkey and Russia experienced difficulties that allowed ambitious and strong leaders to take power. Turkey experienced a rough economy in the 1990s, where there were times when the inflation rate surpassed 100% (Chen, Chew et al, 2-3: 2014). National crisis is an important dynamic to the rise of powerful leaders such as Putin and Erdogan.

Similarly, to Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan's leadership was influenced by his environment and upbringing. Erdogan was one of five children born in a lower-class family. Throughout Erdogan's childhood, he lived and worked as a street vendor in rough neighborhoods of Kasimpasa district that denotes machismo (The man from Kasimpasa) or Kasimpasali has rooted meaning of "manly" in Turkish, Istanbul culture. Not much descriptions are available about Erdogan's youth, other than the fact that he frequented rough neighborhoods as part of his youth job, indicating that he did not grow up in a rich or privileged environment. While he was attending university, he met Necmitten Erbakan, who became Turkey's first 'Islamist' prime

minister in 1996. Idolized Erbakan as a leading figure in Turkish Islamic political landscape, he named his first son after him. While Erdogan was a student in college, he became active in political Islamic movements, acted very assertive, reactive. (BBC: 2015). His early political Islamic activism would no doubt shape his leadership style into an active one. His background in a poor district of Istanbul and his arrest following his famous Islamic poem he recited in 1998 (BBC: 2015). Recep Tayyip Erdogan, like Putin, remember during his time as Mayor of Istanbul as a “doer”, a man who can effect change, this was particularly true during his term as mayor of Istanbul. His critics, cited by the BBC News service, admitted that Erdogan made the city “cleaner and greener.” During his groundbreaking term as mayor, he earned a reputation of being free of corruption. This no doubt added on to Erdogan’s image as a devout Muslim, adding to his appeal with the religious segments of Turkish society. As Putin made Judo his passion, Erdogan played professional soccer during his youth. (BBC: 2002). There seems to be an impact sports, and its emphasis on discipline and competitiveness has on potential leaders.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN AND VLADIMIR PUTIN

Similarities

- I. **Putin and** Erdogan are talent leaders who have acquired a taste for longstanding power and have chosen to lead their nations on a long-term basis (Simonyi, 2014).
- II. They employ formal democracy, process and politics, and ideology as enabling tools to remain in power (Ibid)

Differences

Vladimir Putin	Recep Tayyip Erdogan
Putin was a KGB officer during the Soviet era	Erdogan was a prominent member and promoter of an ideological detachment
Strived to end the Syrian crisis by offering military support against the nation’s rebels	Provided both financial and military support to the Syrian rebels as he sought Assad’s downfall
Putin’s interest in Libya is to strengthen Moscow’s influence in the control of global energy policies and gain a strategic position geopolitically, logistically, and gain a significant impact in Europe	Erdogan’s interest in Libya is to promote Muslim Brotherhood, which may turn the country into a terrorist hotbed
Putin is regarded a Soviet or Tsarist nostalgic	Erdogan is referred to as a modern-day Sultan
Putin promotes Orthodox Christian conservatism, which is embraced by several right-wing and conservative leaders in North America and Western Europe	Erdogan is an Islamist nationalist, which is popular with many conservative Muslims outside of Turkey
Putin’s approach is to maintain and remain in power for years	Erdogan’s use of democratic institutions does not guarantee stability beyond short term
Putin’s leadership is overtly authoritative	Erdogan’s ruler-ship utilizes functions typical of democracies to retain power such as constitutional referenda and snap elections
He represents a different image of status quo	He symbolizes the status quo’s defeat

According to both leaders’ similarities and differences and their political outcomes. Both Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan are “active” leaders. The leadership and aspirations of Putin has remained the same, utilizing Judo

- III. Both have an incredible sense of learning the fears of their people add address their past grandeur and glories, and construct their philosophy on the nation’s exceptionalism (Ibid).
- IV. They build on xenophobia and nationalism and never realized that assimilating the diverse nationalities has been the foundation of strength across centuries (Ibid).
- V. They intend to become the principal force and probably their regions’ example as they perceive themselves as inspiring or motivating to other leaders (Ibid).
- VI. They build on the feelings of relinquishment, abandonment, or isolation by the West within the broader populace, which makes them somewhat independent (Ibid).
- VII. They exhibit a personal hostility towards the West, which is stirred by the fear or indifference to democracy, which is characterized by many checks and balances and an electoral system that can promote political changes (Ibid).
- VIII. Consolidating their power, both shifted to a more paternal role, fostered a conventional gender order, attacked their opponents’ masculinity, and cast them as outsiders (Eksi &Wood, 2019).
- IX. Both are successors and beneficiaries of great empires, which previously saw themselves as superior to the Western world until they were defeated

rules of “minimum effort, maximum efficiency” to attain his desired results. Erdogan has undergone many changes in his leadership style; going from a charismatic man-of-the-people, to the arch-typical Machiavellian desperately

trying to hold onto power with all his effort. Neither of them is interested in pleasing people nor strictly abiding by the set conventions. The recent clashes between Russia and Syria best illustrate the personality of both leaders, as well as the historical temperaments both nations and cultures have towards each other. In an article in Foreign Policy Magazine, Russia is portrayed as the leader of a grand alliance against Terrorism, image that fits Putin's grand ambitions of restoring a powerful Russia. In promoting its anti-terrorism campaign in Syria, Russia seeks remove some tensions between itself in and west, despite some problems (Ioffe, Foreign Policy: 2015). Russia is hard-pressed in winning friends from the West and the Russian leadership, in trying to play the role of "active-positive" leadership, falls short into frustration with the West, exhibiting sentiments more common to a frustration "active-negative" leader.

Despite differences between Putin and Erdogan, there are many similarities. As stated, they are not "passive" rulers. They are active. Neither Erdogan nor Putin are people pleasers. They are also not taken to obeying set conventions and rules. Their trademark political actions and programs testaments to their active leadership. Not much on people pleasing, they do not mind breaking a few bones in order to achieve their goals. Both Erdogan and Putin have histories of bending the rules and acting as mavericks. While both leaders are clearly at odds with each other, Julia Ioffe views both Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan as figures to restore once great empires. In drawing historical parallels; the historical on-off relationship between Russia and Turkey, Russia's view of Turkey being instrumental in keeping Europeans in check, while Russia takes advantage of Turkey's historical and notorious bumbling leadership. (Ioffe, Foreign Policy: 2015). While there is a lot of emotionalism in Julia Ioffe's article and she shows obvious biases against Turkish and Russian leadership, it is important to understand keep into account the recent histories of Russia and Turkey. The turbulent 90s in both Russia and Turkey had made it necessary for powerful and larger-than-life personalities like Putin and Erdogan to climb to power and replace their effete predecessors. Following periods of turbulence and national humiliation, strong leaders are keen to go out of their way and bend or violate established rules, or even walk over the backs of people. It is because they were elected on their promises to restore greatness to their nation and race. Their authoritarianism is fueled by the mass-psychology of people within their societies. This creates a situation wherein to fulfill democratic promises, the leadership needs become more authoritarian, even though authoritarian governance obviously cancels out democracy. The authoritarianism and paternalism.

An important detail understands how active leadership affects areas such as foreign affairs. Active leaders are by definition more ambitious. Ambitious leadership they prefer to exert their power beyond the domestic national realm. An active leader desires to be influential on the international scene. It is similar to how Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman,

John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon and George W. Bush (who are all rated as "active" presidents) were interested in expanding the influence of the United States in its global role. Recep Tayyip Erdogan wants the same for Turkey and Vladimir wants the same for Russia. For active leadership to come into fruition there is a need for a national crisis. A perfect example of such is the Great Depression in the United States, which allowed a robust personality like Franklin Roosevelt to come to power. Sometimes crisis encourages leaderships to behave in certain ways. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the September 11th Incidents were instrumental in influencing John F. Kennedy George W. Bush to pursue active foreign policy. S400 issue and the same way the Syrian Conflict have encouraged Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan to become more active in the affairs of the Middle East, active leadership is a key ingredient for a nation-state to take on an active role in geopolitics.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Barber suggests that a president is most aptly imagined of as one that have challenges like the rest of the citizens who strive to cope with a tough environment. Thus, in the process of managing the issues, a president, like other humans, brings his distinct worldview, political style, and character. He perceives these three aspects, typology as patterned or as creating a blending that drives psychological sense to the leader. They perfectly fit collectively in a dynamic package, which epitomizes his personality. According to Barber, style has been the most distinct of the three characteristics because it is the leader's typical approach of executing his political roles including homework, personal relations, and rhetoric. According to him, worldview is a president's predominant, politically appropriate beliefs, especially his notions of human nature, social causality, and the fundamental moral struggles of the time.

Barber posits character as the most significant of these three elements because it is an individual's lasting perspective towards life, the personal attitude towards life experiences. However, 'experience' is beyond observing and countering externalities. Hence, the president himself is part and parcel of the experience because his standpoint is at the central to his character as he faces himself. The main concerns in this confrontation are the kind of judgments he makes through these criteria and how he appraises himself. As Barber asserts, at the core of his heart, does the president find himself, debased, ordinary, or superb? Since self-esteem is a critical personal resource that defines people's strength, this question is vital. For instance, in case self-esteem is inadequate or tenuous, the leader advances or defends it at varying degrees. How he advances or defends it, or rather the adaptation strategy that he uses, depends on the standards by which he judges and perceives himself. James David Barber, suggested the best leaders are those who are "Active Positive." The Active-Positive leader is adaptive, yet assertive. They set the pace and set the trend, within reasonable means with attention due to circumstances and the outer environment. They are not tempted by selfish motives (as Active-

negative leaders were). Conversely, the worst type of leader is the active-negative ruler, who tend to have a personal history of traumatic experiences that causes them to exhibit “negative” behaviors. They are Machiavellian, and unlike their passive-negative counterparts, they are very eager to break from conventions and rulers to secure benefit. (Hudson, 35: 2006). This paper examines in which category both leaders fall under. They must have started active positive leadership style but end up with passive-negative category. The paper concludes that both Erdogan and Putin started with AP to PN and their traits are similar. Future discussion and research must base on the empirical studies of both leaders end up as PN and their policy making process as methodology.

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